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I.   ADDRESSING OVERDOSE AND ASSOCIATED DRUG HARMS:  
MORE TOOLS NEEDED 
 
The United States is experiencing a historic crisis of opioid-re-
lated harms.1 The rate of fatal overdoses has tripled since 1999, driven 
primarily by opioids.2 Spurred by large numbers of new initiates, the in-
cidence of injection-related infections like HIV is now rapidly rising.3 
Despite concerted policymaker attention and the investment of more than 
ten billion dollars from all levels of government and civil society,4 the 
rate of opioid-related harms remains at astronomically high levels.5 With 
 
1 See David C. Perlman & Ashley E. Jordan, The Syndemic of Opioid Misuse, Overdose, HCV, 
and HIV: Structural-Level Causes and Interventions, 15 CURRENT HIV/AIDS REP. 96, 96 
(2018) (describing the opioid crisis as a syndemic of interrelated epidemics of opioid use, 
overdose, and opioid-related disease transmission occurring within communities already 
struggling with structural conditions of inequality). 
2 See HOLLY HEDEGAARD, MARGARET WARNER & ARIALDI M. MINIÑO, DRUG OVERDOSE 
DEATHS IN THE UNITED STATES, 1999–2016, at 1 (2017) (noting increases in drug overdose 
deaths involving natural and semisynthetic opioids in recent years). 
3 In 2015, new HIV diagnoses attributed to injection drug use increased for the first time in 
two decades. HIV Diagnoses, CDC NCHHSTP ATLASPLUS, https://gis.cdc.gov 
/grasp/nchhstpatlas/charts.html [https://perma.cc/K7PB-U6FC] (change the Year field to 
“2015” and the Transmission Category field to “Injection drug use”). Rates returned to lower 
levels in 2016 and 2017, but dramatic increases are emerging in specific settings. See, e.g., 
Health Advisory, Phila. Dep’t. of Pub. Health, HIV Outbreak Among People Who Inject 
Drugs (PWID) (Oct. 16, 2019) (reporting a 115% increase in new HIV diagnoses among 
people who inject drugs from 2016 to 2018); see also Philip J. Peters et al., HIV Infection 
Linked to Injection Use of Oxymorphone in Indiana, 2014–2015, 375 NEW ENG. J. MED. 229, 
230-38 (describing an HIV epidemic in Indiana caused by high-risk use of injectable oxy-
morphone). The number of new HCV infections reported to the Centers for Disease Control 
and Prevention (CDC) has tripled in the last five years. See U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & 
HUM. SERVS., NATIONAL VIRAL HEPATITIS ACTION PLAN 2017–2020 (2017) (noting that 
hepatitis C infections increased nearly 300% from 2010 to 2015). 
4 See BIPARTISAN POL’Y CTR., TRACKING FEDERAL FUNDING TO COMBAT THE OPIOID CRISIS 
5 (2019), https://bipartisanpolicy.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/Tracking-Federal-Fu-
nding-to-Combat-the-Opioid-Crisis.pdf [https://perma.cc/E3LB-L8LU] (estimating that nearly 
$11 billion in federal funding has been directed to the opioid crisis in 2017 and 2018). 
5 The rate of overdose deaths related to heroin or other commonly prescribed opioids reached 
and then stabilized at 5.2 deaths per 100,000 individuals between 2015 and 2017. Overdose 
Death Rates, NAT’L INST. ON DRUG ABUSE, https://www.drugabuse.gov/related-top-
ics/trends-statistics/overdose-death-rates [https://perma.cc/FM5P-REYL] (last updated Jan. 
2019). The rate for fentanyl-related overdoses continues to rise with the most recent data 
suggesting 9.0 deaths per 100,000 individuals. Id. 
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nearly 200 people in the United States dying of overdose every day, hun-
dreds of preventable HIV infections, and countless other avoidable 
harms,6 progress is far too slow.    
There have been both successes and failures in prevention 
measures deployed to date. Broadening access to naloxone, lowering bar-
riers to Opioid Agonist Therapy (OAT), and adopting 911 Good Samar-
itan Laws have contributed to declines in overdoses and other opioid-
related harms.7 Broader structural interventions to improve overall ac-
cess to health care, including Medicaid expansion, have also helped.8 Ev-
idence of the benefits of supply-reduction efforts, including prescription 
 
6 Every day, over 130 people die in the United States due to opioid overdose. Opioid Over-
dose Crisis, NAT’L INST. ON DRUG ABUSE, drugabuse.gov/drugs-abuse/opioids/opioid-over-
dose-crisis [https://perma.cc/T9VF-3B6Z] (last updated Jan. 2019). With increased injection 
drug use comes increased spread of infections like HIV and hepatitis C. Id. 
7 See Rahi Abouk, Rosalie Liccardo Pacula & David Powell, Association Between State Laws 
Facilitating Pharmacy Distribution of Naloxone and Risk of Fatal Overdose, 179  [J]AMA 
INTERNAL MED. 805, 809 (2019) (finding that states adopting naloxone access laws granting 
direct authority to pharmacists experienced statistically significant declines in fatal opioid-
related overdoses); Lisa Chimbar & Yvette Moleta, Naloxone Effectiveness A Systematic 
Review, 29 J. ADDICTIONS NURSING 167, 167 (2018) (“[T]here is overwhelming support of 
[sic] take-home naloxone programs being effective in preventing fatal opioid overdoses.”); 
Christopher Keane, James E. Egan & Mary Hawk, Effects of Naloxone Distribution to Likely 
Bystanders: Results of an Agent-Based Model, 55 INT’L J. DRUG POL’Y 61, 61 (2018) (“Com-
munity-based naloxone distribution to reverse opioid overdose may significantly reduce 
deaths.”); Chandler McClellan et al., Opioid-Overdose Laws Association with Opioid Use 
and Overdose Mortality, 86 J. ADDICTIVE BEHAVS. 90, 90 (2018) (“[L]aws designed to in-
crease layperson engagement in opioid-overdose reversal were associated with reduced opi-
oid-overdose mortality.”); Holly Nguyen & Brandy R. Parker, Assessing the Effectiveness of 
New York’s 911 Good Samaritan Law—Evidence from a Natural Experiment, 58 INT’L J. 
DRUG POL’Y 149, 149 (2018) (“Accidental heroin overdose emergency department visits and 
inpatient hospital admissions increased in New York State after the enactment of the 911 
GSL, consistent with the intended effect of the GSL.”); Daniel I. Rees et al., With a Little 
Help from My Friends: The Effects of Good Samaritan and Naloxone Access Laws on Opi-
oid-Related Deaths, 62 J. L. & ECON. 1, 1 (2019) (“[T]he estimated effects of GSLs on opi-
oid-related mortality are consistently negative but not statistically significant[, and] adoption 
of an NAL is associated with a statistically significant 9–10 percent reduction in opioid-
related mortality.”); Robert P. Schwartz et al., Opioid Agonist Treatments and Heroin Over-
dose Deaths in Baltimore, Maryland, 1995–2009, 103 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 917, 917 (2013) 
(“[S]tarting in 2000 expansion of opioid agonist treatment was associated with a decline in 
overdose deaths. Adjusting for heroin purity and the number of methadone patients, there 
was a statistically significant inverse relationship between heroin overdose deaths and pa-
tients treated with buprenorphine.”). 
8 See Alana Sharp et al., Impact of Medicaid Expansion on Access to Opioid Analgesic Med-
ications and Medication-Assisted Treatment, 108 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 642, 642–46 (2018) 
(finding that “per-enrollee rates of buprenorphine and naltrexone prescribing increased more 
than 200% after states expanded eligibility, while increasing by less than 50% in states that 
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limits, Prescription Drug Monitoring Program (PDMP) authorizations 
and mandates, and drug interdiction enforcement is far less clear.9 
Legal barriers—or politico-legal barriers10—have stymied adop-
tion of additional measures that have successfully reduced opioid-related 
harms, like fatal overdose, in other countries. These include Safe Con-
sumption Facilities (SCF), Injectable Opioid Agonist Therapy (iOAT), 
rapid access to agonist therapy in pharmacies, correctional programs, and 
prescription status of essential medicines.11 Efforts to make these measures 
 
did not expand . . . [and] per-enrollee rates of Medicaid-reimbursed MAT increased significantly 
more in expansion states.”); see also Hefei Wen et al., Impact of Medicaid Expansion on 
Medicaid-covered Utilization of Buprenorphine for Opioid Use Disorder Treatment, 
55 J. MED. CARE 336, 336 (2017) (“State implementation of Medicaid expansions in 
2014 was associated with a 70% increase in Medicaid-covered buprenorphine pre-
scriptions and a 50% increase . . . in buprenorphine spending.”). 
9 See, e.g., Leo Beletsky, Deploying Prescription Drug Monitoring to Address the Overdose 
Crisis: Ideology Meets Reality, 15 IND. HEALTH L. REV. 139, 140-78 (2018) (providing a 
narrative review of the evidence on prescription drug monitoring programs (PDMPs)); S.C. 
Brighthaupt et al., Effect of Pill Mill Laws on Opioid Overdose Deaths in Ohio & Tennessee: 
A Mixed-Methods Case Study, 126 PREVENTIVE MED. 1, 3 (2019) (suggesting that pill mill 
laws had no effect on overdose rates in Ohio or Tennessee); see also Nabarun Dasgupta, Leo 
Beletsky & Daniel Ciccarone, Opioid Crisis: No Easy Fix to Its Social and Economic Deter-
minants, 108 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1, 3 (2019) (suggesting that pill mill laws had no effect on 
overdose rates in Ohio or Tennessee); see also Nabarun Dasgupta, Leo Beletsky & Daniel 
Ciccarone, Opioid Crisis: No Easy Fix to Its Social and Economic Determinants, 108 AM. J. 
PUB. HEALTH 182, 182–83 (2018) (noting that supply-side interventions have had small, if 
any, effects on population-level opioid-related harms). 
10 See, e.g., Scott Burris et al., Federalism, Policy Learning, and Local Innovation in Public 
Health: The Case of the Supervised Injection Facility, 53 ST. LOUIS L. REV. 1089, 1121–24 
(2009) (noting that the decision to rely on drug control statutes in frustrating evidence-based 
public health interventions like Supervised Consumption Facilities is inflected by politics 
and not driven by the underlying intent of legislators who crafted the statutes). 
11 See, e.g., Kevin Fiscella, Sarah E. Wakeman & Leo Beletsky, Buprenorphine Deregulation 
and Mainstreaming Treatment for Opioid Use Disorder, X the X-Waiver, 76 [J]AMA 
PSYCHIATRY 229, 229-30 (2019) (describing the decline in death from opioid overdoses fol-
lowing deregulation of the prescription of buprenorphine in France and advocating for de-
regulation in the United States); Kevin Fiscella, Sarah E. Wakeman & Leo Beletsky, Imple-
menting Opioid Agonist Treatment in Correctional Facilities, 178 [J]AMA INTERNAL MED. 
1153, 1153-54 (2018) (describing positive outcomes following introduction of opioid treat-
ments in correctional facilities). 
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available in the United States are gathering momentum,12 but progress has been 
dismally slow.13       
Compared with the current roster of interventions in the United States, 
these neglected tools reflect a more complete appreciation for the root causes of 
the crisis. At its core, the overdose crisis is symptomatic of a crisis of 
undertreated pain—physical, emotional, and economic. The structural drivers 
of this crisis include factors outside of the healthcare system like financial stress, 
isolation, and occupational injury,14 as well as factors within the healthcare 
system like fragmented insurance coverage and healthcare financing that 
privileges surgical countermeasures and skimps on preventative and “incremen-
tal” care.15 The very same structural factors have also complicated the response 
to overdose and other opioid-related harms.16  
 
12 For example, United States v. Safehouse held that, because Congress was not aware of 
the existence of SCFs when it drafted the relevant section of the CSA, “no credible argument can 
be made that facilities such as safe injection sites were within the contemplation of Congress.” 
No. 19-0519, 2019 WL 4858266, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 2, 2019). The Safehouse judge 
also acknowledged that, “[v]iewed objectively, what Safehouse proposes is far closer to 
the harm reduction strategies expressly endorsed by Congress than the dangerous conduct § 
856(a) seeks to prohibit.” Id. at *76. There have been some ambitious bills introduced 
like the Mainstreaming Addiction Treatment Act, which would remove restrictions on 
healthcare providers to prescribe buprenorphine. Mainstreaming Addition Treatment 
Act, H.R. 2482, 116th Cong. (2019). Although positive, these developments are unlikely 
to produce immediate relief for those most in need because of the slow pace of litigation 
and legislation. In addition, two Democratic presidential candidates explicitly support 
implementation of Supervised Consumption Sites. See Bernie Sanders, Justice and Safety for All, 
BERNIE, https://berniesanders.com/justice-and-safety-for-all/ [https://perma.cc/KYM5-
DD52] (last visited Oct. 15, 2019); Elizabeth Warren, Rethinking Public Safety to Re-
duce Mass Incarceration and Strengthen Communities, MEDIUM (Aug. 20, 2019), 
https://medium.com/@teamwarren/rethinking-public-safety-to-reduce-mass-incarcera-
tion-and-strengthen-communities-90e8591c6255 [https://perma.cc/G44P-KDBM]. 
13 See, e.g., Leo Beletsky et al., The Law (and Politics) of Safe Injection Facilities in the 
United States, 98 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 231, 232-37 (2008) (making the legal case for 
safe consumption facilities over a decade ago). 
14 See, e.g., Anne Case & Angus Deaton, Mortality and Morbidity in the 21st Century, 
BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. ACTIVITY, SPRING 2017, at 397, 438 (noting that the rise 
of “deaths of despair” is a social phenomenon associated with decreased levels of individual and 
collective participation in thick social networks including activities like church and unions). 
15 See, e.g., T.R. REID, THE HEALING OF AMERICA: A GLOBAL QUEST FOR BETTER, CHEAPER, 
AND FAIRER HEALTH CARE 6-8 (Penguin Books Ltd. ed., Reprint ed. 2009) (describing the 
author’s experience seeking care for a shoulder injury in multiple countries with American 
physicians suggesting a much more invasive and heroic surgical approach and with physicians 
from other countries suggesting less invasive action); Atul Gawande, The Heroism of 
Incremental Care, NEW YORKER, Jan. 15, 2017, at 36, 45 (noting devotion to intensive, 
heroic procedures, while diminishing incremental care that often provides more benefits, and 
suggesting a shift in focus from rescue medicine to more gradual and deliberate care). 
16 See infra Part III. 
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This Article focuses on the nexus between pain treatment, addiction, 
and overdose. It argues that much more proactive measures to better control 
pain among people at high overdose risk are an important but overlooked 
strategy for reducing opioid-related morbidity and mortality. The social and 
political terrain for this argument is tricky. Pain management is commonly 
identified as a key cause of the current crisis, and opioids have been deployed 
without evidence establishing their safety and efficacy in many instances.17 
Pain is also a complex, ambiguous, and poorly-understood phenomenon,18 
making it hard to quantify and easy to dismiss. But the crisis of pain that 
spurred the proliferation of opioid analgesics is undeniable.19 As it progressed, 
many of those who were managing pain through opioid pharmacotherapy moved 
on to street drugs because of supply-side policy measures, reformulations, cost, 
availability, and other factors.20 Their pain—physical or otherwise—has 
 
17 An increasing reliance on opioids to treat pain has been associated with a rising opioid 
crisis in the United States. See, e.g., NAT’L ACADS. OF SCIS., ENG’G & MED., PAIN 
MANAGEMENT AND THE OPIOID EPIDEMIC BALANCING SOCIETAL AND INDIVIDUAL 
BENEFITS AND RISKS OF PRESCRIPTION OPIOID USE 1-2 (Nat’l Acads. Press ed. 2017) 
(ebook) (asserting that the “increase in opioid-related deaths has occurred in tandem 
with an equally unprecedented increase in prescribing of opioid medications for purposes 
of pain management”). A three-paper series in Lancet documents the role of inappropriate 
opioid prescribing after surgery as a major cause of the opioid epidemic. See Lesley A. Colvin 
et al., Perioperative Opioid Analgesia—When Is Enough Too Much? A Review of Opioid-induced 
Tolerance and Hyperalgesia, 393 LANCET 1558, 1568 (2019) (discussing “tolerance and opioid-
induced hyperalgesia”); Paul Glare et al., Transition from Acute to Chronic Pain After Sur-
gery, 393 LANCET 1537, 1537 (2019) (documenting the “epidemiology and societal effect, 
basic science, and current recommendations for managing persistent postsurgical pain”); 
Mark D. Neuman et al., Inappropriate Opioid Prescription After Surgery, 393 LANCET 
1547, 1547 (2019) (tracing “the evolution of prescription opioid use for pain treatment 
after surgery in the USA, Canada, and other countries” and its impact on opioid over-
prescribing and misuse). 
18 See, e.g., Karina M. Berg et al., Providers’ Experiences Treating Chronic Pain Among 
Opioid-Dependent Drug Users, 24 J. GEN. INTERNAL MED. 482, 483 (2009) (noting in a 
study of the experiences of physicians that “[a] central focus for many providers was the 
inherent ambiguity of pain treatment. Providers felt more comfortable treating chronic pain 
that was supported by concrete evidence”). 
19 See, e.g., David G. Blanchflower & Andrew Oswald, Unhappiness and Pain in Modern 
America: A Review Essay, and Further Evidence, on Carol Graham's Happiness for All? 1 
(Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 24087, 2017) (confirming that 
“Americans appear to be in greater pain than citizens of other countries, and most sub-groups 
of citizens have downwardly trended happiness levels.”); CAROL GRAHAM, HAPPINESS FOR 
ALL? UNEQUAL HOPES AND LIVES IN PURSUIT OF THE AMERICAN DREAM 80 (Princeton Univ. 
Press ed. 2017) (noting an epidemic of pain among all but the most affluent Americans). 
20 As a 2013 study suggests, 
The widespread availability of opioid analgesics outside sanctioned channels and, 
paradoxically, medical and regulatory attempts to curb this through monitoring and 
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remained and, in many cases, worsened.21 It is now well-recognized that, 
collateral to the overdose crisis response, the pendulum has swung too far 
away from access to pain pharmacotherapy.22 
The overlap of pain and high-risk opioid use is especially pronounced 
among people who inject drugs without stable housing.23 People who use 
drugs have never received adequate health care, including pain care—a 
situation aggravated by the current efforts to constrain access to opioid pain 
pharmacotherapy. Individuals in this highly-marginalized group are forced to 
inject in settings that put them at high risk for otherwise avoidable infections, 
which can produce a cascade of excruciating conditions.24 Self-medication 
 
limiting prescribing, appear to be drawing a new generation into higher risk heroin 
injecting . . . [users are] ultimately persuaded by market forces when their pill of 
choice becomes unavailable or unaffordable. 
Sarah G. Mars et al., “Every ‘Never’ I Ever Said Came True”: Transitions from Opioid Pills 
to Heroin Injecting, 25 INT’L J. DRUG POL’Y 257, 264 (2013). 
21 See Jianren Mao, Opioid-Induced Abnormal Pain Sensitivity, 10 CURRENT PAIN & 
HEADACHE REP. 67, 68 (2006) (finding that, as opioid therapy progresses for an individual, 
the continued use of opioids as treatment activates a pronociceptive mechanism that increases 
pain sensitivity). 
22 See George Comerci Jr. et al., Controlling the Swing of the Opioid Pendulum, 378 NEW 
ENG. J. MED. 691, 691-93 (2018) (describing how hard line blanket refusals to prescribe 
opioids can increase patient suffering); Meredith Lawrence, How the CDC Guidelines Killed 
My Husband, 8 NARRATIVE INQUIRY IN BIOETHICS 219, 219 (2018) (describing the author’s 
husband’s decision to commit suicide after his pain care was drastically reduced after the 
guidelines were announced); Joseph V. Pergolizzi Jr. et al., Three Years Down the Road: The 
Aftermath of the CDC Guideline for Prescribing Opioids for Chronic Pain, 36 ADVANCES 
IN THERAPY 1235, 1235-38 (2019) (suggesting that efforts to reduce overdose have stimulated 
a silent epidemic of unmanaged chronic pain); Stefan G. Kertesz & Kate M. Nicholson, No 
More ‘Shortcuts’ in Prescribing Opioids for Chronic Pain. Millions of Americans Need 
Nuanced Care, STAT NEWS, (Apr. 26, 2019), https://www.statnews.com/2019/04/26/no-
shortcuts-prescribing-opioids-chronic-pain/ [https://perma.cc/YX62-M58L] (“The health 
care system’s failure to allow for nuance has put at risk the more than 10 million Americans 
who take opioids to manage pain.”). 
23 Cf. Pauline Voon et al., Self-Management of Pain Among People Who Inject Drugs in 
Vancouver, PAIN MGMT. 27, 31 (Mar. 2014) (finding that “a large majority (97.5%) of the 
recruited active [study participants who inject drugs] who reported moderate-to-extreme 
pain had self-managed their pain within their lifetime” and that homelessness was positively 
associated with self-managed pain). 
24 See, e.g., Carl Latkin et al., My Place, Your Place, and No Place: Behavior Settings as a 
Risk Factor for HIV-Related Injection Practices of Drug Users in Baltimore, Maryland, 22 
AM. J. CMTY. PSYCHOL. 415, 426-27 (1994) (finding that reports of injecting at shooting 
galleries and semi-public areas were significantly associated with risky injection practices 
partly explained by the lack of availability of sanitation resources); Will Small et al., Public 
Injection Settings in Vancouver: Physical Environment, Social Context and Risk, 18 INT’L J. 
DRUG POL’Y 27, 28 (2007) (noting that those who inject in public display increased risk for 
adverse health outcomes like abscesses, injection related vein damage, HCV infection, and 
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for these harms and barriers to care are also mediated by emotional pain and 
other vulnerabilities like mental illness or serious physical disability.25 Injection 
in public settings is associated with an especially high risk of violence and 
other injuries.26 Many of these individuals would benefit from medication 
therapy, but a number of barriers prevent them from doing so.27 For some, the 
primary barrier is a chaotic daily existence, which does not align with regimented 
and often overbearing requirements of treatment; inadequate insurance and 
other logistical barriers limit access, too.28 Pervasive stigma, criminalization, 
and racism undermine patient care and facilitate patient abandonment.29 
 
overdose); David Vlahov et al., Reductions in High-Risk Drug Use Behaviors Among 
Participants in the Baltimore Needle Exchange Program, 16 J. ACQUIRED IMMUNE 
DEFICIENCY SYNDROMES & HUMAN RETROVIROLOGY 400, 401 (1997) (noting the im-
portance of considering physical settings of where injections occur, as injections performed 
in public are less likely to be hygienic than those performed in residences). 
25 See infra Section II.B and note 57.61. 
26 See, e.g., Paula Braitstein et al., Sexual Violence among a Cohort of Injection Drug Users, 
57 SOC. SCI. & MED. 561, 566 (2003) (finding a high prevalence of lifetime sexual violence 
among the studied cohort of injection drug users); Mary Clare Kennedy et al., Residential Evic-
tion and Exposure to Violence among People Who Inject Drugs in Vancouver, Canada, 41 
INT’L J. DRUG POL’Y 59, 59 (2017) (noting that people who inject drugs experience signifi-
cantly elevated rates of both physical and sexual violence); Lindsey A. Richardson et al., Soci-
oeconomic Marginalisation in the Structural Production of Vulnerability to Violence Among 
People Who Use Illicit Drugs, 69 J. EPIDEMIOLOGY & COMMUNITY HEALTH 686, 687-91 
(2015) (noting that violence is common among people who use drugs, and that lack of secure 
income-generating opportunities produces much of the risk for experiencing violence). 
27 Some impediments are logistical, administrative, or legal. See, e.g., Gary Enos, Advocate: 
Philadelphia Smoking Ban Shuts Some Patients out of Treatment, 31 ALCOHOLISM & DRUG 
ABUSE WKLY., no. 23, 2019, at 1, 5  (noting one social worker’s position that the same city 
smoking ban induces patients to leave treatment or results in their administrative discharge); 
Brooke Feldman, Why Philly’s Smoking Ban at Addiction Treatment Centers Will Be 
Harmful, FILTER (Feb. 12, 2019), https://filtermag.org/philadelphia-smoking-ban-addic-
tion-treatment-harm-reduction/ (describing a city ban on smoking outside residential substance 
abuse treatment centers as a further barrier people who use drugs must consider when 
deciding to enter treatment); Paul M. Roman et al., Using Medication-Assisted Treatment 
for Substance Use Disorders: Evidence of Barriers and Facilitators of Implementation, 36 
ADDICTIVE BEHAVS. 584, 587 (2011) (describing multiple barriers to successful adoption 
of substance use disorder medications, such as rigid treatment ideology and lack of access 
to prescribing physicians). 
28 Unmanaged pain can be extremely destabilizing. See infra Part II.B. 
29 See, e.g., DL Biancarelli et al., Strategies Used by People Who Inject Drugs to Avoid 
Stigma in Healthcare Settings, 198 DRUG & ALCOHOL DEPENDENCE 80, 81-83 (2019) 
(presenting the stigmatizing experiences of people who inject drugs and how those experiences 
influence poor health care decisions to avoid anticipated stigma); C.E. Paquette, Stigma at 
Every Turn: Health Services Experiences Among People Who Inject Drugs, 57 INT’L J. DRUG 
POL’Y 104, 106-08 (2018) (describing the pervasiveness of stigma people who inject drugs 
 
Vol.5:1]            Intensive Care for Pain as an Overdose Prevention Tool 
 
 
71 
Increasing concerns about relinquishing control over opioid analgesic supplies, 
along with institutional and law enforcement pressure to improve medication 
stewardship have contributed to reluctance to provide adequate pain treatment. 
As a result, some people experience numerous touchpoints with healthcare 
and criminal justice systems, but opportunities for supportive services go 
unrealized.30 When care is provided, it happens far downstream in expensive and 
inherently untherapeutic acute care settings or jails, despite the broadly acknowl-
edged benefits of supporting such “frequent flyers” with resources upstream.31  
Experience in other countries suggests that one important tool for 
reducing drug-related harms among such marginalized individuals is access 
to a stable and safe supply of opioids.32 But in view of wide-spread concerns 
about over-utilization and diversion of opioid analgesics, we propose providing 
this health service within a well-recognized healthcare model: Directly-
Observed Therapy (DOT). A framework for Directly-Observed Therapy for 
 
face and how stigmatization surrounding participants’ access to resources like syringes and 
methadone treatment discourages them from seeking to purchase syringes and accessing 
treatment in the future). 
30 See Marc R. Larochelle et al., Touchpoints—Opportunities to Predict and Prevent Opioid 
Overdose: A Cohort Study, 204 DRUG & ALCOHOL DEPENDENCE 1, 4 (2019) (noting that, in 
a Massachusetts study, effective interventions at critical healthcare and criminal justice 
system touchpoints could have eliminated up to 50% of opioid overdose deaths, but that the 
systems lacked effective interventions to recognize areas for improvement). 
31 See, e.g., Burris et al., supra note 10, at 1096-98  (discussing the use of supervised injection 
facilities as a legally feasible and less socially costly alternative to current prevailing 
regimes for addressing illegal drug use in the United States, where studies suggest many 
people who use illegal drugs are subject to criminal prosecution and sent to jail rather than 
treatment, confounding therapeutic intent); Nabarun Dasgupta, Leo Beletsky & Daniel 
Ciccarone, Opioid Crisis: No Easy Fix to Its Social and Economic Determinants, 108 AM. 
J. PUB. HEALTH 182, 185 (2018) (concluding that “[w]e have lost the commonsense impera-
tive to engage those who use opioids in comprehensive care, especially during periods when 
access to opioids may be fluctuating”); Uchenna Emeche, Is a Strategy Focused on Super-
Utilizers Equal to the Task of Health Care System Transformation? Yes, 13 ANNALS FAM. 
MED. 6, 6 (2015) (finding that so-called “super-utilizers” of health care, not limited to people 
who inject drugs, represent 50% of health care expenditures, which can be reduced by 
intervening before emergency visits are required); Brendan Saloner et al., A Public Health 
Strategy for the Opioid Crisis, 133 PUB. HEALTH REP. 24S, 31S (2018) (finding that investing in 
programs which help people to safely use drugs, among other things, will better ensure patient 
survival and public safety than abstinence-only drug policies); Grant G. Simpson et al., A 
Patient-Centered Emergency Department Management Strategy for Sickle-Cell Disease Su-
per-Utilizers, 18 WESTERN J. EMERGENCY MED. 335, 335 (2017) (suggesting that coordinated 
care plans are feasible and potentially effective in reducing emergency department visits among 
super-utilizers with sickle-cell disease); Bara Vaida, For Super-Utilizers, Integrated Care 
Offers A New Path, 36 HEALTH AFF. 394 (2017) (describing several nascent models for 
reducing super-utilizers’ cost burden by connecting them with resources and intervening to 
ensure care before it is emergent). 
32 See infra Section II.D. 
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Pain (DOT-P) would resemble a specialty intensive pain care clinic, where 
healthcare professionals would provide pharmaceutical-grade opioids like 
hydromorphone in a monitored setting, along with key wraparound services. 
DOT-P would address concerns with polypharmacy33 and overdose,34 while 
also operationalizing a “closed system.” Operating similarly to iOAT clinics 
that exist in other international settings, a DOT-P model would be reserved 
for highly vulnerable people who inject drugs, have diagnosable acute or serious 
chronic pain, and have not benefited from other pharmacotherapy. This approach 
would provide essential care to a marginalized population while minimizing 
risk of diversion—a principal concern in the context of the current crisis.35 
 
33 See, e.g., Aubrey Whelan, Pennsylvania’s Overdose Crisis Is Shifting, New DEA Report 
Finds, PHILA. INQUIRER (Oct. 2, 2019), https://www.inquirer.com/health/dea-philadel-
phia-statewide-overdose-numbers-shifting-20191002.html [https://perma.cc/37FH-R5DT] 
(“Most—87%—overdose victims had two or more drugs in their system, 46% had four or 
more drugs, and 16% had six or more drugs.”). 
34 See infra notes 91–92. 
35 Although diversion does not fully explain the opioid crisis, see supra note 9 and accompanying 
text, it is an important and concerning phenomenon. Diversion takes many forms. Sometimes 
unused opioids, which are prescribed for one individual’s post-surgical analgesia, end up 
being used nonmedically by another individual. See, e.g., Sean Esteban McCabe, Christian 
J. Teter, & Carol J. Boyd, Illicit Use of Prescription Pain Medication Among College 
Students, 77 DRUG & ALCOHOL DEPENDENCE 37, 41 (2005) (describing diversion and illicit 
use of prescription pain medication among undergraduate students at a large Midwestern 
university). In many other instances, opioids were diverted into illicit channels by unscrupu-
lous pill mills or at other points in the supply chain. James A. Inciardi et al., The Diversion 
of Prescription Opioid Analgesics, 7 LAW ENFORCEMENT EXEC. FORUM 127, 133 (2007). 
There are longstanding concerns about the diversion of methadone. See, e.g., Alison Ritter 
& Richard Di Natale, The Relationship Between Take-Away Methadone Policies and Meth-
adone Diversion, 24 DRUG & ALCOHOL REV. 347, 348 (2005) (finding, on a high level, less 
diversion in Australian states with stricter methadone take-away policies). Today, there is 
even evidence of wide-scale diversion of buprenorphine, although the nature of that diversion is 
complex and may say more about inadequate access to medication treatment, rather than 
recreational use. See Jennifer J. Carroll, Josiah D. Rich & Traci C. Green, The More Things 
Change: Buprenorphine/Naloxone Diversion Continues While Treatment Remains Inaccessible, 
12 J. ADDICTION MED. 459, 459 (2018) (finding that rates of diverted buprenorphine use 
among Rhode Island-based survey respondents remained similar between 2009 and 2016); 
Theodore J. Cicero, Matthew S. Ellis & Howard D. Chilcoat, Understanding the Use of 
Diverted Buprenorphine, 193 DRUG & ALCOHOL DEPENDENCE 117, 117 (2018) (finding that 
58% of surveyed adults meeting DSM-IV criteria for substance use disorder and primary opioid 
use reported a history of using diverted buprenorphine, which partly reflects inadequate access 
to buprenorphine through health care channels); Chris-Ellyn Johanson et al., Diversion and 
Abuse of Buprenorphine: Findings from National Surveys of Treatment Patients and 
Physicians, 120 DRUG & ALCOHOL DEPENDENCE 190, 190 (2012) (finding increasing 
diversion to be a threat to the continued of approval of buprenorphine for treatment of OUD). 
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Though distinguishable from maintenance, iOAT, and SCFs,36 DOT-P shares 
some of their strengths including overdose prevention, providing linkages to ser-
vices, reducing drug use in public settings, and reducing community disorder.37  
Unfortunately, DOT-P is not currently implemented in the United 
States in a robust or systematic way. We argue that to reduce overdose risks 
and other health harms from drug injection, far more must to be done to address 
the patients’ underlying pain. This Article begins in Part II by explaining the 
co-occurrence of pain, opioid use disorder (OUD), and housing instability 
through a vignette and through a review of relevant epidemiological research. 
We then describe the benefits of DOT-P for this population in terms of 
underlying theory and related evaluation research. In Part III, we provide a 
reasonable legal roadmap for operationalizing such an approach. We conclude 
in Part IV with some normative observations and predictions.        
 
II.   THE IMPORTANCE OF PAIN-CENTERED CARE 
 
A.   John’s Life of Self-Medicated Pain 
 
   John is 42 years old and has lived in Kensington, a Philadelphia 
neighborhood, for his entire life. For the past eight years, he has injected 
heroin. Sometimes John lives with his sister and at other times he bounces 
between shelters and street homelessness. John’s day-to-day life is physically 
challenging. For years he has lived with depression, chronic obstructive 
pulmonary disorder (COPD), and persistent lower back and extremity pain.  
John is practiced at finding a vein and minimizing risk of infection 
while injecting. He always uses sterile syringes obtained from the local syringe 
exchange. But still he has had a number of infections in recent years, which 
he attributes to a handful of instances when impending withdrawal forced 
him to inject quickly in a poorly lit area with heroin not purchased from his 
usual dealer. When an abscess appeared on his leg recently, he delayed treatment 
because of past negative experiences in the local hospital. However, a vicious 
fever and disabling thigh pain forced him into the emergency department 
where he learned that the infection had infiltrated his blood and colonized in 
his femur. After a two-day inpatient stay in the local hospital, John left against 
medical advice because he felt that the people caring for him viewed him 
suspiciously and (perhaps relatedly) because his pain was undertreated.      
 
36 See infra note 234 and accompanying text describing the statutory and regulatory definitions 
of maintenance and detoxification. There is no single definition of “Supervised Consumption 
Facility,” but the model proposed so far in the United States would require people who use 
drugs to bring illicit substances into the facility for self-administration. See United States v. 
Safehouse, No. 19-0519, 2019 WL 4858266, at *2, *27 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 2, 2019). 
37  See infra notes 59–61. 
                                  Journal of Law & Public Affairs                [November 2019 
 
 
 
74 
The physical challenges in John’s life add to considerable social 
challenges. John has some wonderful personality traits. He considers himself 
an elder statesperson among some of the people who inject drugs in the 
neighborhood. He is quick to share a cigarette or knowledge about how to 
inject more safely. He is often witty and self-aware. But his life is frequently 
hectic and always stressful. Finding ways to pay for heroin consumes his 
thoughts and energy, and to stave off impending withdrawal he sometimes 
steals, which adds to the sense of shame he experiences when living on the 
street or getting care at the emergency department for injection-related harms. 
He has a deep love for his sister and once had diverse interests and hopes. 
And he often wishes and sometimes plans to find and stick with treatment. 
But the daily hustle has sapped his strength, and the idea of confronting the 
terrible things he has experienced without the euphoric escape of heroin is 
daunting. Pain is persistent and overwhelming for most of his waking day.           
John is not typical of all people who inject drugs.38 But John’s medical and 
social complexities are common among the small portion of people who inject 
drugs in public spaces. These people often have overlapping and synergizing 
vulnerabilities including unstable housing, mental illness, physical disability, and 
a history of trauma. They have the greatest unmet healthcare needs and would 
benefit the most from coordinated medical homes. But developing and sustaining 
trusting relationships with marginalized people is not a strength of institutional 
medicine. Stigma explains part of why people like John report negative healthcare 
experiences. So too does fear: John requires clinical management for considerable 
pain, but he looks like the type of patient for whom too much prescribing might 
elicit a call from the authorities. In the next section, we describe how often pain 
and OUD co-occur among people with unstable housing.  
 
B.   Co-Occurrence of OUD, Serious Pain, and Housing Instability 
 
Pain is the single greatest source of disability in developed countries.39 An 
estimated 50 million American adults (more than 20% of the United States 
 
38 John’s story is based on an agglomeration of real individuals’ experiences and meant to 
illuminate the conditions that this group endures. 
39 Musculoskeletal conditions are the leading contributor to disability worldwide, with low 
back pain being the single leading cause of disability globally. James Dahlhamer et al., 
Prevalence of Chronic Pain and High-Impact Chronic Pain Among Adults—United States, 
2016, 67 MORBIDITY& MORTALITY  WKLY REP. 1001-06 (2018); Jan Hartvigsen et al., What 
Low Back Pain Is and Why We Need to Pay Attention, 391 LANCET 2356-67 (2018); Andrew 
S. C. Rice et al., Pain and the Global Burden of Disease, 157 PAIN 791, 792 (2015) (describ-
ing how chronic low back pain, neck pain, migraine, and other musculoskeletal disorders 
consistently featured in the top ten reasons for years lived with disability worldwide, 
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population) suffer from chronic pain, meaning it affects more people in the 
United States than diabetes and cancer.40 Chronic and acute pain41 are especially 
common among people with OUD. Systematic reviews and meta-analyses suggest 
that somewhere between 48% and 64% of people who use opioids nonmedically 
have chronic pain,42 with individual studies reporting prevalence as high as 81%.43  
The relationship between OUD, pain, and housing instability is 
multidirectional. Over 60% of OUD patients experienced chronic pain before 
the onset of their OUD.44 In many instances, people were over- or unnecessarily-
 
and indicating that seven of the commonest chronic conditions globally were primary 
pain conditions); Musculoskeletal Conditions, WORLD HEALTH ORG. (Aug. 9, 2019), 
https://www.who.int/news-room/fact-sheets/detail/musculoskeletal-conditions [https://perma.cc 
/VN9Y-BGKX]. 
40 James Dahlhamer et al., Prevalence of Chronic Pain and High-Impact Chronic Pain 
Among Adults—United States, 2016, 67 MORBIDITY& MORTALITY WKLY REP. 1002, 1003 
(2018). According to the most recent surveillance estimates of the population living in the 
United States, there are just over 30 million people with diabetes and less than 16 million 
people living with cancer. DIV. OF DIABETES TRANSLATION, CTR. DISEASES CONTROL & 
PREVENTION, NATIONAL DIABETES STATISTICS REPORT, 2017, at 2 (2017), 
https://www.cdc.gov/diabetes/pdfs/data/statistics/national-diabetes-statistics-report.pdf 
[https://perma. cc/8CUJ-P593]; Cancer Stat Facts: Cancer of Any Site, NAT’L CANCER INST., 
https://seer. cancer.gov/statfacts/html/all.html [https://perma.cc/D84L-BVPP] (last visited 
Nov. 13, 2019). 
41 Acute pain is a useful and temporary activation of the sympathetic nervous system in 
response to a specific disease or injury. See Katherine P. Grichnik & Francis M. Ferrante, 
The Difference Between Acute and Chronic Pain, 58 MT. SINAI J. MED. 217-20 (1991). 
Chronic pain is a persistent condition serving no useful biological purpose. Id. Treatment of 
acute pain aims to address the underlying cause; treatment of chronic pain requires a multi-
disciplinary approach targeting physiological and psychological etiologies. Id. 
42 See Benedikt Fischer et al., The Prevalence of Mental Health and Pain Symptoms in General 
Population Samples Reporting Nonmedical Use of Prescription Opioids: A Systematic Review 
and Meta-Analysis, 13 J. PAIN 1029, 1029 (2012) (noting pain has been associated with non-
medical prescription opioid use (NMPOU) in general populations, and finding the pooled 
prevalence of pain in general populations reporting NMPOU to be 48%); Yih-Ing Hser 
et al., Chronic Pain Among Patients with Opioid Use Disorder: Results from Electronic 
Health Records Data, 77 J. SUBSTANCE ABUSE TREATMENT 26, 29 (2017) (finding in a 
review of 5307 electronic health records over the course of a decade that most OUD patients 
(64.4%) had chronic pain conditions). 
43 See Kevin Vowles et al., Rates Of Opioid Misuse, Abuse, and Addiction in Chronic Pain: 
A Systematic Review And Data Synthesis, 156 PAIN 569, 569, 573-74 (2015) (noting rates of 
opioid prescriptions have increased and are among the most frequently prescribed medica-
tions, and finding the range of rates of problematic use to be even broader than reported in 
previous work with rates ranging from 0.08% to 81%). 
44 See Yih-Ing Hser et al., supra note 42, at 29 (finding  in a study of 5307 adult patients with 
OUD in a large healthcare system that most patients with opioid use disorder developed it 
after developing chronic pain); Roger G. Weiss et al., Reasons for Opioid Use Among 
Patients with Dependence on Prescription Opioids: The Role of Chronic Pain, 47 J. 
SUBSTANCE ABUSE TREATMENT 140, 140 (2014) (reporting from a survey of 653 participants 
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prescribed opioids for pain management;45 in other instances, however, 
OUD resulted from undertreatment of pain by clinicians.46  
OUD may also produce pain through a process called hyperalgesia.47 
Chronic use of high doses of opioids increases sensitivity to painful stimuli.48 
Hyperalgesia can stimulate new pain or exacerbate preexisting pain.49 
Combined with tolerance, it can contribute to a dangerous cycle in which 
patients with OUD need increasingly higher doses of opioids to avoid 
withdrawal, which lowers tolerance to painful stimuli. Hyperalgesia can 
 
that participants with chronic pain were significantly more likely than those without chronic 
pain to cite pain  management the primary reason for initiation of opioid use). 
45 See Gillian Beauchamp et al., Moving Beyond Misuse and Diversion: The Urgent Need to 
Consider the Role of Iatrogenic Addiction in the Current Opioid Epidemic, 104 AM. J. PUB. 
HEALTH 2023, 2023 (2014) (“Some individuals transition to nonmedical use and addiction 
despite their intention to use medications only as directed and only for pain relief.”); Martin 
Makary, Heidi N Overton & Peiqi Wang, Overprescribing Is Major Contributor to Opioid 
Crisis, 359 BRIT. MED. J. 4792, 4792-93 (2017) (noting that a major contributor to the 
opioid epidemic is physician overprescribing, evidenced by 2016 Medicare data suggesting 
that about 80% of patients were prescribed more pain tablets than the best practice range 
after routine laparoscopic cholecystectomy); Barry Meisenberg et al., Assessment of Opioid 
Prescribing Practices Before and After Implementation of a Health System Intervention to 
Reduce Opioid Overprescribing, 1 [J]AMA NETWORK OPEN 1, 2 (2018) (noting that surging 
opioid overdose deaths were “preceded by a 300% expansion of retail opioid prescribing 
beginning in the early 1990s and peaking in 2012,” and that prescription opioids, “including 
diverted prescription opioids, were the initial source of opioids for most current heroin users”). 
46 Kelly K. Dineen, Defining Misprescribing to Inform Prescription Opioid Policy, 48 
HASTINGS CTR. REP. 5-6 (2018) (noting that underprescribing, characterized by withholding 
appropriate opioids, rapid tapering, as well as refusals to refer patients for medication-as-
sisted treatment, can lead to unnecessary suffering, suicide, and use of illicit drugs); Howard 
L. Fields, The Doctor’s Dilemma: Opiate Analgesics and Chronic Pain, 69 NEURON 591, 
591-94 (2011) (addressing how much harm is done to patients with chronic pain by withholding 
opiate analgesics due to inadequate pain relief); Andrew Rosenblum et al., Opioids and the 
Treatment of Chronic Pain: Controversies, Current Status, and Future Directions, 16 
EXPERIMENTAL & CLINICAL PSYCHOPHARMACOLOGY 405, 405-16 (2008) (“Undertreatment 
of pain among addicted persons may lead to the adverse medical, social and personal 
consequences associated with continued drug-seeking behavior.”). 
47 See Marion Lee et al., A Comprehensive Review of Opioid-Induced Hyperalgesia, 14 PAIN 
PHYSICIAN 145, 145 (2011) (defining opioid-induced hyperalgesia (OIH) as a state of 
nociceptive sensitization caused by exposure to opioids, and explaining that OIH is characterized 
by a paradoxical response whereby a patient receiving opioids for the treatment of pain could 
actually become more sensitive to certain painful stimuli). 
48 See Larry Chu, Martin Angst & David Clark, Opioid-Induced Hyperalgesia in Humans: 
Molecular Mechanisms and Clinical Considerations, 24 CLINICAL J. PAIN 479, 485-86 
(2008) (describing case reports and studies of OIH in patients receiving high dose opioids). 
49 See, e.g., Stephen P. Cohen et al., The Effect of Opioid Dose and Treatment Duration on 
the Perception of a Painful Standardized Clinical Stimulus, 33 REGIONAL ANESTHESIA & 
PAIN MED. 199, 199 (2008) (finding in a study of 355 patients that “[b]oth opioid dose and 
duration of treatment directly correlated with pain intensity and unpleasantness scores”). 
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result from chronic exposure to any opioid, including methadone,50 threatening 
adherence to treatment when pain is poorly managed.51  
Prevalence of pain is even higher for people with OUD who are not 
stably housed.52 Unmanaged pain and OUD are often contributing factors in 
transitions away from stable employment and housing, which, in turn, produce 
more pain and greater challenges to managing OUD.53 Without employment 
some people turn to theft or sex work, increasing risk of trauma and involvement 
with the criminal justice system.54 Without adequate shelter, people experience 
 
50 See, e.g., Mark Doverty et al., Methadone Maintenance Patients Are Cross-Tolerant to the 
Antinociceptive Effects of Morphine, 93 PAIN 155, 155 (2001) (“Our findings suggest that 
methadone patients are cross-tolerant to the antinociceptive effects of morphine, and 
conventional doses of morphine are likely to be ineffective in managing episodes of acute 
pain amongst this patient group.”). 
51 See Peggy Compton, V.C. Charuvastra & Walter Ling, Pain Intolerance in Opioid-Maintained 
Former Opiate Addicts: Effect of Long-Acting Maintenance Agent, 63 DRUG & ALCOHOL 
DEPENDENCE 139, 142 (2001) (describing a study of 36 methadone or buprenorphine-main-
tained patients where the authors found that control patients “remain[ed] in the ice bath more 
than twice as long as the former opioid abusers,” suggesting that methadone or buprenorphine 
mediated hyperalgesia as measured by a lower tolerance to pain caused by cold sensitivity); Mark 
Doverty et al., Hyperalgesic Responses in Methadone Maintenance Patients, 90 PAIN 91, 
93-94 (2001) (finding that the ratio of pain tolerance to pain detection was lower for patients 
receiving methadone medication in cold pressor and electrical stimulation tests, suggesting 
that such patients could endure a painful stimulus for shorter periods of time than control 
patients after initial detection of the stimulus). 
52 See Rebecca Fisher et al., The Nature And Prevalence of Chronic Pain in Homeless 
Persons: An Observational Study, 2 F1000 RES., July 30, 2013, at 1, 1, 6 (noting that the 
prevalence of chronic pain in homeless participants is substantially higher than the prevalence in 
several large population studies); Marc Vogel et al., Chronic Pain Among Homeless Persons 
with Mental Illness, 18 AM. ACAD. PAIN MED. 2280, 2282, 2285 (2017) (noting that 43.4% 
of homeless participants had clinically significant chronic pain and “more than a third reported 
using street drugs to control pain”). 
53 See, e.g., CTR. ON BUDGET & POLICY PRIORITIES, MEETING THE HOUSING NEEDS OF 
PEOPLE WITH SUBSTANCE USE DISORDERS (2019), https://www.cbpp.org/sites/default/files/ 
atoms/files/5-1-19hous.pdf [https://perma.cc/8D4H-4CC9]; SUSAN G. PFEFFERLE, 
SAMANTHA S. KARON & BRANDY WYANT, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., 
CHOICE MATTERS: HOUSING MODELS THAT MAY PROMOTE RECOVERY FOR INDIVIDUALS 
AND FAMILIES FACING OPIOID USE DISORDER 4-5 (2019), https://aspe.hhs.gov/pdf-re-
port/choice-matters-housing-models-may-promote-recovery-individuals-and-families-fac-
ing-opioid-use-disorder [https://perma.cc/NA3W-ABRG]. 
54 See generally Paula Braitstein et al., Sexual Violence Among a Cohort Of Injection Drug 
Users, 57 SOC. SCI. MED. 561 (2003); Clifford A. Butzin, Steven S. Martin & James A. Inciardi, 
Treatment During Transition from Prison to Community and Subsequent Illicit Drug Use, 
28 J.  SUBSTANCE ABUSE & TREATMENT 351 (2005); Mary Clare Kennedy et al., Residential 
Eviction and Exposure to Violence Among People Who Inject Drugs in Vancouver, Canada, 
41 INT. J. DRUG POL’Y  59, 62 (2017); Daniel J. O’Connell, Investigating Latent Trait and 
Life Course Theories as Predictors of Recidivism Among an Offender Sample, 31 J. CRIM. 
JUST. 455 (2003); Jerome J. Platt, Vocational Rehabilitation of Drug Abusers, 117 PSYCHOL. 
BULL. 416 (1995). 
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more violence and other injuries.55 The marginalization that comes with 
homelessness makes it more likely that untreated injuries and infections 
become chronic conditions, as indicated by high prevalence of serious tooth 
decay, cancer, cardiovascular disease, asthma, and other persistent sources of 
discomfort, disability, and death.56 Homelessness, pain, and OUD are also 
linked through shared associations with third factors, chief among them being 
childhood adversity.57 Traumatic early life experiences are associated with 
 
55 Health problems are exacerbated by the conditions of homelessness, such as lack of a 
comfortable sleeping place, exposure to weather, prevalence of violence, inadequate health 
and hygiene practices, overcrowding at shelters, unreliable food sources, and extensive 
walking. Kennedy et al., supra note 54, at 62. 
56 See Lillian Gelberg & Lawrence S. Linn, Assessing the Physical Health of Homeless 
Adults, 262 [J]AMA 1973, 1975-76, 1978 (1989) (finding that “[p]ersons sampled in 
emergency shelters. . . had the fewest symptoms of physical illness; persons in centers were 
intermediate in their physical health; and persons sampled from outdoor areas had the most 
physical health problems” such as acute skin injury, abnormal gait, elevated liver enzyme 
levels, mean corpuscular hemoglobin concentrations, and globulin levels, high lactate 
dehydrogenase levels, and low serum urea nitrogen levels); Margot B. Kushel, Eric Vittinghoff 
& Jennifer S. Haas, Factors Associated with the Health Care Utilization of Homeless Persons, 
285 [J]AMA 200, 200 (2001) (noting that “research has documented that homeless persons 
have high rates of physical illness, mental illness, substance abuse, and early mortality”); 
Christine L. Savage et al, Health Care Needs of Homeless Adults at a Nurse-Managed Clinic, 
23 J.  COMMUNITY HEALTH NURSING 225, 229-31 (2006) (noting homeless adults’ emergency 
department (ED) use during the six months prior to the survey was reported by 61% of 
participants; of these, 40% used the ED at least once per month with the most frequently 
reported medical diagnoses relating to behavioral health and the most frequently reported 
physical health diagnoses including hypertension, arthritis, asthma, and chronic back pain). 
57 Adverse childhood experiences (ACEs) have been implicated in almost every major harm. 
See, e.g., Robert Anda et al., Adverse Childhood Experiences and Chronic Obstructive 
Pulmonary Disease in Adults, 34 AM. J. PREV. MED. 396, 396 (2008) (finding that five or 
more ACEs increased risk of COPD by 2.6 times with only partial attenuation of the relationship 
when controlling for smoking, the primary risk factor for COPD); DP Chapman et al., 
Adverse Childhood Experiences and the Risk of Depressive Disorders in Adulthood, 82 J. 
AFFECTIVE DISORDERS 217, 217 (2004) (finding that experiencing childhood emotional 
abuse increased risk for lifetime depressive disorders over 2.5 times, with more childhood 
adversity associated with more depression in a dose-response relationship); SR Dube et al., 
Childhood Abuse, Household Dysfunction and the Risk of Attempted Suicide Throughout the 
Life Span: Findings from the Adverse Childhood Experiences Study, 286 [J]AMA 3089, 3089 
(2001) (finding that having one or more adverse childhood experiences accounts for 67%, 
64%, and 80% of the risk for lifetime, adult, and childhood/adolescent suicide attempts, 
respectively.); CL Whitfield et al., Adverse Childhood Experiences and Hallucinations, 29 
CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT 797, 797 (2005) (finding that people with seven or more ACEs 
had a five-fold increase in the risk of reporting hallucinations compared to someone with no 
reported ACEs). It is hardly surprising, then, that OUD often co-occurs with other physical 
and mental illness. See, e.g., Tea Rosic et al., The Impact of Comorbid Psychiatric Disorders 
on Methadone Maintenance Treatment in Opioid Use Disorder: A Prospective Cohort Study, 
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both more painful conditions58 and greater sensitivity to painful stimuli.59 When 
these painful conditions exist in populations experiencing other vulnerabilities, 
adequate care is less likely, increasing the risk for self-medication.60 This 
complex set of factors explains why some epidemiologists have suggested 
that nearly two thirds of injection drug use can be attributed to adverse 
childhood experiences.61 
 
C.   Practice and Underlying Theory 
 
Non-adherence to treatment is common across patient populations 
and clinical indications, with as many as half of all patients failing to take 
 
13 NEUROPSYCHIATRIC DISEASE & TREATMENT 1399, 1399 (2017) (finding that 80% of 
patients receiving methadone treatment had a co-occurring psychiatric disorder and 42% had 
another co-occurring substance use disorder). Furthermore, early childhood adversity is 
heavily associated with opioid use disorder and its harms and may predict relapse. See 
Genevieve Chandler, Karen Kalmakis & Teri Murtha, Screening Adults with Substance Use 
Disorder for Adverse Childhood Experiences, 29 J. ADDICTIONS NURSING 172, 172 (2018) 
(finding that more than 80% of individuals in an OUD recovery program had six or more 
ACEs); Karen J. Derefinko et al., Adverse Childhood Experiences Predict Opioid Relapse 
During Treatment Among Rural Adults, 96 ADDICTIVE BEHAVS. 171, 171 (2019) (observing 
that higher ACEs were associated with a higher probability of relapse at medication-assisted 
treatment centers, but also finding that relapse rates went down as individuals continued 
treatment); Michael D. Stein et al., Adverse Childhood Experience Effects on Opioid Use 
Initiation, Injection Drug Use, and Overdose Among Persons with Opioid Use Disorder, 179 
DRUG & ALCOHOL DEPENDENCE 325, 325 (2017) (reporting associations between high levels 
of ACEs in patients seeking detoxification and age of initiation of drug use, injection drug 
use, and overdose). 
58 See Natalie J. Sachs-Ericsson et al., When Emotional Pain Becomes Physical: Adverse 
Childhood Experiences, Pain, and the Role of Mood and Anxiety Disorders, 73 J. CLINICAL 
PSYCHOL. 1403, 1404-05 (listing the many ways that ACEs have been found to be linked to 
painful medical conditions). 
59 See Julia I. Herzog & Christian Schmahl, Adverse Childhood Experiences and the Consequences 
on Neurobiological, Psychosocial, and Somatic Conditions Across the Lifespan, 9 
FRONTIERS PSYCHIATRY, Sept. 4, 2018, at 1, 4 (2018) (detailing a variety of circumstances 
in which ACEs predict unusual and heightened sensitivity to pain stimuli). 
60 See Pauline Voon et al., Pain As a Risk Factor for Substance Use: A Qualitative Study of 
People Who Use Drugs in British Columbia, Canada, 15 HARM REDUCTION J. 35, 35 (2018) 
(finding that “experiences with inadequately managed pain in various policy, economic, 
physical, and social environments reinforced marginalization, such as restrictive policies, 
economic vulnerability, lack of access to socio-physical support systems, stigma from health 
professionals, and denial of pain medication leading to risky self-medication.”); Pauline 
Voon et al., Denial of Prescription Analgesia Among People Who Inject Drugs in a Canadian 
Setting, 34 DRUG AND ALCOHOL REV. 221, 225 (2015) (finding that around two thirds of 
people who inject drugs have been denied prescription analgesia, leading a majority of those 
denied to turn to street drugs as a high-risk means of self-managing their pain). 
61 Robert F. Anda et al., Childhood Abuse, Neglect, and Household Dysfunction and the Risk of 
Illicit Drug Use: The Adverse Childhood Experiences Study, 111 PEDIATRICS 564, 568 (2003). 
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medications as directed.62 Non-adherence presents particularly important 
challenges in opioid therapy because of the risks of overdose, hyperalgesia, 
polypharmacy, and diversion.63 Directly-Observed Therapy (DOT) is rec-
ognized by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) as the 
most effective strategy for ensuring treatment adherence.64 DOT has proven 
especially important in the response to diseases like tuberculosis, in which 
failing to complete a course of treatment can result in the development of 
drug resistance.65 DOT is a simple model: the patient takes the medicine 
under the supervision of a clinician who can also advise about associated or 
other unrelated health issues. Given that supervision is inherently intrusive 
and that logistical barriers to participation are potentially considerable, it is 
important to provide DOT in settings that are welcoming and accessible.66 
A clinic providing DOT-P would provide an appropriate opioid dose to 
people with pain, co-occurring OUD, and housing instability. After the 
administration of the opioid, clinic staff would provide care and linkages to 
other services. Such administration of opioids has existed in one form or 
another for over a hundred years, with some of the earliest incarnations in the 
United States.67 Although the United States abandoned the practice in the 
 
62 Marie T. Brown & Jennifer K. Bussell, Medication Adherence: WHO Cares?, 84 MAYO 
CLINIC PROC. 304, 304 (2011). 
63 See supra notes 28-29. 
64 TB 101 FOR HEALTHCARE WORKERS, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION,  
https://www.cdc.gov/tb/webcourses/tb101/page3832.html [https://perma.cc/6Z92JVEF]  
(last visited Oct. 8, 2019). 
65 See generally Richard S. Garfein, Feasibility of Tuberculosis Treatment Monitoring by 
Video Directly Observed Therapy: A Binational Pilot Study, 19 INT’L J. TUBERCULOSIS & 
LUNG DISEASE 1057, 1062-63 (2015) (describing the successes of a low-cost variation of 
DOT in Tijuana and San Diego in reducing the tuberculosis rates in each respective population); 
Gebremedhin Gebrezgabiher et al., Treatment Outcome of Tuberculosis Patients Under 
Directly Observed Treatment Short Course and Factors Affecting Outcome in Southern Ethiopia: 
A Five-Year Retrospective Study, 11 PLOS ONE, Feb. 2016, at 1, 2, 8 (finding that DOT was 
effective for treating tuberculosis in an Ethiopia hospital over the course of five years and 
for meeting the WHO’s treatment goals). 
66 See Thomas R. Frieden & John A. Sbarbaro, Promoting Adherence to Treatment for 
Tuberculosis: The Importance of Direct Observation, 85 BULL. WORLD HEALTH ORG. 407, 
409 (2007) (“The key challenge of direct observation of treatment is to implement it well, 
maximizing convenience of and respectful interaction with patients.”). 
67 See DAVID F. MUSTO, THE AMERICAN DISEASE: ORIGINS OF NARCOTIC CONTROL 76-82 
(3d ed. 1999) (detailing the rise and abrupt decline of heroin and morphine maintenance in 
the treatment of addiction); see also Alyson J. Bond & John Witton, Perspectives on the 
Pharmacological Treatment of Heroin Addiction, 8 CLINICAL MED. INSIGHTS: PSYCHIATRY 
1, 2 (2017) (explaining the development of methadone maintenance programs in the United 
States in the 1960s); Edward Lewis, A Heroin Maintenance Program in the United States?, 
223  [J]AMA 539, 539 (1973) (“[H]eroin appeared in the United States Pharmacopeia from 
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1920s, a number of countries have since operated similar programs under 
various names.68 In some programs, pharmaceutical grade heroin is adminis-
tered,69 which might seem strange, but heroin is widely used for analgesia 
in the United Kingdom.70 A program in the United States, however, would 
probably follow Canada’s recent preference for hydromorphone, which is a 
cheap71 and frequently prescribed opioid72 with a great safety profile when 
administered under medical supervision.73 
 Centering on pain in the care of people with refractory OUD makes sense 
because pain complicates OUD treatment in multiple ways. One is technical: it 
is difficult to dose agonists or analgesics for people with heightened opioid 
tolerance, which is common among people with OUD.74 Another is social and 
contextual: providers are uneasy treating this population because of clinical 
 
1910 to 1920 . . . by 1920, recognizing the problems of heroin addiction . . . the American 
Medical Association resolved that use of the drug in the United States should be discontinued.”); 
Nicola Metrebian et al., Patients Receiving a Prescription for Diamorphine (Heroin) in the 
United Kingdom, 25 DRUG & ALCOHOL REV. 115, 115 (2006) (noting that the United 
Kingdom started to offer heroin maintenance in the 1920’s). 
68 Common names include Heroin-Assisted Treatment (HAT) and Injectable Opioid Agonist 
Treatment (iOAT). BEAU KILMER ET AL., CONSIDERING HEROIN-ASSISTED TREATMENT AND 
SUPERVISED DRUG CONSUMPTION SITES IN THE UNITED STATES xv, 24 (2018) (ebook). 
69 Id. at vi. 
70 See Michael Gossop & Francis Keaney, Research Note—Prescribing Diamorphine for 
Medical Conditions: A Very British Practice, 34 J. DRUG ISSUES 441, 443-44 (2004) (noting 
that heroin is prescribed and administered in the U.K. for acute pain, chronic pain, intractable 
pain, and pediatric postoperative pain). 
71 In the United States, the wholesale cost is about $0.07 per 2 mg dose. National Drug 
Acquisition Cost as of 2019-02-27, DATA.MEDICAID.GOV, https://data.medicaid.gov/Drug-
Pricing-and-Payment/NADAC-as-of-2019-02-27/s7c9-pfa6 [https://perma.cc/55Q4-ML4X] 
(enter “hydromorphone” in search field; view “NADAC_Per_Unit” column) (last visited 
Mar. 3, 2019); see also Hydromorphone, DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMIN. (July 2013), https: 
//www.deadiversion.usdoj.gov/drug_chem_info/hydromorphone.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
V7ES-VS5P] (“The street price of a 4 mg tablet of Dilaudid® ranges from $5 to $100 per 
tablet depending on the region.”). 
72 In 2016, Dilaudid was the 212th most prescribed medication in the United States, with more 
than 2.5 million prescriptions. See The Top 300 of 2019, CLINCALC, https://clincalc.com/Drug-
Stats/Top300Drugs.aspx [https://perma.cc/4DFA-6BU6] (last visited Dec. 22, 2018). 
73 See generally E. Oviedo-Joekes et al., Safety Profile Of Injectable Hydromorphone and 
Diacetylmorphine for Long-Term Severe Opioid Use Disorder, 176 DRUG ALCOHOL 
DEPENDENCE 55 (2017) (finding that the safety profile of injectable hydromorphone involved 
fewer adverse and serious adverse events than for diacetylmorphine, although both were 
recommended for treating OUD in a supervised injection model). 
74 See generally Amy Wachholtz, Simmie Foster & Martin Cheatle, Psychophysiology of 
Pain and Opioid Use: Implications for Managing Pain in Patients with an Opioid Use 
Disorder, 146 DRUG & ALCOHOL DEPENDENCE 1 (2015) (describing hyperalgesia in people 
with OUD and addressing the difficulties inherent in treating their pain by attempting to 
explain the psychophysiology of pain for those with OUD). 
                                  Journal of Law & Public Affairs                [November 2019 
 
 
 
82 
ambiguity and the potential to cause harm or experience regulatory sanctions.75 
This uneasiness produces poor treatment and amplifies providers’ mistrust of 
patients.76 The most important, however, is practical: an enormous body of 
research confirms that patients must be ready to engage in treatment for OUD 
or to make other change in health behavior to have a reasonable chance of 
long-term benefits, but people in serious pain are not ready to do anything 
until that pain is treated.77 
Few individualized interventions produce durable changes in decision-
making absent a readiness to change.78 This is at the same time a heretical and 
an obvious statement. It is heretical because we want to believe that counseling 
alone can change behavior. But even simple changes—like exercising more or 
eating better—are not hard because we lack information about their value 
or encouragement, or even the means (especially for those reading seventy-page 
articles like this); they are hard because we are unprepared to make them.79  
 
75 See, e.g., Fiona Webster et al., An Ethnography of Chronic Pain Management in Primary 
Care: The Social Organization of Physicians’ Work in the Midst of the Opioid Crisis, 14 
PLOS ONE, May 2019, at 1, 1 (reporting that while treating patients with chronic pain, “many 
providers describe being most challenged by the work involved in helping patients who also 
struggled with poverty, mental health, and addiction,” especially because of “concerns that 
they could lose their license for inappropriate prescribing, thus shifting their work from 
providing treatment and care to policing their patients for malingering and opioid abuse”). 
76 See Berg et al., supra note 18, at 484-86 (noting that providers treating people with OUD 
and pain follow one of two very different treatment frameworks with one focused on treating 
the pain and the other focused on treating the OUD, with those in the latter systematically 
undertreating the pain). 
77 See, e.g., Bobbi Jo H. Yarborough et al., Methadone, Buprenorphine and Preferences for 
Opioid Agonist Treatment: A Qualitative Analysis, 160 DRUG & ALCOHOL DEPENDENCE 
112, 116 (2016) (noting pain as a barrier to entering MAT and noting that some participants were 
more willing to accept maintenance if they believed their pain would be managed adequately). 
78 See generally Gerdien H. de Weert-van Oene et al., Motivation for Treatment and Motivation 
for Change in Substance-Dependent Patients with Co-Occuring Psychiatric Disorders, 47 J. 
PSYCHOACTIVE DRUGS 393 (2015) (noting that “[m]otivation for change has been related to 
treatment seeking, treatment attendance, treatment retention, and treatment participation” 
and concluding that lower readiness for both change and treatment predicts, to an extent, a 
stronger likelihood of premature attrition from treatment); Vincent Wagner et al., Initiation 
of Addiction Treatment and Access to Services: Young Adults’ Accounts of Their Help-Seek-
ing Experiences, 27 QUALITATIVE HEALTH RES. 1614 (2017) (describing different experi-
ences of the decision to seek treatment). 
79 See, e.g., James O. Prochaska et al., The Transtheoretical Model and Stages of Change, in 
HEALTH BEHAVIOR: THEORY, RESEARCH, AND PRACTICE 125, 127-28 (Karen Glanz et al. 
eds., 5th ed. 2015) (describing the length of time people spend in the precontemplation and 
contemplation stages before entering the preparation stage of the Transtheoretical Model’s 
(TTM’s) Stages of Change framework, positing that it isn’t necessarily the difficulty of the 
task, but rather the individual’s internal motivation to match their needs). 
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Health behavior researchers have various ways of describing this concept. 
One of the most common is the Stages of Change model, which posits that 
changing behavior requires people to transition from precontemplation to 
contemplation to preparation before sustainable action takes hold.80 Progression 
through these stages is often nonlinear and frequently iterative.81 People with 
OUD remain in the precontemplation phase for many reasons.82 Contempla-
tion requires thoughtful reflection, and moving from contemplation to prepara-
tion requires self-efficacy.83 Both are difficult if not impossible for someone 
 
80 See, e.g., Carlo C. DiClemente et al., Readiness and Stages of Change in Addiction 
Treatment, 13 AM. J. ON ADDICTIONS 103, 114 (2004) (“A stage of change represents the 
current state of the individual with respect to changing a single behavior or constellation of 
behaviors.”); John C. Norcross et al., Stages of Change, 67 J. CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 143, 143-
48 (2011) (defining the stages of change and reviewing meta-analyses of studies exploring 
the ability of stages of change measures to predict treatment outcomes). 
81 See, e.g., John R. Gallagher et al., A Perspective from the Field: Five Interventions to 
Combat the Opioid Epidemic and Ending the Dichotomy of Harm-Reduction Versus Absti-
nence-Based Programs, 37 ALCOHOLISM TREATMENT Q. 404, 410-12 (2019) (describing a 
program in which the goal was not abstinence but motivation for change, which resulted in 
increased retention in treatment, referrals to detoxification and inpatient treatment programs, 
and, most importantly, promoted recovery and wellbeing); David H. Morris et al., Substance 
Use Consequences, Mental Health Problems, and Readiness to Change Among Veterans 
Seeking Substance Use Treatment, 94 J. SUBSTANCE ABUSE TREATMENT 113, 114 (2018) 
(noting in the context of research on alcohol and drug dependence that Readiness to Change 
(RTC) is conceptualized as a combination of one’s perceived importance to make a change 
and confidence in ability to achieve it (self-efficacy), with greater self-efficacy associated 
with increased treatment engagement, more attempts to quit, better treatment retention, 
sustained abstinence, and reduction of substance use among individuals with problematic 
drug and alcohol use); Muhammad Washdev & Iqbal Afridi, A Survey to Determine 
Motivating Factors to Quit Opioids in Treatment Seekers at a Tertiary Care Hospital, 67 J. 
PAK. MED. ASS’N 1050, 1050-53 (2017) (proposing that motivation should be a main focus 
in addition to pharmacological treatment for those with OUD and suggesting that low motivation 
is the key predictor of poor treatment outcomes). 
82 See, e.g., Emine M. Akdağ et al., The Relationship between Internalized Stigma and 
Treatment Motivation, Perceived Social Support, Depression and Anxiety Levels in Opioid 
Use Disorder, 28 PSYCHIATRY & CLINICAL PSYCHOPHARMACOLOGY 394, 400 (2018) (noting 
that many people with OUD struggled to advance through the early Stages of Change be-
cause of internalized stigma); Ramin Mojtabai et al., Comparing Barriers to Mental Health 
Treatment and Substance Use Disorder Treatment Among Individuals with Comorbid Major 
Depression and Substance Use Disorders, 46 J. SUBSTANCE ABUSE TREATMENT 268, 270 
(2014) (noting cost as a barrier to treatment); Li-Tzy Wu et al., Treatment Use and Barriers 
Among Adolescents with Prescription Opioid Use Disorders, 36 ADDICTIVE BEHAVS. 1233, 1233 
(2011) (“Only 4.2% of adolescents with opioid dependence, 0.5% of those with abuse, and 0.6% 
of subthreshold users reported a perceived need for treatment of nonmedical opioid use.”). 
83 See, e.g., Theodore J. Cicero & Matthew S. Ellis, The Prescription Opioid Epidemic: A 
Review of Qualitative Studies on the Progression from Initial Use to Abuse, 19 DIALOGUES 
CLINICAL NEUROSCIENCE 259, 264 (2017) (“The most cited reasons [for continued opioid 
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experiencing pain.84 To the extent that contemplation is contingent on reasonable 
comfort, addressing pain is a key step in supporting people who are stuck in 
the earlier stages of change. This accounts for why people with moderate 
to severe pain are less likely to access drug-related health services.85 It also 
explains how some heavy-handed or insensitive strategies can undermine 
readiness to change by increasing stress and decreasing self-efficacy.86 
DOT-P would be community-based for three reasons. First, it would 
be deployed in the community at a clinic rather than in a hospital. Hospitals 
are not designed to provide an environment that is welcoming to DOT-P 
 
use] included use as a response to life stressors . . . or as a means of self-medicating psycho-
logical issues, effects of trauma, or emotional pain.”); de Weert-van Oene et al., supra note 
78, at 394 (finding in a study evaluating the association between readiness for change and 
treatment adherence that readiness was more important than sociodemographics, drug use, 
and other background variables in the prediction of retention in treatment.); Rebekka S. Palmer 
et al., Substance User Treatment Drop-Out from Client and Clinician Perspectives: A Pilot 
Study, 44 J. SUBSTANCE USE & MISUSE 1021, 1029 (2009) (finding that the most commonly 
reported reasons for dropping out of treatment were individual or personal factors rather than 
program-related factors). 
84 See Mojtabai et al., supra note 82, at 270 (2014) (finding in a study of 393 adults with 
twelve-month major depressive episodes and substance use disorders that 38.9% of subjects 
reported no interest in stopping drug use). 
85 As Garland et al. observe:  
Chronic pain, which affects 55%–61% of people receiving MMT, contributes 
to continued opioid use, relapse, and MMT dropout. Further, traditional MAT 
does not directly address the emotion regulation and reward processing deficits 
characteristic of OUD—critical mechanisms of addiction and chronic pain. 
Through opponent processes in the brain, emotion dysregulation and reward 
deficits may amplify stress sensitization and opioid craving, serving as critical 
risk factors for OUD that may be neglected by traditional MAT. 
Eric L. Garland et al., Mindfulness-Oriented Recovery Enhancement Reduces Opioid 
Craving Among Individuals with Opioid Use Disorder and Chronic Pain in Medication 
Assisted Treatment: Ecological Momentary Assessments from a Stage 1 Randomized 
Controlled Trial, 203 DRUG & ALCOHOL DEPENDENCE 61, 61 (2019); see Taeho G. Rhee 
& Robert A. Rosenheck, Use of Drug Treatment Services Among Adults With Opioid 
Use Disorder: Rates, Patterns, and Correlates, PSYCHIATRIC SERVS. IN ADVANCE 1, 5-
6 (2019) (finding that that moderate to extreme self-reported pain was associated with a 
lower likelihood of using drug-related health services in adjusted multivariable analyses). 
86 See Rachel Ayres et al., Enhancing Motivation Within a Rapid Opioid Substitution 
Treatment Feasibility RCT: A Nested Qualitative Study, 9 SUBSTANCE ABUSE TREATMENT, 
PREVENTION, & POL’Y 1, 5-7 (2014) (noting that internalized motivation is more effective on 
long-term change than external motivation and that pressure to be in treatment from 
family, law enforcement, and healthcare professionals can provoke resistance or under-
mine self-efficacy); DiClemente et al., supra note 80, at 112 (“Methadone maintenance 
programs often require abstinence from all ‘unauthorized’ drugs. However, individuals 
who apply to and participate in these programs often are ready to change only one or two of the 
drug abuse behaviors that they are engaging in and not all unauthorized drugs.”). 
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patients. Many of these patients have significant and well-founded mistrust 
of healthcare providers and go to great lengths to avoid emergency departments 
even in the face of extremely dangerous and painful conditions.87 Second, 
DOT-P would provide the intense social support—that is, the community—
required for managing pain and OUD.88 Finally, given that patients are 
otherwise likely to be injecting in public settings, a DOT-P approach also 
would be community care in that it reduces harms that communities experience 
related to OUD including public intoxication, injection-related litter, and 
illicit drug dealing.89 
It is important that DOT-P incorporate a patient-centered model, which 
accounts for each patient’s unique experiences, challenges, and aspirations. 
Such holistic care is essential for reaching a population with a history of 
trauma and other overlapping vulnerabilities. Implementation of DOT-P 
would need to occur in an accessible, welcoming, and well-resourced setting. 
The services provided must be oriented to the unique needs of the person, 
which, given the target population, are often extensive and interrelated. In 
addition to being a high threshold intervention, DOT-P is also a high intensity 
and—necessarily and appropriately—low-scale intervention. Most people 
with OUD do not want or would not benefit from DOT-P.90 
 
87 See Robert Harris et al., Experiences with Skin and Soft Tissue Infections Among People Who 
Inject Drugs in Philadelphia: A Qualitative Study, 187 DRUG & ALCOHOL DEPENDENCE 
8, 11, 12 (2018) (describing how many people who inject drugs in Philadelphia delayed 
seeking medical care for skin and soft tissue infections, or engaged in self-care, to avoid 
repeating negative healthcare experiences). 
88 See Jazmin Warren et al., Role of Social Support and Self-Efficacy in Treatment Outcomes 
Among Clients with Co-occurring Disorders, 89 DRUG & ALCOHOL DEPENDENCE 267, 272 
(2007) (describing how higher levels of social support among clients in treatment were predictive 
of better psychological health and less use of heroin and cocaine at follow-up); cf. Markus 
Heilig et al., Time to Connect: Bringing Social Context into Addiction Neuroscience, 17 
NATURE REVS. NEUROSCIENCE 592, 592 (2016) (describing how the use of drugs impairs 
social connections, which in turn leads to more drug use). 
89 See Alison Sutter et al., Public Drug Use in Eight U.S. Cities: Health Risks and Other 
Factors Associated with Place of Drug Use, 64 INT’L J. DRUG POL’Y 62, 63-64  (2019) (finding 
that nearly half of individuals using syringe exchange programs reported that one of their top two 
most frequent places of drug use is a public place, and describing the harms related to public drug 
use, such as increased risk of overdose and improper disposal of used needles). 
90 See, e.g., Thomas V. Perneger et al., Randomised Trial of Heroin Maintenance Programme 
for Addicts Who Fail in Conventional Drug Treatments, 317 BRIT. MED. J. 13, 17 (1998) 
(finding that, in one randomized controlled trial in Switzerland testing the outcomes between 
a group receiving heroin administration versus conventional methadone maintenance, there 
were clear benefits for the first group, yet less than half of the latter chose to receive 
heroin administration at the end of the study, with most preferring to continue medication meth-
adone); Ambros Uchtenhagen, The Role and Function of Heroin Assisted Treatment at the 
Treatment System Level, 19 HEROIN ADDICTION & RELATED CLINICAL PROBS. 5, 7 (2017) 
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D.   Evidence from Other Countries 
 
An enormous body of research suggests that DOT-P would provide 
considerable benefits in the United States without any substantial counter-
vailing harms. Understanding the benefits of DOT-P requires drawing from 
experience and evaluations related to different interventions focusing on 
different problems. DOT-P integrates some of the most beneficial features 
of SCFs, OAT, iOAT, and DOT in the care of people with diseases like 
tuberculosis and HIV/AIDS. In this section, we review research documenting 
these benefits with less emphasis on SCFs, OAT and DOT, only because they 
have been the focus of so many research reviews recently or previously. 
A clinic providing DOT-P would provide medical supervision for 
people while they experience opioid-related intoxication, which is one of the 
key benefits of SCFs. Research has established that SCF personnel can 
effectively reverse overdoses when they occur, saving thousands of lives 
across the over 160 SCFs that currently operate around the world.91 It is 
estimated that opening a SCF in Philadelphia, for example, would result in 
immediate reduction up to 76 fatal overdoses each year.92 These facilities also 
provide a secure and hygienic space, which minimizes the risk of infections 
or other injuries.93 Almost all SCFs offer health and social services, including 
 
(finding that less than 10% of people receiving treatment for OUD in Switzerland are en-
rolled in DOT-P). Moreover, research on Supervised Consumption Facilities suggests that 
people who are stably housed are likely to continue injecting at home whenever possible if a 
facility opened. See Robert Harris et al., Perceptions About Supervised Injection Facilities 
Among People Who Inject Drugs in Philadelphia, 52 INT’L J. DRUG POL’Y 56, 57-58 (2018) 
(noting from interviews with people who inject drugs a clear preference for injection at home for 
those stably housed and only likely use of a facility among those lacking stable housing). 
91 See Chloé Potier et al., Supervised Injection Services: What Has Been Demonstrated? 
A Systematic Literature Review, 145 DRUG & ALCOHOL DEPENDENCE 48, 62-64 (2014) (finding 
that the presence of healthcare workers in SCFs improved the outcome of overdose cases). 
92 See SHARON LARSON ET AL., MAIN LINE HEALTH CTR. FOR POPULATION HEALTH RES., 
SUPERVISED CONSUMPTION FACILITIES—REVIEW OF THE EVIDENCE 6-7 (2017), https:// 
dbhids.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/OTF_LarsonS_PHLReportOnSCF_Dec2017.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/G4NQ-PUCH] (finding that overdose deaths in Philadelphia could be 
reduced by 24 to 76 annually by creating SCFs). 
93 See EA Enns et al., Potential Cost-Effectiveness of Supervised Injection Facilities in 
Toronto and Ottawa, Canada, 111 ADDICTION 475, 485 (2015) (describing reductions in 
infections associated with SCFs in Toronto and Ottawa). 
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access to drug treatment.94 Perhaps most importantly, research documents 
that the most vulnerable people who inject drugs, including those at high risk 
for serious health conditions and unstable housing, are willing to use SCFs to 
improve their health and the health of the community.95 It is also important 
to note that SCFs have been associated with improved community health and 
that no negative community effects have been observed.96   
It is clear that OUD is partly a physiological phenomenon.97 It is 
hardly surprising then that treatment with medications that target related 
neurochemical pathways is more effective than abstinence or behavioral 
interventions at reducing the harm of unmanaged OUD and at bridging the 
gap to long-term detoxification. Patients receiving methadone are over four 
times more likely to remain engaged in treatment compared to patients 
 
94 See, e.g., Larson et al., supra note 92, at 26 (“Generally, SCFs offer an array of other 
comprehensive health and social services, including detoxification and other substance use 
treatment services, medical care, counseling, and legal assistance.”); Thomas Kerr et al., 
A Micro-Environmental Intervention to Reduce the Harms Associated with Drug-Related 
Overdose: Evidence from the Evaluation of Vancouver's Safer Injection Facility, 18 
INT’L J. DRUG POL’Y 37, 38 (2007) (finding that SCFs in Vancouver typically refer drug 
users to health and social services, in addition to providing safe spaces for drug use). 
95 See, e.g., BA Bouvier et al., Willingness to Use a Supervised Injection Facility among 
Young Adults Who Use Prescription Opioids Non-Medically: A Cross-Sectional Study, 14 
HARM REDUCTION J., 2017, at 1, 7 (“If a SIF were opened, more than six in ten of our study 
participants reported they would use the service, and more than eight in ten of participants 
who have injected drugs reported they would use the service.”); Alex Kral et al., Acceptability 
of a Safer Injection Facility Among Injection Drug Users in San Francisco, 110 DRUG & 
ALCOHOL DEPENDENCE 160, 161 (2010) (“Eighty-five percent [of injection drug users] said 
that they would use a [safer injection facility] should it be convenient for them.”); Harris et 
al., supra note 87, at 57-58 (noting that in interviews of people who inject drugs those who 
inject in public settings would use a SCF in part to avoid exposing people in the community 
to their public drug use and intoxication). 
96 Potier et al., supra note 91, at 63 (noting that there have been no additional observed harms 
and fewer injection materials discarded in public in neighborhoods with established SCFs). 
97 That opioids target pain receptors and reward endorphins explains much of their attraction. 
This neurochemical process is easily observable in functional brain scans. See e.g., Henry 
W. Chase, The Neural Basis of Drug Stimulus Processing and Craving: An Activation Likelihood 
Estimation Meta-Analysis, 70 BIOLOGICAL PSYCHIATRY 785, 787 (2011) (explaining meta-
analysis studies of brain imaging, showing cue responses effects for people with substance use 
disorders). Though this neurochemical effect is often more proximal and psychological 
issues are often more distal, they are fully and inextricably linked. See, e.g., Igor Elman & 
David Borsook, The Failing Cascade: Comorbid Post Traumatic Stress and Opioid Use 
Disorders, 103 NEUROSCIENCE & BIOBEHAVIORAL REVS. 374, 379 (2019) (finding a 
common neurological foundation between PTSD and opioid use disorder). 
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receiving a placebo.98 Opioid Agonist Therapy (OAT) with methadone and 
buprenorphine are the “gold standard” treatments for OUD.99  
Despite the benefits of OAT, some patients on these medications do 
continue or return to active, unmanaged consumption of illicit drugs;100 others 
avoid these medications because of a variety of logistical, resource, and 
stigma factors.101 Another strategy for reducing harms among people who 
struggle to start or adhere to OAT or other supportive services is iOAT, which 
involves providing pharmaceutical-grade heroin or hydromorphone to people 
for self-administration.102 To date, nine randomized controlled trials103 have 
evaluated interventions that are programmatically similar to iOAT and 
DOT-P. The trials provided opioids other than methadone or buprenorphine to 
people who would otherwise consume street drugs.104 The first was conducted 
 
98 Fentanyl: The Next Wave of the Opioid Crisis: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Oversight 
and Investigations of the H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 115th Cong. 82 (2017) 
(statement of Wilson M. Compton, Deputy Director, National Institute on Drug Abuse). 
99 Hilary Smith Connery, Medication-Assisted Treatment of Opioid Use Disorder: Review of 
the Evidence and Future Directions, 23 HARV. REV. PSYCHIATRY 63, 64 (2015) (“The evidence 
for efficacy both in reducing opioid use and retaining patients in care is strongest for agonist 
treatment; methadone maintenance remains the gold standard of care for OUD.”). 
100 Brittany Burns Dennis et al., The Effectiveness of Opioid Substitution Treatments for 
Patients with Opioid Dependence: A Systematic Review and Multiple Treatment Comparison 
Protocol, 3 SYSTEMATIC REVS., Sept. 19, 2014, at 1, 1-2; see also Ada Lo et al., Factors 
Associated with Methadone Maintenance Therapy Discontinuation Among People Who 
Inject Drugs, 94 J. SUBSTANCE ABUSE TREATMENT 43 (2018) (noting that only 35-54% of 
patients continue with methadone treatment through the first year, meaning that over half of 
patients who initiate methadone treatment will cease treatment and resume using non-
prescription opioids within twelve months). 
101 See Yarborough et al., supra note 7777, at 114-15 (2016) (delineating the many barriers 
individuals face and perceive when making decisions about OAT treatment). 
102 Guidelines for the delivery of iOAT in Canada were released earlier this fall. See generally 
Nadia Fairbairn et al., Injectable Opioid Agonist Treatment for Opioid Use Disorder: A 
National Clinical Guideline, 191 CAN. MED. ASSOC. J. E1049 (2019) (identifying best 
practices and laying out recommendations for iOAT with injectable heroin and hydro-
morphone for individuals with severe OUD). 
103 Randomized Controlled Trials (RCT) are the gold standard for assessing the causal effects 
of an intervention. The FDA generally requires one large RCT demonstrating the efficacy of 
a drug compared to a similar product or therapy before it can be approved to enter the com-
mercial market. See 21 C.F.R. § 314.126(b) (2018) (emphasizing that when approving new 
drug applications, an “adequate and well-controlled study” includes randomization and control 
groups, while not explicitly describing these studies as RCTs). 
104 See generally Isabelle Demaret et al., Efficacy of Heroin-Assisted Treatment in Belgium: 
A Randomised Controlled Trial, 21 EUR. ADDICTION RES. 179 (2015); Christian Haasen et 
al., Heroin-Assisted Treatment for Opioid Dependence: Randomised Controlled Trial, 191 
BRIT. J. PSYCHIATRY 55 (2007); Richard L. Hartnoll et al., Evaluation of Heroin Mainte-
nance in Controlled Trial, 37 ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 877 (1980); Joan Carles March 
 
Vol.5:1]            Intensive Care for Pain as an Overdose Prevention Tool 
 
 
89 
in 1980, when ninety-six high-functioning heroin users in London were 
randomly assigned to receive a prescription for home-use heroin or metha-
done.105 After twelve months, patients receiving the heroin prescription had 
fewer arrests and higher treatment adherence compared to patients receiving 
methadone.106 Social and health outcomes were otherwise stable and similar.107 
The second trial began in 1995, in Switzerland, with fifty-one participants.108 
Unlike their counterparts in the United Kingdom, the Swiss participants 
had significantly greater physical and social challenges including more 
unemployment, mental illness, and participation in high-risk practices.109 
Patients receiving heroin, which was administered by healthcare providers 
three times daily, experienced significantly better physical, social, emotional, 
and mental functioning at the end of the trial compared to the control group.110  
Researchers in the Netherlands completed a much larger and more 
complex trial a few years later when they randomly assigned 549 treatment-
resistant heroin users to either standard methadone medication treatment or 
methadone medication treatment with the option of being administered 
 
et al., Controlled Trial of Prescribed Heroin in the Treatment of Opioid Addiction, 31 J. 
SUBSTANCE ABUSE TREATMENT 203 (2006); Eugenia Oviedo-Joekes et al., Diacetylmor-
phine Versus Methadone for the Treatment of Opioid Addiction, 361 NEW ENG. J. MED. 777 
(2009) [hereinafter Oviedo-Joekes et al., Diacetylmorphine Versus Methadone]; Eugenia 
Oviedo-Joekes et al., Hydromorphone Compared with Diacetylmorphine for Long-Term 
Opioid Dependence: A Randomized Clinical Trial, 73 [J]AMA PSYCHIATRY 447 (2016) 
[hereinafter Oviedo-Joekes et al., Hydromorphone Compared with Diacetylmorphine]; 
Perneger et al., supra note 90; John Strang et al. Supervised Injectable Heroin or Injectable 
Methadone Versus Optimised Oral Methadone as Treatment for Chronic Heroin Addicts in 
England After Persistent Failure in Orthodox Treatment (RIOTT): A Randomised Trial, 375 
LANCET 1885 (2010); Wim van den Brink et al., Medical Prescription of Heroin to Treat-
ment Resistant Heroin Addicts: Two Randomised Controlled Trials, 327 BRIT. MED. J. 310 
(2003). The evidence base is nicely summarized in a recent RAND report. See KILMER ET 
AL., supra note 68, at iii (“This mixed-methods report assesses evidence on and arguments 
made about HAT and SCSs and examines some of the issues associated with implementing them 
in the United States.”). 
105 These patients were considered high functioning because many were able to remain 
employed either full- or part-time and they experienced relatively good health. See Hartnoll 
et al., supra note 104, at 881 (noting that 32% of participants were employed full time at 
intake and only 10% of both groups experienced bad health). 
106 See id. at 880-81 (noting that 48% of HAT patients had no arrests, whereas only 28% of MMT 
patients had no arrests; that 32% of MMT patients spent time in prison compared to 19% of 
HAT patients; and that over 12 months, 74% of HAT patients continued to receive their 
prescriptions compared to only 29% of MMT patients). This study was essentially an RCT of 
drug control because denial of HAT was otherwise available. 
107 Id. 
108 See Perneger et al., supra note 90, at 14-17. 
109 Id. 
110 Id. 
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heroin.111 Once again, the group with access to heroin administration ex-
perienced better outcomes, measured by a composite functioning index, 
compared to the group that only received normal treatment with methadone.112 
The benefits for those in the treatment group notably dissipated in the two 
months after their heroin treatment stopped.113  
A small fourth trial was completed in Spain in 2006, with a focus on 
people engaging in injection drug use with other serious co-occurring con-
ditions.114 In the control group, oral methadone was dispensed to patients 
once a day.115 The patients in the treatment group received heroin in the 
morning and at night along with one dose of oral methadone around 8 p.m.116 
Yet again, compared with the control group, the treatment group experienced 
improved general health status, decreased drug-related problems, and reduced 
HIV-related risk behavior.117 The findings from a large trial in Germany 
emerged in 2007.118 Across multiple cities, researchers randomly assigned 
over 1,000 participants with opioid dependence to receive heroin for self-
administration under supervision in outpatient clinics or standard methadone 
treatment.119 Consistent with previous trials, retention was substantially 
higher in the group receiving heroin, as were improvements in self-reported 
health.120 There was, once again, a much larger reduction in illicit use of street 
drugs in the group receiving heroin.121   
The first trial in North America reported findings in 2009 from the 
random assignment of 251 long-term users of injectable heroin with a history 
 
111 See van den Brink et al., supra note 104, at 310-12; see also Isabelle Demaret et al., Loss 
of Treatment Benefit When Heroin-Assisted Treatment is Stopped after 12 Months, 69 J. 
SUBSTANCE ABUSE TREATMENT 72, 74 (2016) (noting that the benefits of treatment in a 
Belgian study totally dissipated and that those receiving heroin returned to active use of street 
drugs at the same rate of those in the control group). 
112 van den Brink et al., supra note 104, at 310-12. 
113 Id. at 311-12. 
114 See March et al., supra note 104, at 204 (conducting the study specifically to address 
injection drug use in individuals with at least two of the following: “infectious disease related 
to intravenous drug use, mental health problems, and social maladjustment”). 
115 Id. at 205. 
116 Id. 
117 Id. at 208-09 (finding that patients receiving HAT had approximately three times fewer 
days engaging in criminal activity compared to MMT control patients and higher score of 
general health—2.5 times higher than the control group—including avoiding behaviors correlated 
with contracting HIV and that “[t]he rate of improvement was higher within the DAM group, as 
compared with the control group, in terms of general health status[,] . . . drug related 
problems, and reduced HIV-risk behavior”). 
118 See Haasen et al., supra note 104, at 55, 57, 59-60. 
119 Id.  at 55. 
120 Id. at 57, 59. 
121 Id. at 58-59. 
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of relapse after one or more treatments with methadone who were living in 
Vancouver.122 Retention was significantly higher in the treatment group, 
as was the reduction in illicit-drug use and other illegal activity.123 Some 
overdoses were observed and reversed, leading the researchers to conclude 
that such treatment should be medically supervised.124 The following year, 
researchers reported on a trial in London evaluating the effects of the 
assignment of 301 patients to supervised injectable methadone, supervised 
injectable heroin, and optimized oral methadone.125 Treatment with supervised 
injectable heroin led to immediate and significant reductions in the use of illicit 
heroin compared with supervised injectable methadone or oral methadone.126 
An eighth trial was conducted in Belgium where seventy-four participants 
were randomly assigned to supervised self-administration of heroin or 
methadone prescriptions for home use. After twelve months, participants 
in the treatment group reported significantly less illicit drug use and significantly 
better physical and mental health.127 
In the most recent trial, completed in 2011, researchers explored 
whether the benefits of heroin-administration could be replicated with hydro-
morphone.128 In this non-inferiority trial, 202 long-term street opioid injectors 
were randomly assigned to receive either injectable heroin or hydromorphone 
(up to three times daily) for six months under supervision.129 The researchers 
observed equivalent benefits—that is, with no statistically significant differ-
ences—in the form of reduced street heroin use and reduced use of any street 
opioids.130 There were fewer adverse events such as seizures and overdoses 
in the group receiving hydromorphone.131  
The delivery of iOAT has occurred with and without clinical supervi-
sion. Although some people do not require supervision, for others supervision is 
likely to offer a number of important benefits. These benefits are evident from 
the broader experience of Directly-Observed Therapy in other contexts. DOT 
 
122 Oviedo-Joekes et al., Diacetylmorphine Versus Methadone, supra note 104, at 779. 
123 See id. at 782 (observing a 43.5% reduction in illicit drug usage and illegal activities in 
the HAT group relative to 28.8% in the MMT group and an 87.8% retention rate in the HAT 
group compared to a 54.1% rate in the MMT group). 
124 Id. at 784. 
125 Strang et al., supra note 104. 
126 Id. at 1891-92. 
127 Demaret et al., supra note 104, at 183-85. 
128 Oviedo-Joekes et al. Hydromorphone Compared with Diacetylmorphine, supra note 104, 
at 448-49. 
129 Id. 
130 Id. at 452-53. 
131 See id. at 447 (reporting from a study conducted with 202 patients and the efficacy of 
hydromorphone as a substitute for diacetylmorphine was evaluated through measuring the 
days of street heroin use in each group, with the assumption that street heroin use is inversely 
correlated to efficacy). 
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is the standard of care for ensuring compliance with treatment protocols when 
noncompliance can produce serious individual or communal harm, as with the 
development of drug resistant tuberculosis when medication is discontinued.132 
There is a long history of culturally sensitive DOT, which addresses potential 
nonadherence not through after-the-fact punishment, which does not work, 
but through extensive social supports.133  
These studies collectively suggest that DOT-P would improve the 
quality of life for individuals with OUD, provide benefits to the community, 
and would not result in other harms. Two systematic reviews134 emphasize 
that the relative advantage of iOAT compared with methadone treatment is 
greater for individuals with severe OUD,135 who are more likely to experience 
homelessness136 and have co-occurring mental health disorders. 137 DOT-P 
 
132 See C. Patrick Chaulk et al., Eleven Years of Community-Based Directly Observed Therapy 
for Tuberculosis, 274 [J]AMA 945, 949-50 (1995) (reporting on a substantial decline in 
TB following implementation of community-based DOT in Baltimore despite prevalent risk 
factors); Stephen E. Weis et al., The Effect of Directly Observed Therapy on the Rates of Drug 
Resistance and Relapse in Tuberculosis, 330 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1179, 1182 (1994) (reporting 
from observation of over 400 patients receiving traditional treatment for tuberculosis and over 580 
patients receiving DOT that DOT was associated with less drug resistance and fewer relapses). 
133 See, e.g., Jimmy Volmink, Patrice Matchaba & Paul Garner, Directly Observed Therapy 
and Treatment Adherence, 355 LANCET 1345, 1346-49 (2000) (reviewing other strategies to 
improve and augment DOT with a focus on patients’ needs, convenience, and relationships). 
134 Marica Ferri, Marina Davoli & Carla A. Perucci, Heroin Maintenance for Chronic Heroin-
Dependent Individuals, 12 COCHRANE DATABASE SYSTEMATIC REVS., no. 12, 2011, at 1; 
John Strang et al., Heroin on Trial: Systematic Review and Meta-Analysis of Randomised 
Trials of Diamorphine-Prescribing as Treatment for Refractory Heroin Addiction, 207 BRIT. 
J. PSYCHIATRY 5 (2015). 
135See Marcel G.W. Dijkgraaf et al., Cost Utility Analysis of Co-Prescribed Heroin Com-
pared with Methadone Maintenance Treatment in Heroin Addicts in Two Randomised Trials, 
330 BRIT. MED. J. 1297, 1299 (2005) (reporting that the program of prescribing heroin with 
methadone in the Netherlands resulted in an average savings of $16,122 per patient per year 
when compared to methadone treatment alone). 
136 See Lo et al., supra note 100, at 41, 73 (noting that patients experiencing homelessness 
during treatment are 2.5 times more likely to stop MMT). 
137 See William C. Becker et al., Non-Medical Use, Abuse and Dependence On Prescription 
Opioids Among U.S. Adults: Psychiatric, Medical and Substance Use Correlates, 94 DRUG 
& ALCOHOL DEPENDENCE 38, 38 (2008) (“Among those with past-year non-medical prescription 
opioid use, those with abuse/dependence were [70%] more likely to have panic and social 
phobic/agoraphobic symptoms.”). Antidepressants increased the efficacy of patients receiving 
agonist therapy of opioid dependence in a meta-analysis of eight RCTs, leading to a 2.3 times 
reduction in depressive symptoms when compared to control patients. Ahmed N. Hassan et 
al., Management of Mood and Anxiety Disorders in Patients Receiving Opioid Agonist Therapy: 
Review and Meta-analysis, 26 AM. J. ADDICTION 551, 551 (2017). These data suggest that the prev-
alence of clinical depression among patients receiving agonist therapy for opioid addiction is high. 
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and iOAT have the built-in advantages of preventing criminal activity138 
associated with obtaining illicit drugs and preventing harms that occur 
with the injection of drugs of unknown purity.139  
 
III.   THE REGULATORY FRAMEWORK 
 
A.   Clinical Care, Instead of Self-Medication, for John  
 
One day an outreach worker invites John to visit a local specialized 
clinic. At the clinic, John’s various conditions are diagnosed. The clinic 
physician documents that John is in considerable pain, which is exacer-
bating and complicated by a secondary diagnosis of opioid dependence. 
John is on his feet most of the day or resting on a hard sidewalk. When he 
has to scramble to stave off withdrawal, it is excruciating limping from 
one place to another. The clinic physician describes the following course 
of treatment: John can come into the clinic and be administered hydromor-
phone as many times as needed to treat his pain between 6 AM and 10 PM, 
as long as he spends time in the clinic after so that staff can be sure he is 
not at risk of overdose. Dosing is determined by clinic staff in close col-
laboration with John to treat his pain without producing or intensifying 
hyperalgesia. If he wants to start maintenance or detoxification therapy, 
he can access methadone or buprenorphine at an affiliated clinic next door. 
John is encouraged to stay off his feet as much as possible to give his leg 
adequate time to heal. The facility has respite housing to enable such rest. 
Given the benefits to John and to the community, it is likely that 
the locality and state would support such care for John.140 But federal law 
 
138 In Spain, patients receiving heroin had more days free of crime than the control group 
receiving methadone, from eleven days per month to less than one day a month. March 
et al., supra note 104, at 208. Swiss patients receiving in the control arm acquired 3123 
Swiss francs in illicit income before treatment and 4931 after treatment, whereas treated 
patients reduced their illicit income from 3372 to 311. Perneger et al., supra note 90, at 
16. In Canada, patients receiving diacetylmorphine were 40% more likely to demonstrate 
a reduction in illegal activities and illegal drug use relative to patients receiving metha-
done. Oviedo-Joekes et al., Diacetylmorphine Versus Methadone, supra note 104, at 782. 
139 Only 1.5% of patients receiving heroin in Switzerland experienced an overdose event 
during six months of treatment whereas 48% experienced an overdose event in the six 
months preceding treatment. Perneger et al., supra note 90, at 15. Overdoses that occur at Swiss 
facilities are routinely reversed. KILMER ET AL., supra note 68, at x (noting that thousands of over-
doses have occurred over thirty years with no or only a few fatal overdoses). 
140 They may also very well not. State legislatures and state boards of medicine could 
prevent such a facility from opening, as could local officials. Analysis of the legal and 
political mechanisms related to states and localities is beyond the scope of this analysis. 
Broadly speaking, though, we think it reasonable that a locality like Philadelphia 
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enforcement is fickle, ideological, and politically distanced from individ-
ual people and communities. Local Drug Enforcement Administration 
(DEA) officials might condemn or even bring charges against a clinic car-
ing for John in this way. In the next three Sections we provide context that 
would guide courts in assessing such a case.  
 
B.   Federal Regulation of Medicine Generally: Hands-Off    
 
Since the founding of the country, medicine has been regulated 
predominantly at the local and state levels.141 This is operationalized pri-
marily through licensing: states delegate authority to physicians to define 
educational standards, specify the limits of practice through informal and 
formal rulemaking, and enforce rules through professional self-regulation.142 
 
would support a pain-centered approach and that state officials would not interfere. 
See Kate Kilpatrick, Philadelphia’s Plan for Opioid Safe Injection Site Splits Opinion, 
GUARDIAN (July 18, 2018, 6:00 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2018/jul/ 
18/philadelphia-opioid-safe-injection-site-plan [https://perma.cc/89LC-6NUP] (discussing 
the push and pull between stakeholders in Kensington, the Philadelphia neighborhood most 
likely to see the implementation of an SCF if its legality is ultimately decided). 
141 The practice of medicine emerged from public health practice. And public health prac-
tice is the paradigmatic example of police power. See, e.g., Hillsborough Cty. v. Auto-
mated Med. Labs., Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 719 (1985) (noting regulation of health and safety 
is “primarily, and historically, a matter of local concern”); Barsky v. Bd. of Regents, 347 
U.S. 442, 449 (1954) (“It is elemental that a state has broad power to establish and enforce 
standards of conduct within its borders relative to the health of everyone there. It is a vital 
part of a state’s police power. The state’s discretion in that field extends naturally to the 
regulation of all professions concerned with health.”); State v. Gee, 236 P.2d 1029, 1033 
(Ariz. 1951) (noting in concluding that it is unquestioned that state legislatures have the 
power and duty to control and regulate the health professions and practices affecting the 
public health and welfare including the definition of terms like “healing”). 
142 See, e.g., ROBERT I. FIELD, HEALTH CARE REGULATION IN AMERICA: COMPLEXITY, 
CONFRONTATION, AND COMPROMISE 19 (2007) (noting that the “cornerstone” of medical 
practice regulation is states’ licensing schemes). In some cases, state boards also might take 
actions to prevent unlicensed individuals from practicing medicine. Timothy S. Jost et 
al., Consumers, Complaints, and Professional Discipline: A Look at Medical Licensure 
Boards, 3 HEALTH MATRIX 309, 326-30 (1993). 
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Congress has respected this arrangement for historical,143 political,144 and in-
strumental reasons.145  
There are notable exceptions. The Food and Drug Administration 
(FDA) regulates the approval and marketing of pharmaceuticals, and other 
various agencies of the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) 
and the DEA restrict availability of controlled substances to approved uses146 
 
143 “Early in United States history, most acts considered crimes were subject only to 
state criminal law. Federal criminal laws were limited to areas in which the Constitution 
gave Congress specifically enumerated powers. Over time, Congress began to criminalize 
much ordinary criminal activity under the guise of regulating interstate commerce. With the 
Controlled Substances Act of 1970, however, Congress established virtually unlimited 
federal jurisdiction for all drug offenses as a way to protect public morals—without 
even the pretense of regulating interstate commerce.” Sandra Guerra, The Myth of Dual 
Sovereignty: Multijurisdictional Drug Law Enforcement and Double Jeopardy, 73 N.C. 
L. REV. 1159, 1165-66 (1995) (internal citations omitted). 
144See PAUL STARR, THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN MEDICINE 2 (2d ed. 
2017) (describing the ability of the American Medical Association from the 1940s until 
the 1970s to prevent regulatory encroachments, including calls for universal insurance or 
other restraints on practice through concentrated lobbying). 
145 The decentralization of lawmaking authority has enabled a vigorous policy learning 
process in the United States in which states and localities implement policy innovations, 
which are evaluated, providing data for ongoing reform and dissemination in other 
jurisdictions. See, e.g., Scott Burris & Evan Anderson, Legal Regulation of 
Health-Related Behavior: A Half Century of Public Health Law Research, 9 ANN. REV. 
L. SOC. SCI. 95, 106-07 (2013) (finding that research on legal interventions regarding 
individual health behavior determines how and why certain laws may fail or succeed); 
see also New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) 
(“Denial of the right to experiment may be fraught with serious consequences to the 
Nation. It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous 
State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic 
experiments without risk to the rest of the country.”). 
146 The Fifth Circuit stated: 
Congress fashioned the Comprehensive Drug Control Act to provide a 
closed system of drug distribution for legitimate handlers of such drugs. 
Such a closed system should significantly reduce the widespread diversion 
of these drugs out of legitimate channels into the illicit market, while at 
the same time providing the legitimate drug industry with a unified ap-
proach to narcotic and dangerous drug control. 
United States v. Collier, 478 F.2d 268, 273 (5th Cir. 1973) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
The primary role of the DEA is to prevent the diversion of substances into illicit channels. 
Under the CSA, the DEA is responsible for preventing, detecting, and investigating the 
diversion of controlled substances while ensuring the availability of these drugs for legitimate 
use. U.S. Organization, Mission and Functions Manual: Drug Enforcement Administration, 
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, http://www.justice.gov/jmd/mps/manual/dea.htm [https:// 
perma.cc/A9WC-PHGD] (last visited Nov. 3, 2019) (discussing the DEA‘s mission). The 
primary role of HHS, operating through the FDA, under the CSA is to perform technocratic 
medical assessments of controlled substances and provide recommendations to the DEA in 
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based on their classification on five drug schedules.147 The DEA also deter-
mines who can interact with scheduled substances, which, importantly for our 
purposes, includes the registration of clinicians.148  
These regulatory schemes position the federal government as a gate-
keeper of pharmaceutical therapy. Schedule I substances are kept outside the 
gate, a substantial barrier to effective medical practice and research.149 But 
physicians retain broad authority to administer, dispense, and prescribe for 
any legitimate medical purpose all other substances once the FDA approves 
them for medical use. The definition of what constitutes legitimate medical 
practice is left to self-governing boards and extends well beyond federally 
approved uses of drugs.150 The statutes that define the gatekeeping role of 
 
regard to scheduling and other CSA-related decisions. Controlled Substance Staff Functional 
Roles, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., https://www.fda.gov/about-fda/center-drug-evaluation-
and-research-cder/controlled-substance-staff-functional-roles [https://perma.cc/345A-924S] 
(last updated July 9, 2018). 
147 See 21 U.S.C. § 812(b) (2018) (listing the schedules under which narcotic drugs are classified). 
The CSA and associated laws regulate access to controlled substances throughout the supply 
chain from production to dispensing. See generally, e.g., Evan Anderson & Corey Davis, 
Breaking the Cycle of Preventable Suffering: Fulfilling the Principle of Balance, 24 TEMPLE 
INT’L & COMP. L.J. 329 (2010) (discussing how international agreements and conventions 
govern the international drug control system). 
148 See U.S. Organization, Mission and Functions Manual: Drug Enforcement Administration, 
supra note 146. The registration requirement for individuals interacting with scheduled 
narcotics, including clinicians, is found at 21 U.S.C. § 823. 
149 Schedule I substances are classified as having no currently accepted medical use and high 
potential for abuse yet include heroin, which is widely used as a medication for opioid depend-
ence and for analgesia in other places, and marijuana (cannabis), which is now permitted in 
medical and recreation use. See supra text accompanying notes 103-31 (describing the medical 
benefits of using heroin, a schedule I narcotic, to treat OUD); infra text accompanying note 
292 (observing that the federal government’s oblique recognition of marijuana’s medical value 
by refraining from prosecuting individuals for its prescribed uses despite its being a schedule I 
narcotic). While an important practical limitation, placement of substances into Schedule I is 
in some sense not an example of federal regulation of medicine because the substances are 
deemed to have no medical applications. See David B. Brushwood, Defining “Legitimate Med-
ical Purpose”, 62 AM. J. HEALTH-SYS. PHARMACY 306, 307 (2005) (“A practice that is medical 
is legitimate and is legal under the DEA regulation. DEA does not regulate within medical 
practice but simply discerns whether a practice is medical or nonmedical.”). 
150 Indeed, so-called off-label prescribing is a common and widely accepted practice. The 
Supreme Court has supported and even encouraged the off-label use of FDA regulated drugs. 
See Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs’ Legal Comm., 531 U.S. 341, 350 (2001) (holding that off-label 
use is an “accepted and necessary corollary of the FDA’s mission to regulate in this area 
without directly interfering with the practice of medicine”). 
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the FDA, DEA and HHS explicitly claim not to otherwise interfere with 
legitimate medical practice.151 
Since medicine became a mature profession,152 very few cases have 
explored putative transgressions of federal gatekeeping rules by clinicians 
providing care in good faith. One commonly cited guidepost is the Supreme 
Court’s Moore decision from 1975.153 But it offers little practical guidance: 
Moore wantonly prescribed methadone for home-use to hundreds of people 
a day without any meaningful medical evaluation while billing based on the 
amount prescribed and not medical services provided.154 The Supreme Court 
allowed the DEA to treat Moore like a “large-scale pusher”155 rather than a 
bona fide physician. Lower federal courts have issued analogous rulings 
related to similarly venal activity.156 Even in these instances, however, courts 
 
151 The Food Drug and Cosmetics Act’s (FDCA) authorizing language is explicit that it 
should not “be construed to limit or interfere with the authority of a health care practitioner 
to prescribe or administer any legally marketed device . . . within a legitimate health care 
practitioner-patient relationship.” 21 U.S.C. § 396; id. § 801a(3) (“[N]othing in the Convention 
will interfere with ethical medical practice in this country as determined by the Secretary of 
Health and Human Services on the basis of a consensus of the views of the American medical 
and scientific community.”). Similar language in other federal laws also preserves the practice of 
medicine’s special status, leaving it generally unregulated at the federal level. The Social 
Security Amendments of 1954, for example, provided that “[n]othing in this title shall be 
construed as authorizing the Commissioner of Social Security or any other officer or 
employee of the United States to interfere in any way with the practice of medicine . . . .” 42 
U.S.C. § 416 (1954); see also 21 U.S.C. § 823(g)(2)(H)(i) (2018) (“Nothing in such regulations 
or practice guidelines may authorize any Federal official or employee to exercise supervision or 
control over the practice of medicine or the manner in which medical services are provided.”). 
152 See infra text accompanying notes 178-84 (discussing cases in the 1910s and 1920s, 
when addiction-treatment exceptionalism emerged, and before medicine had established 
consistent therapeutic benefits). 
153 United States v. Moore, 423 U.S. 122 (1975). 
154 Moore issued over 11,000 prescriptions for methadone in a five-month period, which trans-
lated into over 800,000 methadone tablets and over 100 prescriptions a day. Id. at 126. He billed 
based on the quantity prescribed not the performance of a medical service. Id. Unlike typical 
medical care, and certainly medical care culminating in opioid therapy, he provided “only the 
most perfunctory examination” and typically provided a prescription for the amount of metha-
done requested. Id. On return visits, Moore issued refills without another medical examination. 
Id. These practices yielded in excess of $200,000 over this time period. Id. 
155 Id. at 143 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
156 See, e.g., United States v. Hurwitz, 459 F.3d 463, 474 (4th Cir. 2006) (holding that there 
was probable cause to admit evidence from defendant’s practice because it was “permeated 
with the illegal distribution of drugs,” from high initiation and maintenance fees paid in cash 
to prescribing heavy narcotics doses); United States v. Nelson, 383 F.3d 1227, 1233 (10th Cir. 
2004) (upholding a lower court’s finding that the defendant acted without a legitimate med-
ical purpose in distributing hydrocodone prescriptions over the internet and hiding proceeds 
of sales); United States v. Steele, 147 F.3d 1316 (11th Cir. 1998) (reiterating that defendant’s 
knowledge that he dispensed drugs based on forged prescriptions was sufficient evidence to 
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have noted that while the FDA “was obviously intended to control the 
availability of drugs for prescribing by physicians,” it “did not purport to 
regulate the practice of medicine.”157 There are no cases in the appellate record 
on our reading that examine good faith divergences.158 
Given that healthcare delivery has been regulated by the states histori-
cally, DOT-P would also implicate principles of preemption. These principles 
provide few if any hard limits on federal power. Despite the longstanding norm 
of federal noninterference in medicine, it is clear that the federal government 
can regulate medical practice if it makes its intention to do so clear and unam-
biguous. Supreme Court jurisprudence related to marijuana underscores the 
special breadth and dominance of federal power over drug control.159   
Though the Court’s preemption jurisprudence does not insulate states 
from federal intrusions, there is a longstanding presumption against preemption, 
particularly in areas of traditional state regulation.160 This presumption colored 
the resolution of another controversy over whether states or the federal 
 
show that that activity was outside of the course of professional practice); United States v. 
Rosenberg, 515 F.2d 190, 200 (9th Cir. 1975) (upholding the conviction of a physician 
who prescribed opioids to undercover agents without any physical examination). 
157 United States v. Evers, 643 F.2d 1043, 1048 (5th Cir. 1981); see also United States v. 
Regenerative Sci., LLC, 878 F. Supp. 2d 248, 255 (D.D.C. 2012) (“Defendants state[d] that 
Congress has left the practice of medicine to the States to regulate. FDA does not disagree 
with these principles.”); RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, MANHATTAN INST., THE FDA’S MISGUIDED 
REGULATION OF STEM-CELL PROCEDURES: HOW ADMINISTRATIVE OVERREACH BLOCKS 
MEDICAL INNOVATION 12 (2013) (describing the regulation of medical practice as distinct 
from the FDA’s regulation of drugs and biologics). 
158 This is not surprising. The prevailing model for understanding physician overprescribing 
does not recognize good faith innovations or reasonable extensions of the traditional practice. 
See, e.g., Kelly K. Dineen & James M. DuBois, Between a Rock and Hard Place: Can 
Physicians Prescribe Opioids to Treat Pain Adequately While Avoiding Legal Sanction?, 42 
AM. J.L. MED. 7, 15-18 (describing and criticizing the AMA’s heuristic for categorizing 
overprescribing oriented around the “four Ds,” which refer to physicians who are dated, 
duped, disabled, and dishonest). 
159 After California authorized home production and home use of marijuana for medical 
purposes in the late 1990s, federal officials continued to enforce federal prohibitions on all 
marijuana-related activity. In dispensing with any pretense of a limiting principle for federal 
drug control pursuant to the Interstate Commerce Clause, the Court’s decision in Raich threw 
out an injunction aiming to stop federal law enforcement from interfering with activity that 
California had authorized. Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 33 (2005); see also id. at 49 
(O’Connor, J., dissenting) (“[T]he Court’s definition of economic activity for purposes of 
Commerce Clause jurisprudence threatens to sweep all of productive human activity into 
federal regulatory reach.”). 
160 See Mary J. Davis, The “New” Presumption Against Preemption, 61 HASTINGS L.J. 1217, 
1223 (evaluating the most recent decades in Supreme Court jurisprudence and affirming that 
the presumption against preemption continues to “operate as a meaningful default rule in 
express preemption cases” where there is no clarity from Congress). 
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government define medical practice with controlled substances. In 1999, 
Congress failed to pass an act prohibiting use of controlled substances for 
physician-assisted suicide161 because of widespread concern among lawmakers 
that it impermissibly federalized regulation of medicine.162 The Attorney 
General sought the same result by issuing an interpretive rule stating that 
physician-assisted suicide is not legitimate medical practice.163 The rule 
would have exposed clinicians in Oregon to criminal prosecution under the 
federal law, even if they complied with all the requirements of the state’s 
Death with Dignity statute.164  
According to the Supreme Court, the Attorney General lacked such 
authority. The Court reached this result through a narrow interpretation of the 
power of the Attorney General to promulgate rules.165 It was “evident” that 
“Congress did not delegate to the Attorney General authority to carry out or 
effect all provisions of the [Controlled Substances Act (CSA)]. Rather, he 
can promulgate rules relating only to ‘registration’ and ‘control,’ and ‘for the 
 
161 The Pain Relief Promotion Act of 1999, H.R. 2260, 106th Cong. (2000). 
162 See, e.g., Pain Relief Promotion Act: Hearing Before the Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th 
Cong. 22 (2000) (statement of Sen. Ron Wyden) (“[The bill] would allow the Federal Gov-
ernment to intrude into the doctor-patient relationship at one of the most difficult and 
personal times of an individual's life.”); S. REP. NO. 106-299, at 61 (2000) (“[T]his poorly 
written, poorly thought-out statute would wreak havoc on States’ traditional police authority 
to regulate their own doctors—an authority they have enjoyed for more than 200 years . . . . 
In our view, the DEA is not qualified to handle investigations into allegation [sic] of the 
misuse of pain management drugs.”). 
163 According to the interpretive rule, 
assisting suicide is not a “legitimate medical purpose” within the meaning 
of 21 CFR 1306.04 (2001), and . . .  prescribing, dispensing, or adminis-
tering federally controlled substances to assist suicide violates the Con-
trolled Substances Act. Such conduct by a physician registered to dispense 
controlled substances may “render his registration . . . inconsistent with 
the public interest” and therefore subject [it] to possible suspension or rev-
ocation under 21 U.S.C. 824(a)(4). The Attorney General’s conclusion ap-
plies regardless of whether state law authorizes or permits such conduct by 
practitioners or others and regardless of the condition of the person whose 
suicide is assisted. 
66 Fed. Reg. 56,608, 56,608 (Nov. 9, 2001). 
164 Id. 
165 See 21 U.S.C. § 821 (2018) (providing that the Attorney General may “promulgate rules 
. . . relating to the registration and control of the manufacture, distribution, and dispensing of 
controlled substances.”); id. § 871(b) (authorizing the Attorney General to “promulgate and en-
force any rules, regulations, and procedures which he may deem necessary and appropriate for 
the efficient execution of his functions under this subchapter”); Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 
U.S. 243, 259 (2006) (“The CSA gives the Attorney General limited powers, to be exercised 
in specific ways.”). 
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efficient execution of his functions’ under the statute.”166 These provisions, 
according to the Court, do not empower the Attorney General “to make a rule 
declaring illegitimate a medical standard for care and treatment of patients 
that is specifically authorized under state law.”167 This reading of the statute 
relied on an understanding that Attorney General “control” under the CSA is 
limited to the prevention of diversion.168  
It is important not to read too much into the Oregon decision. The 
outcome might have differed if the Attorney General had used notice and 
comment rulemaking or if the rulemaking had come from the Secretary of 
HHS.169 Nevertheless, in striking down the interpretive rule, the Court explained 
that “Congress regulates medical practice insofar as it bars doctors from using 
their prescription-writing powers as a means to engage in illicit drug dealing 
and trafficking,” but the CSA “manifests no intent to regulate the practice of 
medicine generally.”170 The Court did, however, note that “[e]ven though reg-
ulation of health and safety is primarily, and historically, a matter of local 
concern, there is no question that the Federal Government can set uniform 
national standards in these areas.”171 The Court ended that sentence by listing 
a section of the Public Health Services Act,172 to which we now turn. 
 
C. Federal Regulation of OUD Treatment: Hands-On (The Exception) 
 
 
166 Gonzales, 546 U.S. at 259. The limits on the Attorney General’s authority under § 821 are 
discussed further below. As to § 871, the Court wrote: 
This section allows the Attorney General to best determine how to execute 
“his functions.” It is quite a different matter, however, to say that the At-
torney General can define the substantive standards of medical practice as 
part of his authority. To find a delegation of this extent in § 871 would put 
that part of the statute in considerable tension with the narrowly defined 
delegation concerning control and registration. It would go, moreover, 
against the plain language of the text to treat a delegation for the “execu-
tion” of his functions as a further delegation to define other functions well 
beyond the statute’s specific grants of authority. 
Id. at 264-65. 
167 Id. at 258. 
168 See id. at 260 (“The statutory references to ‘control’ outside the scheduling context make 
clear that the Attorney General can establish controls ‘against diversion,’ e.g., §823(a)(1), but do 
not give him authority to define diversion based on his view of legitimate medical practice.”). 
169 See id. at 265 (“The CSA allocates decision making powers among statutory actors so that 
medical judgments, if they are to be decided at the federal level and for the limited objects 
of the statute, are placed in the hands of the Secretary [of HHS].”). 
170 Id. at 270. 
171 Id. at 271. 
172 Id.; 42 U.S.C. § 290bb-2a (2018). 
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The Supreme Court has found one exception in which the federal 
government does appear to regulate medical practice: maintenance and 
detoxification treatment.173 It is a longstanding and curious exception. Prior 
to the Harrison Narcotics Tax Act in 1914, controlled substances were 
mostly unregulated.174 Pursuant to the Harrison Narcotics Tax Act, all dis-
tribution of heroin, morphine, and cocaine was banned except for prescriptions 
“by a physician . . . in the course of his professional practice.”175  
Physicians, who were still transforming from a trade to a profession,176 
tested the limits of this exception. The results of many of these cases were 
described then and are still sometimes described today as convictions for 
prescribing heroin and other drugs for “maintenance” therapy.177 The 
Webb decision in 1919 in particular is billed as a firm statement by the Supreme 
Court that heroin maintenance therapy is not a legitimate form of treatment.178 
 
173 See Gonzales, 546 U.S. at 271 (“In connection to the CSA, however, we find only one 
area in which Congress set general, uniform standards of medical practice.”). 
174 Erik Grant Luna, Our Vietnam: The Prohibition Apocalypse, 46 DEPAUL L. REV. 483, 
486, 503-04 (1997). 
175 Pub. L. No. 63-223, § 2(a), 38 Stat. 785, 786 (1914) (repealed 1939). 
176 The practice of medicine transformed in the first quarter of the twentieth century. Until 
that time, it was largely unregulated, and had little scientific basis. This little therapeutic 
reach perpetuated limited social and political power. For example, as Victor Vaughan, dean 
of the University of Michigan Medical School tellingly stated, 
I served in the war with Spain in 1898, and I went time and again to a 
division officer and made certain requests or offered advice. As a rule, I 
was snubbed and told by action, if not by words, that I was only a medical 
officer, and that I had no right to make any suggestions, and it was impru-
dent of me to do so. The commanding general at Chickamauga [an army 
camp], when we had an increasing number of cases of typhoid fever, would 
every day ostentatiously ride up to a well which had been condemned and 
drink of this water to show his contempt. But in the late war I had a different 
experience. I never went to a line officer with a recommendation but that 
he said, “Doctor, it will be done” . . . . 
STARR, supra note 144, at 141; see also MUSTO, supra note 67, at 185 (“The social and eco-
nomic position of the registered physician was so sensitive [in the 1920-30s], trials so time 
consuming, and appeals so long and costly, that hostile agents could make cases against phy-
sicians with impunity and nearly ruin them whether charges were warranted or not.”). 
177 See Diane E. Hoffmann, Treating Pain v. Reducing Drug Diversion and Abuse: Recalibrating 
the Balance in Our Drug Control Laws and Policies, 1 ST. LOUIS U.  J.  HEALTH L. & POL’Y 
231, 260 (2008) (“These Supreme Court cases clearly established that registered physicians 
were permitted to prescribe and dispense narcotic drugs strictly within the bounds of their 
professional practice and that maintenance therapy for addicts was not within such bounds. 
They set the stage for practitioner investigations and prosecutions for years to come.” (inter-
nal quotation marks omitted)). 
178 Webb v. United States, 249 U.S. 96 (1919); see Richard C. Boldt, Drug Policy in Context: 
Rhetoric and Practice in the United States and the United Kingdom, 62 S.C. L. REV. 261, 
280 (2010) (“In [Webb], the Court held that the legitimate practice of medicine did not 
include the provision of maintenance doses of narcotics to addicts.”). 
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But this is a strained reading. The issues in Webb and other cases like it were 
clear examples of profiteering either incidental or totally unrelated to 
maintenance therapy.179 The Court recognized the conflation in Webb a few 
years later in its Linder decision. Linder had been prosecuted for prescribing a 
reasonable amount of cocaine and morphine to a woman with stomach pain 
following a normal medical examination, which was absent from other high-
profile prosecutions.180 The Court unanimously overturned the conviction, 
noting that “[o]bviously, direct control of medical practice in the states is 
beyond the power of the federal government.”181 
Notwithstanding the Court’s full-throated defense of medical auton-
omy, the arrests and prosecution of hundreds of physicians in the time pe-
riod between Webb and Linder182 emboldened law enforcement and their 
 
179 See, e.g., United States v. Behrman, 258 U.S. 280, 286-89 (1922) (holding that the indictment 
of a physician who prescribed to one person 150 grains of heroin, 360 grains of morphine, 
and 210 grains of cocaine to one person for home use as the “patient” saw fit was proper 
under the Narcotic Drug Act); United States v. Jin Fuey Moy, 241 U.S. 394, 400, 402 (1916) 
(upholding the lower court’s decision to quash an indictment for flagrant and indiscriminate 
morphine prescribing and charging per gram prescribed by narrowly reading the controlling 
statute solely as a revenue measure and confining its narcotic regulating powers). 
180 Compare Linder v. United States, 268 U.S. 5, 16-17, 22-23 (1925) (finding that the petitioner 
had not violated the Harrison Narcotics Tax Act by treating his opiate-addicted patient with 
a small amount of narcotics for her use alone), with United States v. Doremus, 249 U.S. 86, 
94-95 (1919) (upholding § 2 of the Harrison Narcotics Tax Act as constitutional under the 
taxing authority of Congress, because a large volume of drugs dispensed to one individual 
likely would be sold to third parties in violation of the Act), and Behrman, 258 U.S. at 289 
(upholding the indictment of a physician because, based on the enormous quantity of pills—more 
than 3000 ordinary doses—allegedly prescribed to a known addict, the defendant physician 
would not have been acting in the course of his professional practice). 
181 As the Linder Court explained, 
The enactment under consideration levies a tax . . . upon every person who 
imports, manufactures, produces, compounds, sells, deals in, dispenses or 
gives away opium or coca leaves or derivatives therefrom, and may regu-
late medical practice in the States only so far as reasonably appropriate for 
or merely incidental to its enforcement. It says nothing of “addicts” and 
does not undertake to prescribe methods for their medical treatment. They 
are diseased and proper subjects for such treatment, and we cannot possi-
bly conclude that a physician acted improperly or unwisely or for other 
than medical purpose solely because he has dispensed to one of them, in 
the ordinary course and in good faith, four small tablets of morphine or 
cocaine for relief of conditions incident to addiction. 
Linder, 268 U.S. at 18. 
182 More than 5000 physicians were fined or jailed for these offenses between 1915 and 1938. 
ARNOLD TREBACH, THE HEROIN SOLUTION 125 (1982). 
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legislative allies,183 who quickly turned to limiting Linder through what can 
only be described as regulatory exceptionalism.184 The resulting statutes 
were consolidated in 1970 with the adoption of the CSA.185  
For our purposes, the CSA does four important things: it (1) forbids 
all activity with controlled substances by clinicians outside of “the course of 
[their] professional practice,”186 (2) defines detoxification and maintenance 
as terms of art,187 (3) limits the dispensing of schedule II substances for use 
in maintenance and detoxification,188 and (4) requires clinicians providing 
 
183 Even in the 1960s, four decades after Linder, Narcotics Bureau regulations advising doctors 
and pharmacists of their rights in dealing with addicts continued to ignore what the Supreme 
Court had so plainly said, and still relied on the discredited language of Webb: 
An order purporting to be a prescription issued to an addict or habitual user 
of narcotics, not in the course of professional treatment but for the purpose 
of providing the user with narcotics sufficient to keep him comfortable by 
maintaining his customary use, is not a prescription within the meaning 
and intent of section 4705(c)(2), and the person filling such a [sic] order, 
as well as the person issuing it, shall be subject to the penalties provided 
for violations of the provisions of law relating to narcotic drugs. 
26 C.F.R. § 151.392 (1971), repealed by 36 Fed. Reg. 7778 (Apr. 24, 1971). 
184 One explanation for this exceptionalism is the meek and counter-productive actions of the 
fledgling American Medical Association (AMA). Indeed, a 1924 special committee of the 
AMA suggested that ambulatory treatment of narcotics addicts “begets deception, extends 
the abuse of habit-forming narcotic drugs, and causes an increase in crime.” Rufus G. King, 
The Narcotics Bureau and the Harrison Act: Jailing the Healers and the Sick, 62 YALE L.J. 
736, 745 (1953); see also MUSTO, supra note 67, at 185 (“The social and economic position 
of the registered physician was so sensitive, trials so time consuming, and appeals so long 
and costly, that hostile agents could make cases against physicians with impunity and nearly 
ruin them whether charges were warranted or not.”). 
185 Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-513, 84 
Stat. 1236 (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. §§ 801–971 (2018)). 
186 21 U.S.C. §§ 828(e); accord id. § 829. 
187 As defined by the CSA, 
The term “maintenance treatment” means the dispensing, for a period in 
excess of twenty-one days, of a narcotic drug in the treatment of an indi-
vidual for dependence upon heroin or other morphine-like drugs . . . . The 
term “detoxification treatment” means the dispensing, for a period not in 
excess of one hundred and eighty days, of a narcotic drug in decreasing 
doses to an individual in order to alleviate adverse physiological or psy-
chological effects incident to withdrawal from the continuous or sustain-
ed use of a narcotic drug and as a method of bringing the individual to a 
narcotic drug-free state within such period. 
Id. § 802 (29)–(30). 
188 The CSA provides that: 
(1) Except as provided in paragraph (2), practitioners who dispense narcotic 
drugs to individuals for maintenance treatment or detoxification treatment 
shall obtain annually a separate registration for that purpose. The Attorney 
 
                                  Journal of Law & Public Affairs                [November 2019 
 
 
 
104 
maintenance and detoxification to complete a special registration process.189 
In sum, under the CSA, no clinician can provide maintenance or detoxification 
treatment with unapproved substances without a special registration (with 
limited exceptions190 ) and no clinician can do anything with controlled 
substances outside of their professional practice.191  
The Controlled Substances Act and the Public Health Services Act 
authorize the Attorney General and the Secretary of HHS to implement 
the CSA through rulemaking.192 According to the Supreme Court, the rule-
making authority of the Attorney General is limited to registration and 
 
General shall register an applicant to dispense narcotic drugs to individuals for 
maintenance treatment or detoxification treatment (or both) 
(A) if the applicant is a practitioner who is determined by the Secretary to 
be qualified (under standards established by the Secretary) to engage in the 
treatment with respect to which registration is sought; 
(B) if the Attorney General determines that the applicant will comply with 
standards established by the Attorney General respecting (i) security of 
stocks of narcotic drugs for such treatment, and (ii) the maintenance of 
records (in accordance with section 827 of this title) on such drugs; and 
(C) if the Secretary determines that the applicant will comply with 
standards established by the Secretary (after consultation with the Attorney 
General) respecting the quantities of narcotic drugs which may be provided 
for unsupervised use by individuals in such treatment. 
Id. § 823. 
189 Id. 
190 Under the “three-day rule,” in emergency situations where the immediate relief of a 
person’s acute withdrawal symptoms is necessary, while arrangements for referral to an OTP 
for treatment are being made, a physician may administer narcotic drugs to that person, but 
only for a maximum of three days. 21 C.F.R. § 1306.07(b) (2018); see also Emergency 
Narcotic Addiction Treatment, U.S. DEP’T JUST. DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMIN.: DIVERSION 
CONTROL DIVISION, https://www.deadiversion.usdoj.gov/pubs/advisories/emerg_treat.htm 
[https://perma.cc/7UGX-XCSX] (last visited Nov. 3, 2019) (confirming that the three-day 
rule can only be invoked by unregistered practitioners to alleviate a patient’s acute with-
drawal symptoms when the treatment is given in single-day doses, for no longer than 72 
hours, and while arranging for the patient to enter treatment). In addition to the “three-day 
rule,” the DEA permits wider latitude regarding treatment of intractable pain. See 21 C.F.R. 
§ 1306.07(c). 
191 21 U.S.C. § 829 (a)–(b). 
192 Aside from authority over scheduling, which is not relevant for our purposes, the CSA has 
two provisions authorizing the Attorney General to promulgate rules. Section 821 provides that 
she may “promulgate rules . . . relating to the registration and control of the manufacture, 
distribution, and dispensing of controlled substances.” Id. §821. Section 871(b) authorizes 
the Attorney General to “promulgate and enforce any rules, regulations, and procedures 
which he may deem necessary and appropriate for the efficient execution of his functions 
under this subchapter.” Id. § 871(b). 
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controlling diversion.193 This provides the basis for DEA regulations limiting 
prescriptions (i.e., authorizations to obtain substances for unsupervised home 
use),194 which obviously present greater risk of diversion compared to direct 
administration.195 DEA regulations include a general requirement limiting 
prescriptions to “legitimate medical practice”196 and a specific prohibition of pre-
scribing Schedule II substances for maintenance or detoxification treatment.197  
The HHS Secretary’s rulemaking authority is considerably broader. 
The Public Health Services Act directs HHS to “determine the appropriate 
methods of professional practice in the medical treatment of the narcotic 
addiction of various classes of narcotic addicts,” after consultation with the 
Attorney General.198 HHS has utilized this authority to promulgate regulations 
restricting this practice in Opioid Treatment Programs (OTPs).199 An OTP is 
a “program or practitioner engaged in opioid treatment of individuals with an 
opioid agonist treatment medication registered under” the section of the CSA 
 
193 See Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 259-60 (2006) (holding that the Attorney General 
“can promulgate rules relating only to registration and control, and for the efficient execution 
of his functions under the statute” but cannot “define diversion based on his view of legitimate 
medical practice.” (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)). 
194 21 C.F.R. § 1300.01(b). “[P]rescription means an order for medication which is dispensed to 
or for an ultimate user but does not include an order for medication which is dispensed 
for immediate administration to the ultimate user (e.g., an order to dispense a drug to a bed 
patient for immediate administration in a hospital is not a prescription).” Id. (emphasis removed). 
195 The important distinction between administration and prescription has been obscured in 
drug policy discourse. As Rufus King explains, 
There is a much-neglected distinction between prescription of narcotics to 
an addict for self-administration, and direct administration by the physi-
cian. The former is the subject of valid criticism, i.e., it does remove all 
restraints on consumption by the addict, and the drugs prescribed may be 
resold in the illicit traffic. There is merit in the suggestion, made from time 
to time, that all self-administration of narcotics should be made illegal. The 
‘official line’ has always ignored this distinction, equating prescription for 
self-administration with direct or supervised administration, and attacking 
both as ‘ambulatory treatment. 
King, supra note 184, at 740 n.23. 
196 21 C.F.R. § 1306.04(a) (“A prescription for a controlled substance to be effective must be 
issued for a legitimate medical purpose by an individual practitioner acting in the usual 
course of his professional practice.”). 
197 Id. § 1306.04(c) (“A prescription may not be issued for ‘detoxification treatment’ or 
‘maintenance treatment,’ unless the prescription is for a Schedule III, IV, or V narcotic drug 
approved by the Food and Drug Administration specifically for use in maintenance or detoxifi-
cation treatment.”). Nevertheless, dispensing is permitted. See id. § 1306.07(a) (“A practitioner 
may administer or dispense directly (but not prescribe) a narcotic drug listed in any schedule 
to a narcotic dependent person for the purpose of maintenance or detoxification treatment if 
the practitioner meets [qualifying] conditions . . . .”). 
198 42 U.S.C. § 290bb–2a (2018). 
199 See 42 C.F.R. §§ 8.1–8.2. 
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defining maintenance and detoxification treatment.200 Those operating under 
this catchall “shall use only those opioid agonist treatment medications that 
are approved by the Food and Drug Administration . . . in the treatment of 
opioid use disorder,” which under associated regulations only includes 
methadone, levomethadyl acetate (LAAM), or buprenorphine.201  
The DEA’s regulations provide some exceptions to the requirement 
that physicians specifically register to provide FDA-approved narcotics to 
treat OUD. In emergency situations where the immediate relief of a person’s 
acute withdrawal symptoms is necessary while arrangements for referral to 
an OTP for treatment are being made, a physician may administer narcotic 
drugs to that person, but only for a maximum of three days.202 In addition to 
the “three-day rule,” the DEA also does not 
impose any limitations on a physician or authorized hospital 
staff to administer or dispense narcotic drugs in a hospital to 
maintain or detoxify a person as an incidental adjunct to 
medical or surgical treatment of conditions other than ad-
diction, or to administer or dispense narcotic drugs to persons 
with intractable pain in which no relief or cure is possible or 
none has been found after reasonable efforts.203   
The DEA and the Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services 
Administration (SAMHSA) have unequivocally stated that restrictions related to 
maintenance and detoxification therapy do not apply to opioid therapy for 
pain.204 Despite considerable discussion of opioid overprescribing, the closest 
 
200 Id. § 8.2. 
201 Id. § 8.12(h)(2). 
202 21 C.F.R. § 1306.07(b). For a description of the limited circumstances in which a practitioner 
who is unregistered as a narcotic treatment program may treat OUD in those experiencing 
acute withdrawal symptoms for up to 72 hours while arranging to refer the patient to an OTP, 
see Emergency Narcotic Addiction Treatment, supra note 190. What is not described is what 
happens if referral cannot be arranged within this time period and the patient continues to 
experience acute withdrawal symptoms. Id. 
203 21 C.F.R. § 1306.07(c). 
204 See id. (stating that there are no “limitations on a physician or authorized hospital staff to 
. . . administer or dispense narcotic drugs to persons with intractable pain in which no relief 
or cure is possible or none has been found after reasonable efforts”); OFFICE OF DIVERSION 
CONTROL, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE,  PHARMACIST’S MANUAL 54 (2004) (“A practitioner may 
prescribe methadone or any other narcotic to a narcotic addict for analgesic purposes.”). This 
allows treatment of patients with opioids indefinitely, if indicated. See Questions & Answers: 
Prescriptions, U.S. DEP’T JUST. DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMIN.: DIVERSION CONTROL DIVISION, 
https://www.deadiversion.usdoj.gov/faq/prescriptions.htm [https:// perma.cc/H3ZF-TAJC] (last 
visited Nov. 3, 2019) (“Federal law and regulations do not restrict the prescribing, dispensing, 
or administering of any schedule II, III, IV, or V narcotic medication, including methadone, for 
the treatment of pain, if such treatment is deemed medically necessary by a registered practitioner 
acting in the usual course of professional practice.”). 
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the federal government has come to regulating pain care “on the books”205 is 
the release of guidelines by the CDC in 2016.206 In response to condemnation 
from the American Medical Association’s House of Delegates in 2018,207 the 
CDC underscored that the guidelines are recommendations, and not a mandate, 
and more recent efforts have focused on remedying policies and practices that 
have resulted from its misapplication.208 There have also been some adjustments 
to Medicare,209 and Congress previously granted the FDA authority to regulate 
post-marketing activity by drug manufacturers.210 But even as the opioid crisis 
 
205 As we note below in Part IV, investigations and prosecutions are also ways to regulate 
prescriptions. Those tools have been used with increasing breadth and intensity, with detrimental 
results. DOT-P is sensitive to such enforcement underscoring the importance of resisting 
knee-jerk supply-side responses, especially given their potential to perpetuate or increase 
opioid-related harms. 
206 The guidelines urge practitioners to avoid opioid dosing above 50 morphine milligram 
equivalents (MME) per day and to complete risk and benefit reviews. Deborah Dowell et al., 
CDC Guidelines for Prescribing Opioids for Chronic Pain—United States, 2016, 65 
MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY REP. 1, 22 (2016). For patients maintained on doses above 
90 MME, doctors were told to conduct and document risk and benefit reviews. Id. 
207 The resolution read in part: 
[N]o entity should use MME (morphine milligram equivalents) thresholds as any-
thing more than guidance, and physicians should not be subject to professional 
discipline, loss of board certification, loss of clinical privileges, criminal prosecu-
tion, civil liability, or other penalties or practice limitations solely for prescribing 
opioids at a quantitative level above the MME thresholds found in the CDC Guide-
line for Prescribing Opioids. 
AM. MED. ASS’N HOUSE OF DELEGATES (I-18), REPORT OF REFERENCE COMMITTEE B 1-40 
(2018), https://www.ama-assn.org/system/files/2018-11/i18-refcomm-b-annotated.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/L8R2-FVVZ]. 
208 See Opioid Overdose, Frequently Asked Questions, CTRS. DISEASE CONTROL, https:// 
www.cdc.gov/drugoverdose/prescribing/faq.html [https://perma.cc/3PRH-TRNC] (last vis-
ited Oct. 9, 2019) (“The Guideline is not a regulation, but rather a set of recommendations. 
The recommendations in the Guideline are voluntary, rather than prescriptive standards.”). 
209 These adjustments include a mandated system of electronic prescribing for controlled 
substances, electronic prior authorization requirements for Part D drugs, a new drug man-
agement program or “lock-in program,” for Part D patients, hard safety edits for opioids, and 
seven-day limits on initial opioid prescriptions for acute pain under Part D. See generally 
CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., A PRESCRIBER’S GUIDE TO THE NEW MEDICARE 
PART D OPIOID OVERUTILIZATION POLICIES FOR 2019 (2018), https://www.cms.gov/ Out-
reach-and-Education/Medicare-Learning-Network-MLN/MLNMattersArticles/Down 
loads/SE18016.pdf [https://perma.cc/76H7-3G7X]. There will also be a real-time safety edit 
at 90 morphine milligram equivalents (MME) per day, which could be triggered when a 
beneficiary reaches a cumulative level of 90 MME per day across all their opioid prescriptions. 
Id. at  2-3. Patients in hospice care, long-term care facilities, or who are receiving palliative 
or end-of-life care, or are being treated for cancer-related pain, will be exempt from these 
rules. Id. at 4-5. 
210 See, e.g., Marta J. Brooks, Mitigating the Safety Risks of Drugs with a Focus on Opioids: 
Are Risk Evaluation and Mitigation Strategies the Answer?, 89 MAYO CLINIC PROC. 1673, 
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intensified, federal agencies have endeavored not to deter pain care at least in 
formal written policy.211  
 
D.   A Straight Path with the Law on the Books  
 
Large cities in the United States are grappling with dramatic increases 
in public injection drug use. The people engaged in this public injection drug 
use represent a very small portion of the overall population of people with OUD. 
In Philadelphia, for example, there are an estimated 50,000 people misusing 
prescription opioids and an estimated 70,000 people using heroin,212 but 
fewer than 2,000 people with a substance use disorder are “street homeless” 
at any given time.213 Frontline social and health service providers report that 
the needs of this population are extensive, but many are not ready to engage 
in maintenance or detoxification treatment. Although medication treatment is 
scarce in many parts of the country, in some cities, such as Philadelphia, as 
many as a quarter of all inpatient beds are empty.214 To the extent that pain is 
 
1678 (2014) (describing the history of Risk Evaluation and Mitigation Strategies (REMS) 
and noting that the FDA approved a REMS program for extended-release and long-action 
opioids in 2012 that included new product labeling and required manufacturers to offer opi-
oid training programs for prescribers on a voluntary basis). 
211 In light of concerns that the CSA overly burdens access to opiates and other controlled 
substances needed in the treatment of pain, federal agencies have reaffirmed their role in 
ensuring that anti-diversion efforts do not compromise the provision of medical care. See, 
e.g., Dispensing Controlled Substances for the Treatment of Pain Notice, 71 Fed. Reg. 
52,719, 52,719–20 (Sept. 6, 2006) (“DEA takes just as seriously its obligation to ensure that 
there is no interference with the dispensing of controlled substances to the American public 
in accordance with the sound medical judgment of their physicians.”). But see infra note 305 
and accompanying text noting that in practice the DEA and other law enforcement agencies 
have increased investigations and prosecutions of clinicians. 
212 MAYOR’S TASK FORCE TO COMBAT THE OPIOID EPIDEMIC IN PHILA., FINAL REPORT & 
RECOMMENDATIONS 6, 7 (2017), http://dbhids.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/OTF_Report.pdf  
[https://perma.cc/2D58-CG5K]. 
213 PHILA. OFFICE OF HOMELESS SERVS., ADDITIONAL HOMELESS POPULATIONS SUMMARY 
FOR PA-500 - PHILADELPHIA COC (2019), http://philadelphiaofficeofhomelessservices.org/ 
wp-content/uploads/2019/05/Subpopulations.pdf [https://perma.cc/BKF2-WZ9P] (report-
ing, from a one night census conducted on January 23, 2019, that 767 people with SUD 
stayed in emergency shelters, 159 in transitional shelters, 133 in safe havens, and 608 people 
with SUD remained unsheltered). 
214 Aubrey Whelan, As Philly Pushes for More Medication-Assisted Drug Treatment, Thousands 
of Treatment Slots Are Still Empty, PHILA. INQUIRER (Jan. 18, 2019), https://www.in-
quirer.com/health/philadelphia-opioids-medication-assisted-treatment-capacity-overdose-
crisis-20190118.html [https://perma.cc/D2SC-DDFE]. This is because of administrative and 
logistical barriers, including issues like tobacco smoking bans and bans on cannabis. Brooke 
Feldman, Why Philly’s Smoking Ban at Addiction Treatment Centers Will Be Harmful, 
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an impediment to stabilizing the lives of people to enable the contemplation 
required for behavior change, a locality might implement DOT-P, as we have 
described it above. 
The federal government might argue that DOT-P is engaged in 
addiction maintenance treatment that does not comply with the multiple statutory 
and regulatory requirements. Operating outside of these boundaries would 
expose DOT-P clinicians to deregistration and criminal prosecution. A clinic 
offering DOT-P would be on strong footing arguing that DOT-P is not 
maintenance, but simply analgesia.215 If the clinic prevailed on this first level of the 
analysis, as we expect it would, the federal government might then offer a more 
nebulous declaration that DOT-P does not constitute professional practice.216  
At its core, then, this would present an interpretive case. The threshold 
question for the analysis is whether there is ambiguity in the relevant statutes and 
regulations:217 specifically, whether DOT-P fits within the definition of 
maintenance.218 We actually think, in contrast, that it is reasonable to read the 
plain language of the CSA and its associated regulations as unambiguously 
carving DOT-P out of the definition of maintenance. However, on the chance 
that a court differed from our plain language analysis, we also construe 
potential ambiguities in the legal text in terms of legislative intent and in light 
of principles of statutory interpretation.  
 
FILTER MAG. (Feb. 12, 2019), https://filtermag.org/philadelphia-smoking-ban-addiction-
treatment-harm-reduction/ [https://perma.cc/W75X-EATM]; Enos, supra note 27, at 5; Nina 
Feldman, Philly Health Officials, Advocates Split on Impact of Smoking Ban at Inpatient Rehabs, 
WHYY (June 25, 2019), https://whyy.org/articles/philly-health-officials-advocates-split-on-
impact-of-smoking-ban-at-inpatient-rehabs/ [https://perma.cc/S6ZM-2Z5E]. 
215 This is not to say that medical necessity arguments do not make sense conceptually or that 
other constitutional arguments are not worth arguing. Some cases hint at a constitutional 
right to adequate pain relief. See, e.g., Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 736-37 
(1997) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“The parties and amici agree that in these States a patient 
who is suffering from a terminal illness and who is experiencing great pain has no legal barriers 
to obtaining medication, from qualified physicians, to alleviate that suffering, even to the point 
of causing unconsciousness and hastening death.”). However, we find it hard to believe that the 
Roberts Court would rely on constitutional principles in addressing a DOT-P challenge, when 
interpretive arguments provide a less disruptive way of resolving the dispute. 
216 DOT-P does not involve prescribing opioids, so the “legitimate medical practice” standard 
does not apply. See infra note 196 and accompanying text. 
217 Textual ambiguity is a required predicate for engaging in statutory construction using legis-
lative intent. See Conn. Nat’l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 254 (1992) (“[W]hen the words 
of a statute are unambiguous, then, this first canon is also the last: ‘judicial inquiry is com-
plete.’”); INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 452-53 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring) 
(“Judges interpret laws rather than reconstruct legislator’s intentions. Where the language of 
those laws is clear, we are not free to replace it with an unenacted legislative intent.”). 
218 Of the two definitions, maintenance provides a more challenging hurdle for DOT-P pro-
ponents, so we focus on it rather than detoxification. 
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The plain language argument in support of DOT-P is simple: the CSA 
regulations at 21 C.F.R. § 1306.07(c) affirmatively recognize a distinction 
between maintenance and primary pain care in the presence of secondary OUD. 
Specifically, they include an exception from OTP regulations, which reads:   
a physician or authorized hospital staff to administer or dispense 
narcotic drugs in a hospital to maintain or detoxify a person as an 
incidental adjunct to medical or surgical treatment of conditions 
other than addiction, or to administer or dispense narcotic drugs 
to persons with intractable pain in which no relief or cure is 
possible or none has been found after reasonable efforts.219  
A grammatically correct construction of the sentence reduces to a carve-out 
from the definitions and therefore the requirements of OTP for “a physician 
. . . to administer or dispense narcotic drugs to persons with intractable pain 
in which no relief or cure is possible or none has been found after reasonable 
efforts.”220 A physician providing DOT-P to John could reasonably fit this 
definition, if the primary indication for John was documented as pain.221 
A factual analysis would show that local healthcare entities spent hundreds of 
thousands of dollars treating John through other clinical channels, yet his 
pain remained the same. There is no legislative or regulatory discussion of what 
constitutes “intractable pain” or “reasonable efforts.”222 But a recent adminis-
trative decision makes clear that these determinations are medical ones and must 
be based on the standards of medical practice as evaluated by a physician.223  
 
219 21 C.F.R. § 1306.07(c) (2018). 
220 Id. 
221 This is so even in a case where a practitioner treats acute pain in a patient with a chemical 
dependency on controlled substances and lowers the dosage over time, in what would appear 
to be treatment similar to detoxification. See William F. Skinner, M.D.; Continuation of Reg-
istration, 60 Fed. Reg. 62,891, 62,891  (Dec. 7, 1995) (finding that, although the patient was 
dependent on the drugs and the respondent was not specially registered as an NTP, the patient 
did not fall under the statutory definition of an “addict” and the respondent was “acting in the 
usual course of his professional practice” by tapering prescriptions following an acute pain 
episode, not performing maintenance or detoxification treatment). 
222 See 21 C.F.R. § 1306.07(c). 
223 See Morris W. Cochran, M.D.; Revocation of Registration, 77 Fed. Reg. 17,505, 17,505  
(Feb. 1, 2012). In this decision, the administrator disputed an ALJ determination that the 
respondent violated 21 C.F.R. § 1306.07(c) because “his charts failed to show the use of any 
treatment options besides the prescribing of controlled substances,” and so he had not em-
ployed “reasonable efforts” to find relief. Id. at 17,520. Instead, the administrator read the 
regulation as requiring “a clinical judgment which must be assessed by reference to the standards 
of medical practice as set by the state medical boards and the profession itself.” Id. A failure 
to recommend alternative treatments was only “some evidence” of failure to comply with the 
regulation when dispensing narcotic drugs without a license to a patient suffering from pain. 
Id. While the respondent ultimately had his registration revoked for other violations, this 
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The government surely would minimize the regulatory language in 
the CFR and rely on the more seemingly encompassing language in the CSA 
itself. It would probably begin by noting that maintenance treatment is 
defined broadly as “the dispensing . . . of a narcotic drug in the treatment of 
an individual for dependence upon heroin or other morphine-like drugs”224 
and that registrations and other requirements attach to any practitioner who 
“dispense[s] narcotic drugs to individuals for maintenance treatment.”225 
However, DOT-P provides treatment with a narcotic drug to people with 
opioid dependence; it does not provide that treatment for opioid depend-
ence.226 Given that the DEA and SAMHSA note that the treatment with opioids 
for pain and for OUD are distinguishable clinically and legally,227 the choice of 
for rather than with should be read as deliberate and understood as limiting.228 
The DEA might also argue that the other exception in § 1306.07(b) 
contemplates and therefore restricts treatment for people with co-occurring 
pain and OUD. The “three-day rule” allows immediate relief of acute withdrawal 
symptoms to bridge the gap to an OTP treatment for someone in a hospital.229 
But treatment of withdrawal is not the primary or even necessarily a secondary 
aim of DOT-P; few DOT-P participants need help preventing withdrawal 
given the ubiquity of street opioids, which contrasts with someone experiencing 
withdrawal inside of a hospital.  
The legislative history and appellate record related to section 
1306.07(b) are sparse. There are only oblique references to the “three-day 
 
portion of the order underscores how the legitimate practice of medicine prevails when 
treating pain with narcotic drugs. Id. at 17522. 
224 21 U.S.C. § 802(29) (2018) (emphasis added). 
225 Id. § 823(g) (emphasis added). 
226 Dependence is not defined in any statute or regulation. Dependence is defined as “a state 
in which an organism functions normally only in the presence of a drug.” Definition of De-
pendence, NAT’L INST. ON DRUG ABUSE, https://www.drugabuse.gov/publications /teaching-
packets/neurobiology-drug-addiction/section-iii-action-heroin-morphine/8-definition-de-
pendence [https://perma.cc/7X5W-TLA5] (last visited Nov. 3, 2019). It “manifest[s] as 
physical disturbances when the drug is removed.” Id. 
227 See supra note 204 and accompanying text194. 
228 See, e.g., United States v. Hayes, 794 F.2d 1348, 1353 (9th Cir. 1986) (supporting the 
lower court’s contention that, if the defendant “prescribed the drugs in good faith for legitimate 
medical purpose in the usual course of professional practice and did not prescribe them for 
drug maintenance or addiction he is not guilty,” and obliquely supporting a finding of ‘not 
guilty’ in an instance where “a patient was an addict and the doctor treated his addiction with 
Sched[ule] II drugs, and the patient experienced chronic pain, and the doctor treated the 
chronic pain in a good faith effort”). 
229 See 21 C.F.R. § 1306.07(b) (allowing physicians to administer “narcotic drugs to a person 
for the purpose of relieving acute withdrawal symptoms when necessary while arrangements 
are being made for referral for treatment . . . . Such emergency treatment may be carried out 
for not more than three days and may not be renewed or extended”); see also Emergency 
Narcotic Addiction Treatment, supra note 190. 
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rule” in judicial examinations of other subparts.230 There is no discussion of 
the rule in the preambles of the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) or 
the Final Rule.231 The DEA has forcefully stated that “[t]he 72-hour exception 
offers an opioid dependent individual relief from experiencing acute withdrawal 
symptoms, while the physician arranges placement in a maintenance/ 
detoxification treatment program. This provision was established to augment, 
not to circumvent the separate registration requirement.”232 But this simply 
reflects the interest of the DEA in preserving registration requirements for 
maintenance therapy.233 If DOT-P is not maintenance therapy, the three-day 
rule is inapposite.  
 
230 See, e.g., United States v. Ilayayev, 800 F. Supp. 2d 417, 446 (E.D.N.Y. 2011) (citing 21 
C.F.R. § 1306.07(c) as an example of an exception to the limitations on prescribing opioids 
as part of a long discussion of the opioid crisis in the United States while ultimately uphold-
ing the defendant’s revoked supervised release and new sentence); United States v. Witt, 
1982 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14387, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (citing an older version of the regulation to 
uphold a pharmacist’s indictment for “willfully and knowingly” prescribing and dispensing 
scheduled drugs “without legitimate medical purpose and outside the usual course of professional 
practice” (internal quotation marks omitted)); United States v. Cap Quality Care, Inc., 486 F. 
Supp. 2d 47, 50 n.3 (Me. 2007) (dispensing with 21 C.F.R. § 1306.07 as only indirectly supporting 
the fact that “prescriptions for methadone are illegal” in maintenance or detoxification treatment, 
instead finding that 21 C.F.R. § 1306.04(c) better supports that proposition). 
231 See 39 Fed. Reg. 37,983, 37,983 (Oct. 25, 1974); 39 Fed. Reg. 26,424, 26,424  (July 19, 
1974). The legislative history and congressional records, too, were silent on subpart (b), 
which makes sense, since the DEA promulgated the rule four years after the CSA was 
passed giving relatively broad authority to the DEA to do what it pleased, and nothing in the 
authorizing statute makes any mention of any of these rules’ substance. See 21 U.S.C. § 821 
(2018) (giving the Attorney General the authority to “promulgate rules and regulations . . . 
relating to the registration and control of the manufacture, distribution, and dispensing of 
controlled substances and to listed chemicals.”). 
232  Emergency Narcotic Addiction Treatment, supra note 190. 
233 See Randall L. Wolff, M.D.; Decision and Order, 77 Fed. Reg. 5106, 5106 (Feb. 1, 2012)  
(finding that the “three-day rule” exception for non-registered physicians did not permit the 
prescribing of opioids, even to allay acute withdrawal symptoms, for an undefined period of 
time and concluding that the physician had not prescribed the controlled substances with a 
legitimate medical purpose and that the revocation of his registration to dispense controlled 
substances was in the public interest). There exists some case law in the states indicating that 
violating the DEA’s registration requirement for OTPs does not show negligence per se, and 
so good faith treatment beyond the “three-day rule” might end up going to a jury to decide 
whether a practitioner was negligent. See, e.g., Friedel v. Osunkoya, 994 A.2d 746, 756 (Del. 
Super. Ct. 2010) (finding that violating the DEA’s registration requirement for OTPs is not 
a basis to find negligence per se). Nevertheless, a jury trial and revocation of registration is 
a risk few practitioners would be willing to assume. See generally Beth Jung & Marcus M. 
Reidenberg, The Risk of Action by the Drug Enforcement Administration Against Physicians 
Prescribing Opioids for Pain, 7 PAIN MED. 353 (2006) (describing the fear physicians feel 
about losing their registrations for prescribing opioids for pain, although finding that, generally, 
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If a court disagreed with our plain language analysis of § 1306.07(c), 
it would approach the question about the definition of maintenance therapy 
as one of statutory ambiguity. That analysis would begin with an examination 
of legislative intent. The place to start would be the House and Senate discussion 
of the Narcotic Addict Treatment Act (NATA) of 1974, which defined 
maintenance and detoxification treatment and added HHS oversight to 
narcotics treatment.234 As both reports indicate, the CSA additions in NATA 
primarily aimed to prevent diversion of controlled substances into illicit 
channels, which is impossible with DOT-P because opioids are directly 
administered in the clinic. 
The Senate report began by declaring that the bill aimed to help “law 
enforcement agencies . . .  investigate and to curb the diversion and abuse of 
narcotic drugs used in the treatment of narcotic addicts.”235 Specifically, and 
notably, the amendment targeted the “increased opportunity for diversion 
of methadone into the illicit market” caused by the expansion of metha-
done programs after the CSA’s passage three years prior.236 In drafting the 
bill, the Senate weighed the traditional powers the states had to regulate “the 
general practice of medicine” against “the specialized circumstances within 
the purview of the bill [specifically opioid treatment], which entail inordinate 
risks of diversion and unethical profiteering.”237 The Senate report concludes 
by stating that the CSA amendments “will reaffirm the commitment Congress 
 
the risk of an action by the DEA is low for physicians with adequate documentation in the 
medical record). 
234 See Narcotic Addict Treatment Act, Pub. L. No. 93-281 §§ 2-3, 88 Stat. 124, 124-125 
(1974). 
235 S. REP NO. 93-192, at 2 (1973). 
236 Id. at 4 (emphasis added). 
237 Id. at 13 (emphasis added). In the end, the Senate placed power in what is now the HHS to 
“approv[e] . . . treatment standards” based on its authority “to determine standards of treatment 
in this area.” Id. at 3, 12. This statement speaks to the fact that maintenance was, at that 
point, delivered exclusively through research exemptions, which was unsustainable. Un-
til the Narcotic Addict Treatment Act of 1974 was passed, maintenance treatment was 
considered a “research endeavor[].” Id. at 11. Programs proliferated well beyond the 
scope that had been anticipated, leading to the necessity of classifying them as defined 
treatment programs. See id. at 11-12 (finding that “[m]ethadone maintenance programs 
were first initiated as research endeavors” and that these criteria were “never intended 
to apply to the massive treatment efforts now in progress nor the proposed expanded 
approval of methadone to the status of a new drug which permits the use of methadone 
for the maintenance treatment of narcotic addiction for all addicts for whom it is medi-
cally justified”). This is in contrast to detoxification programs, which were already es-
tablished and well recognized, and therefore—prior to this amendment—could not be 
regulated in a manner outside of any other general medical practice. See H.R. REP NO. 
93-884, at 9 (1974) (“[T]he Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs has required a 
separate registration of all maintenance programs but has lacked authority to require this 
of detoxification programs.”). 
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made to the nation when it passed the [CSA] by . . . facilitating the prosecu-
tion of those who engage in the criminal distribution of legitimate narcotic 
drugs for profit.”238  
The House report similarly describes the Act as necessary to address 
diversion related to the massive expansion of methadone treatment programs.239 
It declares that the “bill is designed to permit flexibility in treatment, while 
requiring adequate accountability for narcotic drugs administered in that 
treatment,” and it places emphasis on “the increased regulation of metha-
done and other narcotic drugs used in the treatment of narcotic addicts.”240 
The way that representatives sought to accomplish both goals is illustrated 
in the report’s pronouncement that “[t]he intent of the bill is twofold: (1) to 
increase the DEA's ability to deal with law enforcement aspects of diversion; 
and (2) to maintain jurisdiction within FDA over the medical, scientific, and 
public health aspects of narcotic addiction treatment.”241 This second stated 
intention—to maintain FDA’s jurisdiction over medical practice in opioid 
treatment—specifically reflects the drafters’ reaction to FDA’s inability to 
regulate detoxification treatment, despite its similarities to maintenance 
treatment and the attendant potential for diversion.242 
Given the textual and legislative intent arguments available, we 
think that DOT-P would be on solid legal footing facing a challenge from 
federal law enforcement: neither the plain language nor the legislative history 
suggests that treatment of pain with secondary OUD must conform with 
maintenance or any other requirements beyond the generally prevailing 
obligation of professional practice. But it is also important to note that even 
if federal lawyers could introduce more ambiguity into the analysis, the legal 
principles for addressing that ambiguity militate in favor of DOT-P. In 
particular, three constitutional issues inflect the construction of the statutes 
and regulations in ways that support DOT-P proponents: the presumption 
against preemption, the rule of lenity, and the plausible right to pain care. 
 
238 S. REP NO. 93-192, at 15 (emphasis added). 
239 See H.R. REP NO. 93-884, at 1 (claiming that as narcotics treatment programs have 
expanded, methadone diversion from these programs has increased). 
240 Id. at 4. 
241 Id. 
242 The House Report explained that 
the joint DEA-FDA regulatory efforts did bring about some improve-
ment in the quality of methadone maintenance programs, did result in 
the closing of some of the worst programs, and did lay the groundwork 
for further legal developments, but regrettably left many problems un-
solved, particularly with respect to diversion of methadone used for 
detoxification. 
Id. at 3. 
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The Court’s preference for avoiding far-reaching constitutional rulings 
suggests that any one or all three provide a basis for steering the interpreta-
tion of maintenance towards a more limited construction.243   
The Court has established that in areas of traditional state concern—
of which regulation of medical practice is a classic example244—there exists 
a presumption against preemption.245 The Court requires that, “when choice 
has to be made between two readings of what conduct Congress has made a 
crime, it is appropriate, before we choose the harsher alternative, to require 
 
243 What had once been called a “cardinal principle” of judicial restraint, the avoidance doc-
trine is the principle that, if faced with a statute whose interpretation raises a constitutional 
issue, a court should determine “whether a construction of the statute is fairly possible by 
which the question may be avoided.” See Ashwander v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 
348 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring) (quoting Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 62 (1932)). 
In recent years, the Supreme Court has weaponized the avoidance doctrine, relying on 
“active avoidance” to develop new constitutional law principles and to rewrite statutes 
beyond how they might “more naturally” be read. See e.g., Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. 
Sebelius (NFIB), 567 U.S. 519, 574 (2012) (“[I]t is only because we have a duty to construe 
a statute to save it, if fairly possible, that § 5000A can be interpreted as a tax.”); see also 
Neal Kumar Katyal & Thomas P. Schmidt, Active Avoidance: The Modern Supreme Court 
and Legal Change, 128 HARV. L. REV. 2109, 2112 (2019) (discussing how the modern shift 
in the constitutional avoidance doctrine under the Roberts Court “leads to tortured construc-
tions of statutes that bear little resemblance to laws actually passed by the elected branches” 
through “sloppy and cursory constitutional reasoning”). Nevertheless, courts continue to rely 
on the doctrine generally. Tangentially, in an interesting parallel, NFIB used a maneuver 
similar to that employed in the early Harrison Narcotic Drug Act cases discussed supra by 
construing the federal government’s taxing powers to extend beyond their rational limits. 
Compare NFIB, 567 U.S. at 574 (“[I]t is only because we have a duty to construe a statute 
to save it, if fairly possible, that §5000A [a provision of the ACA] can be interpreted as a 
tax.”), with United States v. Doremus, 249 U.S. 86, 95 (1919) (upholding the constitutional-
ity of the Harrison Act as a revenue measure—before the DEA, narcotics enforcement was 
administered by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue—because the defendant’s patient 
was prescribed more narcotic doses than he would likely use and “[h]e might sell some to 
others without paying the [Harrison Act’s] tax,” thus frustrating the overall goal of the Act, 
“facilitating the collection of the revenue”). 
244 The Court has emphasized that 
There can be no question of the authority of the State in the exercise of its 
police power to regulate the administration, sale, prescription and use of 
dangerous and habit-forming drugs . . . . The right to exercise this power 
is so manifest in the interest of the public health and welfare, that it is 
unnecessary to enter upon a discussion of it beyond saying that it is too 
firmly established to be successfully called in question. 
Minnesota ex rel. Whipple v. Martinson, 256 U.S. 41, 45 (1921). 
245 According to the Supremacy Clause, the U.S. Constitution, federal statutes, federal regu-
lations, and ratified treaties trump the laws of the states when a direct conflict exists. U.S. 
CONST. art. VI. However, there is a presumption against federal preemption when it comes 
to the exercise of “historic police powers of the States.” Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 
U.S. 218, 230 (1947). 
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that Congress should have spoken in language that is clear and definite.”246 
This presumption exists also in administrative and civil cases, as the Court 
“ha[s] never assumed lightly that Congress has derogated state regulation, but 
instead ha[s] addressed claims of pre-emption with the starting presumption 
that Congress does not intend to supplant state law.”247  
Constitutional principles also require criminal statutes to clearly 
define proscribed activity.248 Without such clarity, criminal laws are considered 
impermissibly vague for failing to warn citizens of potential sanctions and 
for inviting arbitrary enforcement.249 This suggests that a court facing two 
plausible interpretations should shy away from the one involving prosecution 
of a practitioner acting with a reasonable claim to legality.250 It also means 
 
246 United States v. Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp., 344 U.S. 218, 221-22 (1952). 
247 N.Y. State Conf. Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 514 U.S. 645, 
654-55 (1995) (quoting Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. at 230); see also JAMES T. 
O’REILLY, AM. BAR ASS’N, FEDERAL PREEMPTION OF STATE AND LOCAL LAW: 
LEGISLATION, REGULATION AND LITIGATION 7 (2006) (“If the subject matter was ‘traditionally 
regarded as properly within the scope of state superintendence,’ or a matter of public 
health or safety, then the courts rely more heavily on the presumption that states will 
continue to have an important role.”). 
248 As the Connally Court explained: 
The terms of a penal statute . . . must be sufficiently explicit to inform those 
who are subject to it what conduct on their part will render them liable to its 
penalties . . . [A]nd a statute which either forbids or requires the doing of an 
act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess 
at its meaning and differ as to its application, violates the first essential of due 
process of law. 
Connally v. Gen. Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926). 
249 This is sometimes referred to as the Rule of Lenity. See, e.g., Papachristou v. City of 
Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 162 (1972) (“If a statute or ordinance is so indefinite that ‘it 
encourages arbitrary and erratic arrests and convictions,’ it will be void for vagueness.”); 
Rewis v. United States, 401 U.S. 808, 812 (1971) (holding that, where the statute is 
silent and legislative history absent on a particular issue, “ambiguity concerning the am-
bit of criminal statutes should be resolved in favor of lenity”); United States v. Harriss, 
347 U.S. 612, 617 (1954) (“It is settled that, as a matter of due process, a criminal statute 
that ‘fails to give a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice that his contemplated con-
duct is forbidden by the statute’ is void for vagueness.”). 
250 See, e.g., United States v. Kozminski, 487 U.S. 931, 952 (1988) (“[W]e adhere to the 
time-honored interpretive guideline that uncertainty concerning the ambit of criminal 
statutes should be resolved in favor of lenity.”); Bell v. United States, 349 U.S. 81, 83 
(1955) (“When Congress leaves to the Judiciary the task of imputing to Congress an 
undeclared will, the ambiguity should be resolved in favor of lenity.”). But see Intisar 
A. Rabb, Response, The Appellate Rule of Lenity, 131 HARV. L. REF. F. 179, 198-99 
(2018) (finding that “the Roberts Court rejected lenity in favor of broad constructions in 
31 of its 44 lenity-eligible cases . . . . In the vast majority of these cases (all but 6), the 
Court asserted that its readings were dictated by the texts’ ‘plain meaning[s]’ . . . despite 
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that the prosecution would have to prove that the clinician knowingly or 
intentionally administered a prohibited narcotic outside the usual course 
of professional practice. Establishing the requisite intent—or mens rea—has 
proven difficult in misprescribing prosecutions.251 Courts have generally 
allowed evidence of good faith in such cases.252 Because these cases exclusively 
involve prescribing—as opposed to administration—usually with minimal 
or no medical evaluation, such good faith arguments are substantially 
weaker than a clinician providing DOT-P could offer.  
The difficulty and uncertainty in the diagnosis and treatment of 
pain complicates identifying the requisite mens rea. Determining whether pain 
or OUD is the primary indication or whether addressing one is contingent on 
addressing the other relies on individualized assessments that cannot be reduced 
to bright lines and biologic indicators. Courts have been reluctant to impose 
criminal sanctions when guilt hinges on physicians making impossible clinical 
judgments—such as identifying the moment viability occurs in abortion-related 
 
concurrences or dissents raising alternative plausible meanings and sometimes arguing 
for lenity.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
251 As the Ninth Circuit explained, 
a practitioner who acts outside the usual course of professional practice may 
be convicted under § 841(a) only if he does so intentionally. . . . 
Simply put, to convict a practitioner under § 841(a), the government 
must prove . . . that the practitioner acted with intent to distribute the 
drugs and with intent to distribute them outside the course of professional 
practice. In other words, the jury must make a finding of intent not 
merely with respect to distribution, but also with respect to the doctor’s 
intent to act as a pusher rather than a medical professional. 
United States v. Feingold, 454 F.3d 1001, 1007-08 (9th Cir. 2006). 
252 See, e.g., United States v. Hurwitz, 459 F.3d 463, 476 (4th Cir. 2006) (noting that 
“a doctor’s good faith generally is relevant to a jury’s determination of whether the 
doctor acted outside the bounds of medical practice or with a legitimate medical purpose 
when prescribing narcotics,” although still sentencing the defendant to nearly five 
years in prison); see also Diane E. Hoffmann, Physicians Who Break The Law, 53 ST. 
LOUIS U. L.J. 1049, 1072 (2009) (noting that “the legal system has responded much 
more discriminately, even compassionately in a number of cases where physicians 
appear to be acting to help their patients . . . when the law is in flux or when there is 
considerable societal ambivalence about a law,” as is the case with OUD). 
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litigation253—which constitute little more than “a trap for those who act in 
good faith.”254  
Interpretive arguments would also unfold in the shadow of a plausible 
right to pain care. Although a majority of the Court has never acknowledged 
such a right in a single joint opinion, multiple legal scholars have observed 
that reading across plurality decisions, and some of the Justices have signaled 
that treatment for severe pain is a fundamental right.255 Justice O’Connor 
once remarked that “[t]here is no dispute that dying patients in Washington 
 
253 In the context of abortion, the Court stated, 
The perils of strict criminal liability are particularly acute here because of 
the uncertainty of the viability determination itself. As the record in this 
case indicates, a physician determines whether or not a fetus is viable after 
considering a number of variables: the gestational age of the fetus, derived 
from the reported menstrual history of the woman; fetal weight, based on 
an inexact estimate of the size and condition of the uterus; the woman's 
general health and nutrition; the quality of the available medical facilities; 
and other factors. Because of the number and the imprecision of these 
variables, the probability of any particular fetus’ obtaining meaningful life 
outside the womb can be determined only with difficulty. Moreover, the 
record indicates that even if agreement may be reached on the probability 
of survival, different physicians equate viability with different probabilities of 
survival, and some physicians refuse to equate viability with any numerical 
probability at all. In the face of these uncertainties, it is not unlikely that 
experts will disagree over whether a particular fetus in the second trimester 
has advanced to the stage of viability. The prospect of such disagreement, 
in conjunction with a statute imposing strict civil and criminal liability for 
an erroneous determination of viability, could have a profound chilling 
effect on the willingness of physicians to perform abortions near the point 
of viability in the manner indicated by their best medical judgment. 
Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 395-96 (1979). 
254 United States v. Ragen, 314 U.S. 513, 524 (1942); see also Colautti, 439 U.S. at 395 
(“This Court has long recognized that the constitutionality of a vague statutory standard is 
closely related to whether that standard incorporates a requirement of mens rea.”). 
255 Burt explained, 
the Supreme Court has unanimously ruled that there is no constitutional 
right to physician-assisted suicide. Unexpectedly, however, the Court did 
much more than simply uphold the New York and Washington statutes 
prohibiting assisted suicide. A Court majority effectively required all 
states to ensure that their laws do not obstruct the provision of adequate 
palliative care, especially for the alleviation of pain and other physical 
symptoms of people facing death. 
Robert A. Burt, The Supreme Court Speaks: Not Assisted Suicide but a Constitutional Right 
to Palliative Care, 337 NEW. ENG. J. MED. 1234, 1234 (1997); see Beth Packman Weinman, 
Freedom from Pain: Establishing a Constitutional Right to Pain Relief, 24 J. LEG. MED. 495, 
525-29 (2003) (analyzing different Justices’ concurring opinions in physician-assisted suicide 
cases and concluding that many of the opinions indicate that up to five of the Justices 
on the bench in 2003 “recognize[d] the right to pain relief as fundamental”). 
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and New York can obtain palliative care, even when doing so would hasten 
their deaths.”256 It would be strange, indeed, if the Supreme Court effectively 
upheld a program that hastened death with opioids, over federal claims about 
the legitimacy of the practice (e.g., Gonzales v. Oregon), but not a program 
preventing death with opioids, over similar federal objections. Just as the 
Court avoided weighty constitutional issues about federalism and the right to die 
by disposing of the Oregon case on interpretive grounds, it might similarly avoid 
an interpretation that forced a decision on the right to pain care. 
If, as we suspect, the federal government challenged DOT-P and lost 
the argument that DOT-P is maintenance, it might follow up by suggesting 
that DOT-P falls beyond the bounds of professional practice.257 This would 
be a difficult argument. Considerable evidence and experience support the 
primary treatment modality of DOT-P.258 The definition of what constitutes 
professional practice encompasses all good faith activity between patients 
and providers.259 In the words of a former DEA Legal Counsel, in a description 
of the agency’s efforts to prosecute clinicians for violations of the CSA, 
[a]cts of prescribing or dispensing of controlled substances 
which are done within the course of the registrant’s profes-
sional practice are, for purposes of the Controlled Sub-
stances Act, lawful. It matters not that such acts might con-
stitute terrible medicine or malpractice. They may reflect 
 
256 Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 736-37 (1997) (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
257 A practitioner’s liability for possibly violating the CSA in the case of DOT-P hinges on 
three statutory requirements: 1) a practitioner must knowingly or intentionally 2) dispense 
(including administer) a controlled substance 3) in the course of professional practice. 21 
U.S.C. § 841(a) (2018). Section 829(a) states that, for Schedule II substances, a practitioner 
(other than a pharmacist) directly dispensing the controlled substance to an ultimate user 
does not need a prescription. Id. § 829(a). The definition of a practitioner in the CSA specifies 
that this dispensing must be “in the course of professional practice or research.” Id. § 802(21). 
Only later, once the DEA promulgated its regulations following the CSA’s passage, was an 
additional requirement that the practitioner must prescribe with “a legitimate medical 
purpose . . . in the usual course of his professional practice” added. 21 C.F.R. § 1306.04(a) 
(2018). Statutorily and regulatory-wise, the legitimate medical purpose requirement, there-
fore, only applies to prescribing, and not to a practitioner dispensing directly to an ultimate 
user, as would be the case with DOT-P. The distinction here is important to note, as a physi-
cian administering hydromorphone would only be subject to the ‘in the course of professional 
practice’ requirement. 
258 Based both on the existence of similar practices internationally and the research studies 
discussed in supra note 90. 
259 See Katherine Goodman, Prosecution of Physicians as Drug Traffickers: The United States’ 
Failed Protection of Legitimate Opioid Prescription Under the Controlled Substances Act and 
South Australia's Alternative Regulatory Approach, 47 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 210, 230 
(2008) (“The professional practice requirement of the good faith defense . . . helps to 
ensure that physicians only prescribe controlled substances in the course of medical 
treatment.”). 
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the grossest form of medical misconduct or negligence. 
They are nevertheless legal.260 
The DEA itself, in its most current Practitioner’s Manual, acknowledges 
that “[f]ederal courts have long recognized that it is not possible to expand 
on the phrase ‘legitimate medical purpose in the usual course of professional 
practice’ in a way that will provide definitive guidelines to address all the 
varied situations physicians may encounter.”261 Clinicians act outside of 
their professional practice only when their activities aim not at addressing 
a diagnosed medical complaint but at some other purpose like profit.262 
Undercover agents pursuing overprescribing physicians, the DEA Counsel 
notes, “should present themselves as persons seeking drugs and should 
never give a legitimate medical complaint.”263  
Few cases have explored either the professional practice or legitimate 
medical practice standard.264 Some courts do not draw a distinction between 
 
260 Stephen E. Stone, The Investigation and Prosecution of Professional Practice Cases 
Under the Controlled Substances Act, 10 DRUG ENFORCEMENT 21, 23 (1983). 
261 OFFICE OF DIVERSION CONTROL, DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMIN., PRACTITIONER’S 
MANUAL: AN INFORMATIONAL OUTLINE OF THE CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES ACT  30 (2006), 
https://www.deadiversion.usdoj.gov/pubs/manuals/pract/pract_manual012508.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/6ZYS-TUX6]. 
262 According to Stone, 
While every practitioner case is different, most lend themselves to an 
undercover approach in which agent, posing as a typical client, attempts to 
obtain drugs or prescriptions under circumstances showing lack of a 
physician-patient relationship. In order for a practitioner to prescribe 
or dispense in the course of his professional practice, there must exist 
between the doctor and the ‘patient’ a valid physician-patient relationship. To 
establish this relationship, the patient must come to the physician seeking treat-
ment for some kind of physical or psychological condition or symptomology. 
The physician must then obtain from the patient enough of a medical history 
. . . [and] conduct an examination or other medically recognized pro-
cedure sufficient to make a diagnosis. Finally, there must be a logical 
connection, or nexus, between the drug ultimately prescribed and the 
physical or psychological condition diagnosed. Patients of violative 
physicians typically do not present medical complaints. 
Stone, supra note 260, at 24. 
263 Id. 
264 It is worth noting that all of the following cases involve prescribing, not administering, but 
their opinions refer to dispensing generally, and so might represent the applicable caselaw in in-
stances of administering, as well. 
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the two;265 others refer to both but do not evaluate them separately.266 In 
Moore, the Supreme Court appears to define professional practice based 
simply on whether the defendant procedurally acted like a physician, focusing 
on the fact that “he gave inadequate physical examinations or none at all[,] . 
. . [h]e did not give methadone at the clinic[,] . . . [h]e did not regulate the 
dosage at all, prescribing as much and as frequently as the patient demanded[,] . 
. . [and h]e did not charge for medical services rendered, but graduated his 
fee according to the number of tablets desired.”267 No self-respecting federal 
official would suggest that DOT-P fails the Moore test.268 
 
IV.   PRECISION IN OPIOID POLICY—NOT PENDULUM SWINGS— 
IS KEY TO REDUCING OVERDOSE 
 
As this Article goes to print, federal law enforcement officials are 
appealing a decision in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania ruling that a 
 
265 See, e.g., United States v. Rosenberg, 515 F.2d 190, 197 (9th Cir. 1975) (holding that 
“[t]he two phrases [from 21 U.S.C. § 802(20) and 21 C.F.R. § 1306.04(a)(1974)] in the 
indictment have essentially the same meaning” for purposes of the defendant’s indict-
ment, and relying on a “good faith” standard to determine whether the defendant was 
acting in the course of professional practice). 
266 See, e.g., United States v. Joseph, 709 F.3d 1082, 1103-04 (11th Cir. 2013) (relying 
on testimony regarding medical standards to support a finding that there was enough 
evidence to support the lower court’s sentencing, but incompletely matching that evi-
dence to legitimate medical purpose and the usual course of professional practice, in-
stead ruling on a more general “applicable standard of practice” that appears to subsume 
both terms); United States v. Norris, 780 F.2d 1207, 1209 (5th Cir. 1986) (recognizing 
that there is a difference between the two terms and their provenance, but still supplying 
no language to differentiate their legal applicability); United States v. Guerrero, 650 
F.2d 728, 730-31 (5th Cir. 1981) (reversing defendant’s convictions in the lower court 
because of erroneously admitted evidence pertaining to defendant’s conduct and going 
back and forth between the two terms when evaluating the evidence and combining them 
in interesting ways, such as “normal medical purposes” and “normal course of a medical 
practice,” but never distinguishing between any of the terms’ incarnations). 
267 United States v. Moore, 423 U.S. 122, 142-43 (1975). 
268 In the Safehouse case, Judge McHugh observed that the government’s counsel 
derided [Safehouse's description of the program] as ‘Bizarro World,’ urged 
the Court to ‘be real,’ and seemingly rejected any therapeutic purpose, stat-
ing, ‘They’re not inviting people onto their property just to get treatment or 
whatever other services they’re offering. The whole purpose here is for peo-
ple to use drugs.’ My inclination is to discount these remarks as a moment 
of overly zealous advocacy. But in any case, no plausible reading of the 
pleadings before me supports such a caricature of what Safehouse proposes. 
United States v. Safehouse, No. 19-0519, 2019 WL 4858266, at *24 n.46 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 2, 
2019) (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted). 
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planned SCF in Philadelphia does not violate a section of the CSA.269 Philadel-
phia has the highest rate of fatal overdoses in the country among large cities.270 
The proposed SCF would help bring that rate down while addressing other 
individual and community harms associated with widespread injection drug use 
in public in one particular neighborhood.  
It is a momentous decision. But as the case moves through the courts 
and clears other procedural hurdles, people will continue to experience avoidable 
harm including death. When the stakes are so high, in terms of immediate and 
preventable harm, any delay is horrific. In this Article, we introduce a new 
intensive pain care model to engage an especially vulnerable subset of people 
who inject drugs, namely those experiencing serious and otherwise unmanaged 
pain. This model is essential for addressing substantial avoidable harm 
including death and it is plainly within the bounds of professional practice. 
But we cannot deny that a case involving DOT-P might encounter legal road-
blocks given the grand tradition of drug policy (“drugs bad; prosecution 
good”271) and the DEA’s recent surge in investigations and prosecutions. 
Law enforcement action against DOT-P would be especially ironic 
and misguided. There are valid reasons to be concerned about overprescribing, 
especially in the pill mill incarnation of the problem, which the DEA miserably 
failed to identify and disrupt.272 Preventing diversion and overdose among 
people prescribed opioids also remain legitimate and challenging public 
health priorities. However, the DOT-P model we propose—a highly structured 
dispensing and consumption environment designed to maximize benefits, 
while minimizing the risks—responds to these concerns and challenges with 
 
269 See id. at *11-12 (holding that the “Crack House” statute in the CSA is capable of 
multiple interpretations and that because Congress did not contemplate SCFs when cre-
ating or revising the provision, it does not apply against at SCF); Jeremy Roebuck & 
Aubrey Whelan, Judge: Philly Supervised Injection Site Proposal Does Not Violate Fed-
eral Law, PHILA. INQUIRER (Oct. 2, 2019), https://www.inquirer.com/health/opioid-ad-
diction/safehouse-supervised-injection-site-ruling-philadelphia-mchugh-opioids-20191002. 
html [https://perma.cc/AN27-GGF8] (“Justice Department officials, who had asked the 
judge to declare the supervised injection plan illegal, vowed an immediate appeal.”). 
270 See Alexis M. Roth et al., Overdose Prevention Site Acceptability Among Residents 
and Businesses Surrounding a Proposed Site in Philadelphia, USA, 96 J. URBAN HEALTH 
341, 341-42 (2019) (stating that the more than 1074 overdose deaths involving opioids 
in 2017 constituted a rate of 69.5 per 100,000, higher than in other U.S. cities). 
271 Burris et al., supra note 10, at 1123. 
272 See, e.g., Leo Beletsky & Jeremiah Goulka, The Federal Agency That Fuels the 
Opioid Crisis, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 17, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/17/ 
opinion/drugs-dea-defund-heroin.html [https://perma.cc/M5Q3-VHJW] (describing the 
DEA’s poor design for not being informed by public health or addiction science, and 
thus focusing on eradicating illicit drugs and being “unable to balance legitimate access 
to and control of prescription drugs.”). 
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precision. For this and other reasons, we expect the DOT-P approach and 
others like SCFs to triumph in a saner drug policy in the not so distant future. 
Our optimism is grounded not just on the hint of daylight provided by the 
Safehouse decision but also in converging epidemiological, political, public 
health, and legal dynamics. 
In 2016, as the opioid crisis in the United States worsened, Congress 
passed the Comprehensive Addiction and Recovery Act (CARA).273 It was 
the first time in four decades that Congress adopted major drug policy 
legislation underscoring the gravity of increasing opioid-related harms. 
Nevertheless, CARA only chipped at the edges of the crisis.274 At the tail 
end of 2018, when it became clear that CARA was inadequate to reverse 
the opioid epidemic’s toll, Congress passed the SUPPORT for Patients and 
Communities Act.275 But it, too, operated on the periphery of the crisis.276  
The policy response at the federal and state level has followed a long-
term pattern in search of pharmacological counter-measures. Federal officials 
have accurately acknowledged limitations in existing treatment modalities. 
Former FDA Commissioner Scott Gottlieb recognized that, although current 
OUD treatments do improve outcomes, “relapse rates are still high” and 
“not all patients respond positively to such medications.”277 But the FDA 
 
273 Comprehensive Addiction and Recovery Act of 2016, Pub. L No. 114-98, 130 Stat. 695 (2016). 
274 It expanded the number of patients who could be treated. Id. § 303. It also sought to 
improve information and training campaigns. Id. §§ 102, 202. At the same time, it made 
millions of dollars in grants available to states and medical facilities to expand access to 
methadone and buprenorphine. Id. § 201. 
275 Substance Use-Disorder Prevention that Promotes Opioid Recovery and Treatment 
for Patients and Communities Act, Pub. L. No. 115-271 (2018). 
276 Among other small improvements, it focused on encouraging drug manufacturers and 
distributors to report and stop suspicious orders and expanded treatment programs con-
centrating on opioid diversion and OUD in specific populations, such as mothers and 
infants. Id. §§ 3272, 7061. 
277 Press Release, Food & Drug Admin., Statement from FDA Commissioner Scott Gottlieb, 
M.D., on New Steps to Encourage More Widespread Innovation and Development of New 
Treatments for Opioid Use Disorder (April 20, 2018), https://www.fda.gov/news-events/ 
press-announcements/statement-fda-commissioner-scott-gottlieb-md-new-steps-encourage-
more-widespread-innovation-and [https://perma.cc/EQ92-MGTM]. Indeed, he continued to 
“welcome” the development of new treatments for OUD and indicated that “such therapies 
may qualify for the agency’s expedited review programs.” Id. The FDA and the National 
Institute on Drug Abuse (NIDA) have highlighted the barriers to new MAT drug develop-
ment. Nora D. Volkow et al., Medication Development in Opioid Addiction: Meaningful 
Clinical End Points, 10 SCI. TRANSLATIONAL MED., no. 434, at 1, 1  (noting that “developing 
new medications to reduce the burden caused by opioid-use disorders is a high priority”). 
The FDA also released draft guidance with an expanded list of endpoints to demonstrate the 
effectiveness of a drug for use in MAT. U.S. FOOD & DRUG AD-MIN., GUIDANCE FOR 
INDUSTRY: OPIOID USE DISORDER: ENDPOINTS FOR DEMONSTRATING EFFECTIVENESS OF 
DRUGS FOR MEDICATION-ASSISTED TREATMENT (2018), https://www.fda.gov/media/114948/ 
download [https://perma.cc/6SN5-Q6GB]. 
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has not approved a new medication treatment for maintenance and detoxifica-
tion since 2002,278 in part because the drug approval process is tedious, costly, 
and time-consuming.279  
Improvements in access to methadone and buprenorphine are lifesaving 
for many people, but not all, or at least not without adequate pain control. 
Herein lies a key impediment to sensible reform but also an important practical 
opportunity: opioid use, opioid dependence, and opioid use disorder are not 
monolithic. They differ in their causes and in their clinical presentation.280 
 
278 Letter from Cynthia G. McCormick, Dir., Div. of Anesthetic, Critical Care, and Addiction 
Drug Products, Office of Drug Evaluation II, Ctr. for Drug Evaluation and Research, U.S. 
Food & Drug Admin., to Alan N. Young, Dir., Regulatory Affairs, Reckitt Benckiser (Oct. 
8, 2002), https://www.accessdata.fda.gov/drugsatfda_docs/appletter/2002/20732 20733ltr. 
pdf [https://perma.cc/ ZR4J-4XS3] (“These new drug applications provide for the use of 
Subutex and Suboxone for the treatment of opioid dependence in patients 16 years of age 
and older.”). All MAT drugs have been specifically approved for this purpose through the 
FDA’s prescribed new drug application (NDA) process. See id.; Determination That 
ORLAAM (Levomethadyl Acetate Hydrochloride) Oral Solution, 10 Milligrams/Milliliter, 
Was Not Withdrawn From Sale for Reasons of Safety or Effectiveness, 76 Fed. Reg. 32,366, 
32,366 (June 6, 2011) (discussing the discontinuation of ORLAAM, but recognizing that it 
was submitted for approval via NDA for the management of opioid dependence and was 
approved in 1993); Approved New Drugs Requiring Continuation of Long-Term Studies, 
Records, and Reports; listing of Methadone With Special Requirements for Use, 37 Fed. 
Reg. 26,790, 26,795 (Dec. 15, 1972) (revising prior regulations and listing methadone as a 
drug subject to NDA approval). While the FDA has in recent years approved new forms and 
delivery mechanisms for MAT drugs, those have also gone through the NDA process. See, 
e.g., U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., APPROVAL PACKAGE FOR SUBLOCADE (2017), https:// 
www.accessdata.fda.gov/drugsatfda_docs/nda/2017/209819Orig1s000Approv.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/WP5G-WU97] (approving a new extended release form of buprenorphine for use 
in OTP). In fact, the FDA’s most recent draft guidance document encouraging the develop-
ment of buprenorphine depot products solicits applications through the expedited NDA pro-
cess. U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY: OPIOID USE DISORDER: 
DEVELOPING DEPOT BUPRENORPHINE PRODUCTS FOR TREATMENT (2018), https://www.fda. 
gov/media/ 112739/download [https:// perma.cc/EHG2-SL4F]. However, this draft guidance 
document also hedges, stating that using the expedited 505(b)(2) NDA submission pathway 
“may be appropriate” for this form of buprenorphine. Id. at 1. 
279 See Cassandra L. Santoro, Overdosing on Authority: Negative Side Effects of the FDA's 
Proposal for Generic Label Changes May Include Increased Costs and Liabilities, 49 
SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 183, 185-88 & n.41 (2016) (stating that “[t]he process for filing a new 
drug application is cumbersome and extensive” and noting that, over the course of a decade, 
“brand-name drug manufacturers invested over $500 billion in research and development for 
[300 approved] new drugs.”). The FDA itself has indicated in multiple statements and papers 
that it is seeking more, and better, drugs for use in MAT. See supra note 277. Nevertheless, 
even in its solicitations for a specific MAT drug that it intends to approve, it requires that the 
developer go through the NDA process, albeit on an expedited timetable. See id. 
280 Opioid Use Disorder (OUD) is defined as opioid use leading to a clinically significant impair-
ment or distress, as indicated by two or more of ten possible symptoms. AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, 
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The people likely to benefit from DOT-P represent a concentrated subset of 
people who experience OUD along with co-occurring pain and housing 
instability. Better access to OUD pharmacotherapy alone will not fully 
address their needs, especially considering the limited models for providing 
OAT in the United States. And to the extent that their needs are not met, 
communities will continue to experience the effects of public injection drug 
use, which are largely preventable.  
Federal officials have celebrated—sometimes cautiously and 
sometimes not281—that the epidemic has crested in part through federal 
initiatives.282 But the evidence on the ground is far more complex. Public 
drug use is widely prevalent in many urban areas, producing infections and 
community effects.283 An outbreak of hepatitis A in Philadelphia284 underscores 
the challenges in reducing the incidence and harms of public injection drug 
use. The only way to break the cycles that perpetuate public injection is 
through interventions like DOT-P, and, to a lesser extent, SCFs. Although 
some of the most affected neighborhoods have opposed SCFs in the United 
States, that opposition is grounded in mistaken beliefs that SCFs will promote 
 
DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS (DSM-5) § 2.17.22 (5th ed. 
2013) (ebook). Of the 256 possible combinations of opioid-related symptoms that meet 
the diagnostic criteria, some are exclusively physiological, and others are exclusively social. Id. 
OUD severity is mild when there are 2 or 3 of these symptoms, mild when there are 4 or 5 of 
these symptoms, and severe when there are 6 or more of these symptoms. Id. 
281 See, e.g., Press Release, U.S. Dep’t. of Health and Human Servs., Secretary Azar State-
ment on 2018 Provisional Drug Overdose Death Data (July 17, 2019), https://www.hhs. 
gov/about/news/2019/07/17.html [https://perma.cc/DQG6-TU56] (“While the declining 
trend of overdose deaths is an encouraging sign, by no means have we declared victory 
against the epidemic or addiction in general. This crisis developed over two decades and it 
will not be solved overnight.”); Donald Trump, Remarks in a Meeting on Opioids (June 12, 
2019),  https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-president-trump-meet-
ing-opioids/ [https://perma.cc/4BA6-JHRV] (“And I think what we do—this is a meeting on 
opioid [sic] and the tremendous effect that’s taken place over the last little period of time. 
And I’m very proud of it and the people working so hard on it.”). 
282 See Abby Goodnough, Josh Katz & Margot Sanger-Katz, Drug Overdose Deaths Drop in 
U.S. for First Time Since 1990, N.Y. TIMES (July 17, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/ in-
teractive/2019/07/17/upshot/drug-overdose-deaths-fall.html [https://perma.cc/LL5V-PC7C] 
(noting that, although overdose deaths have decreased, much of that decrease is due to limits 
on opioid painkiller prescribing; whereas overdoses related to other drugs, such as fentanyl, 
have continued to increase). 
283 See Sutter et al., supra note 89, at 63, 65 (describing community harms associated with 
public injection drug use, such as increased secondary infections and syringe litter). 
284 See, e.g., Health Alert, Phila. Dep’t. of Pub. Health, Hepatitis A Increases in Philadelphia: 
Considerations for Diagnosis, Control, and Prevention (June 12, 2018), 
https://hip.phila.gov/Portals/_default/HIP/HealthAlerts/2018/PDPH-HAN_Alert_7_Hep 
AIncrease_06122018.pdf [https://perma.cc/GSX2-874Q] (noting an increase to 26 cases of 
Hepatitis A in the recent twelve-month period compared to an average rate of 6 cases annu-
ally between 2012 and 2016). 
                                  Journal of Law & Public Affairs                [November 2019 
 
 
 
126 
public disorder,285 rather than abate it.286 Recent research suggests that public 
opinion in the most affected neighborhoods is shifting in favor of SCFs.287   
Social and political momentum is necessary but not sufficient to 
reform. There must be policy alternatives once limitations with traditional 
first-line approaches emerge. Drug policy in the United States has seldom 
offered such policy options in the last century. But the dynamics of drug policy 
are changing. Political scientists have often described policy reform in terms 
of punctuated equilibrium, meaning that in most regulatory domains there are 
long periods of stability and that when change happens, it is violent and 
revolutionary.288 Legal reform related to marijuana fits the pattern, as do 
realignments in drug policy more generally. As Philadelphians confront an 
entrenched opioid crisis, well-funded corporations in the suburbs are managing 
pot farms for medical dispensing,289 and recreational use is likely not far 
 
285 See, e.g., Nina Feldman, Kensington Neighbors Angered by Potential Location of Super-
vised Injection Site, WHYY (Mar. 27, 2019), https://whyy.org/articles/kensington-neigh-
bors-angered-by-potential-location-of-supervised-injection-site/ [https://perma.cc/8C8Y-
TREP] (describing how community members “expressed fear that a supervised injection fa-
cility would increase crime and keep drug dealers and drug use stuck in” their neighborhood); 
Kilpatrick, supra note 140 (describing one resident’s worry that  “a safe-injection site in the 
neighborhood will cause more violence as dealers fight for corners surrounding the site” 
although studies on safe injection sites in Canada and Australia found no increase in crime 
in the surrounding areas). 
286 See NEIL DONNELLY & NICOLE MAHONEY, N.S.W. BUREAU OF CRIME STATISTICS AND 
RESEARCH, TRENDS IN PROPERTY AND ILLICIT DRUG CRIME AROUND THE MEDICALLY 
SUPERVISED INJECTING CENTRE IN KINGS CROSS: 2012 UPDATE 8 (2013) (finding, in a study 
spanning over a decade, “no evidence that [an Australian SCP] had a negative impact on 
property crime and little evidence that it had an adverse impact on drug use and dealing” in 
the surrounding neighborhood). 
287 See, e.g., Alexis M. Roth et al., Overdose Prevention Site Acceptability among Residents 
and Businesses Surrounding a Proposed Site in Philadelphia, USA, 96 J. URB. HEALTH 
341, 344 (2019) (finding that 90% of individuals in Kensington, PA, the neighborhood with 
the highest drug-overdose mortality in Philadelphia, favor opening an SCF in that area). 
288 Political scientists brought this theory over from biology. See, e.g., James L. True, Bryan 
D. Jones & Frank R. Baumgartner, Punctuated Equilibrium Theory: Explaining Stability and 
Change in Public Policymaking, in THEORIES OF THE POLICY PROCESS 155, 180 n.1 (Paul A. 
Sabatier ed., 2d ed. 2007) (noting that the punctuated equilibrium theory was imported from 
evolutionary biology). See generally Stephen J. Gould & Niles Eldredge, Review Article, Punc-
tuated Equilibrium Comes of Age, 366 NATURE 223 (1993) (describing the emergence and 
ultimate validation of punctuated equilibrium in the evolutionary research). 
289 See John George, The Region’s First Medical Marijuana Grower Expects Its First Harvest 
Soon—and Is Already Expanding, PHILA. BUS. J. (Aug. 30, 2019, 7:37 AM), https:// 
www.bizjournals.com/philadelphia/news/2019/08/30/the-regions-first-medical-marijuana-
grower-expects.html [https://perma.cc/4BGY-VK3J] (describing four corporations that grow and 
process medical marijuana in Philadelphia and its surrounding suburbs). 
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off.290 This is not to suggest that irony or hypocrisy will provide any discipline 
in political or judicial discourse; we are not so naive. Rather, it demonstrates 
that drug control reforms have moved into the laboratories of the states, which 
produce evidence to support and accelerate ongoing legislative changes.291  
These legislative developments may encounter judicial roadblocks. 
The Roberts Court may ultimately weigh in on SCFs if the Safehouse decision 
reaches the Supreme Court, but courts are unlikely to provide the final or 
determinative word. While the Raich decision appeared to be a victory for 
federal regulation of marijuana, the effects of the ruling withered almost 
immediately.292 Practically speaking, the Raich decision never reached adoles-
cence; medical and recreational marijuana use was minimally affected in 
California, which now has the largest legal marijuana market in the world,293 
and recreational marijuana use came to Colorado, the first of many states, less 
than a decade later.294 The history of the Oakland Cannabis Buyers’ Cooperative 
(OCBC) provides a better example of how little judicial outcomes matter in 
the face of secular changes in perceptions about drugs and associated willingness 
of localities to engage in consistent policy experiments.295 There is plenty of 
 
290 See Associated Press, Gov. Tom Wolf Now Supports Legalizing Marijuana in Pennsylva-
nia, PHILA. INQUIRER (Sept. 25, 2019), https://www.inquirer.com/news/pennsylvania/ 
pennsylvania-legalize-marijuana-governor-tom-wolf-20190925.html [https://perma.cc/ 
8V38-FL9P] (“Pennsylvania Gov. Tom Wolf is now in favor of legalizing marijuana for re-
creational use, saying . . . that most of the state’s residents support it and that the state has a 
wealth of knowledge from the experience in other states to guide it.”). 
291 See generally Burris & Anderson, supra note 145 (noting that in regulatory domains in 
which states use their authority to experiment, there typically follows a process of policy 
learning in which innovations beget research opportunities, which incrementally enrich the 
understanding of underlying problems and point to paths for future refinement or retirement 
of legal interventions). 
292 See Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Attorney General Announces Formal Medical Mari-
juana Guidelines (Oct. 19, 2009), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/attorney-general-announces-
formal-medical-marijuana-guidelines [https://perma.cc/X27K-CZ6Q] (“It will not be a pri-
ority to use federal resources to prosecute patients with serious illnesses or their caregivers 
who are complying with state laws on medical marijuana . . . .”). 
293 See Patrick McGreevy, California Now Has the Biggest Legal Marijuana Market in the 
World. Its Black Market Is Even Bigger, L.A. TIMES (Aug. 15, 2019, 5:00 AM), https:// 
www.latimes.com/california/story/2019-08-14/californias-biggest-legal-marijuana-market 
[https://perma.cc/7X9Q-4J23] (reporting that California is expected to post $3.1 billion in 
licensed marijuana sales for 2019, nearly twice those projected in Colorado and considerably 
more than in other countries). 
294 See COLO. CONST. art. XVIII, §16. 
295 OCBC provided marijuana to patients who complied with California laws authorizing 
medical use. The federal government issued an injunction halting OCBC’s activity, which 
was upheld by the Supreme Court despite reasonable arguments that marijuana was medi-
cally necessary to prevent considerable harm. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY Code §11362.5 
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reason to doubt that experiences with marijuana generalize to injection drugs. 
Yet we think that the mechanics broadly transfer across state and federal policy, 
with more open-minded thinking on marijuana likely to support saner, evidence-
based reform in other areas.296 
Broader contemplation and implementation of legislative reforms 
should extend to federal regulation of treatment for substance use disorder. 
The registration and waiver laws and regulations are a product of earlier and 
different eras, and they have persisted because of receding dynamics. When 
the Supreme Court issued its opinion in Webb in 1919,297 the medical profession 
was still weak therapeutically and politically. It was only four years after 
the dean of the Harvard Medical School had said: “For the first time in history, . 
. . [a patient] stands a better than 50/50 chance of benefiting from a [clinical] 
encounter.”298 But for most of the following decades, the medical profession 
has been good at both treatment and influencing national policy.299 Physicians 
have become so powerful, in fact, that they, like most powerful interests, have 
tended not to question problems in the status quo that they could avoid, even 
if they had strong opinions purely on the merits.300 This is what Paul Starr 
 
(West 2019) (authorizing the medical use of marijuana in California); United States v. Oak-
land Cannabis Buyers’ Coop., 532 U.S. 483, 486 (2001). It remains a disappointing result 
(in allowing law enforcement to define medical practice), but practically irrelevant; despite 
its defeat, OCBC has issued over 100,000 medical marijuana ID cards in California. Canna-
bis Badges, PATIENT ID CTR., http://www.cannabisbadges.com/index.php/patient-id-card 
[https://perma.cc/B44H-LHLW] (last visited Sept. 18, 2019). It is now known as the Patient 
ID Center, or PIDC. Mission Statement, PATIENT ID CTR., https://www.patientidcenter. 
org/index.php/mission-statement (last visited Sept. 18, 2019). 
296 See Sanders, supra note 12 (describing Bernie Sanders’s support for SCFs); Warren, supra 
note 12 (describing Elizabeth Warren’s support for SCFs). 
297 See Webb v. United States, 249 U.S. 96, 99-100 (1919) (holding that issuing an order for 
maintenance of a habitual morphine user “would be so plain a perversion of meaning” of a 
physician’s prescription that it cannot be considered as such). 
298 JACOB S. HACKER & PAUL PIERSON, AMERICAN AMNESIA: HOW THE WAR ON 
GOVERNMENT LED US TO FORGET WHAT MADE AMERICA PROSPER 45 (2016) (quoting 
Harvard Medical School Professor Lawrence Henderson). 
299 See STARR, supra note 144, at 285 (detailing the AMA’s campaign against universal health-
care, which linked it to failed socialist policies, scuttling its passage on more than one occasion). 
300 This is evident in the medical industry’s ongoing battle against surprise billing reform in 
California. See Sarah Kliff & Margot Sanger-Katz, In California, a ‘Surprise’ Billing Law 
Is Protecting Patients and Angering Doctors, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 26, 2019), https://www.ny 
times.com/2019/09/26/upshot/california-surprise-medical-billing-law-effects.html [https:// 
perma.cc/KMZ7-8PJ4] (describing the battle between patient advocacy groups and physi-
cians and physician staffing firms to control the narrative regarding California’s recent 
“surprise billing” law limiting out-of-network payments for care in in-network facilities). 
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calls a Policy Trap.301 Groups or individuals with privilege seldom put their 
privilege on the line for principle, if they can avoid it, when the potential 
downside far outweighs any potential personal upside. For example, Medicare 
for All sounds great in principle, but if your insurance is employer-based, 
your support is likely more conceptual than actual. Evidence-based treatment for 
people with OUD—and especially for the most marginalized—sounds great in 
theory, but getting physicians to demand it in the face of law enforcement 
opposition was always a big ask when the benefits for physicians were small.    
But the dynamics here have changed, too. Opioids are commonly 
dispensed, and while their dispensing sometimes does more harm than good, 
the best evidence suggests that they can be essential for addressing disabling 
pain in many people.302 The threat of regulatory sanctions for overprescribing 
has been exaggerated historically, with law enforcement actions limited 
generally to brazen or incompetent conduct far beyond the scope of rea-
sonable practice.303 Today, however, the DEA is casting a much wider net. 
Diane Hoffmann provides a compelling account of a number of prosecutions 
of physicians whose prescribing was reasonable if not exemplary, based on 
assessments from other medical experts.304 Providers would understandably 
feel uncomfortable treating pain with opioids in this climate, especially with 
patients for whom pain co-occurs with OUD.305 Prescribers are still reluctant 
 
301 PAUL STARR, REMEDY AND REACTION: THE PECULIAR AMERICAN STRUGGLE OVER 
HEALTH CARE REFORM 122-23 (2011) (using the example of healthcare financing to describe 
the concept of a policy trap in the sense that many older Americans like Medicare enough 
and many affluent Americans like their employer-based insurance plans enough to not want 
to support healthcare reform that would probably, but not definitely, improve the status quo). 
302 See Dowell et al., supra note 206 (encouraging the balancing of the risks of opioid 
prescribing with the benefits of their use for treatment of chronic and acute pain). 
303 See generally, e.g., Peggy Eastman, Fear of Prosecution for Prescribing Opioids Exag-
gerated, Law Study Concludes: Growing Sophistication by the States Leading to Leniency, 
25 ONCOLOGY TIMES, no. 11, at 62 (2003) (“Physicians overestimate their level of 
regulatory scrutiny when they use opioids legitimately in aggressive pain manage-
ment.”); Donald M. Goldenbaum et al., Physicians Charged with Opioid Analgesic-
Prescribing Offenses, 9 PAIN MED. 737 (2008) (noting that criminal and administrative 
charges for overprescribing opioids are rare and that pain specialists are no more likely 
than other providers to face prosecution). 
304 Hoffmann, supra note 177, at 239-56. 
305 Many physicians have described practicing defensively and skeptically given the 
threat of prosecution. See, e.g.,  Karina M. Berg et al., Providers’ Experiences Treat-
ing Chronic Pain Among Opioid-Dependent Drug Users, J. GEN. INTERNAL MED. 482, 
484 (2009); Diane E. Hoffmann & Anita J. Tarzian, Achieving the Right Balance in 
Oversight of Physician Opioid Prescribing for Pain: The Role of State Medical 
Boards, 31 J. L., MED. & ETHICS 21, 21-40 (2003) (noting that some physicians inad-
equately prescribe opioids due to fear of regulatory scrutiny and potential disciplinary 
action, which leads to immense suffering for their patients with serious pain). 
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to prescribe buprenorphine as a maintenance agent, partly because it consistently 
gets diverted when prescribed.306 
In the minds of providers faced with such patients, their hands are 
tied: they could be sued for abandonment if they refuse to treat patients as 
they believe (and as evidence indicates) is proper or they might be prosecuted 
for overprescribing or contributing to drug diversion. While this is a false 
dichotomy, even in this era of intensified law enforcement oversight, the 
real possibility of either prospect occurring is enough to intrude on the normal 
functioning of the physician-patient relationship. The DEA has always policed 
medicine from a law enforcement—rather than patient care—perspective,307 but 
physicians have also provided a vacuum by failing to vigorously regulate 
themselves308 or to strenuously defend evidence-based interventions. We 
expect providers to flex more of their political muscle, collateral benefits to drug 
 
306 See generally Jennifer J. Carroll, Josiah D. Rich & Traci Green, The More Things 
Change: Buprenorphine/naloxone Diversion Continues While Treatment Remains Inac-
cessible, 12 J. ADDICTION MED. 459 (2018) (finding that the use of diverted buprenor-
phine remains common among people who use opioids non-medically); Theodore J. 
Cicero, Matthew S. Ellis & Howard D. Chilcoat, Understanding the Use of Diverted 
Buprenorphine, 193 DRUG & ALCOHOL DEPENDENCE 117 (2018) (conducting a medical 
study to understand diversion of buprenorphine within an adult population). 
307 See generally Ruth C. Stern & J. Herbie DiFonzo, The End of the Red Queen's Race: 
Medical Marijuana in the New Century, 27 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 673 (2009) (describing 
the DEA’s intense scrutiny of marijuana, among other narcotics, and the intensity and 
lack of discerning beginning prior to its inception and continuing to today despite vast 
medical and scientific evidence to the contrary). 
308 See Corey S. Davis, Commentary on Pardo (2017) and Moyo Et Al. (2017): Much Still 
Unknown About Prescription Drug Monitoring Programs, 112 ADDICTION 1797, 1797-98 
(2017); Corey S. Davis & Derek Carr, Physician Continuing Education to Reduce Opioid 
Misuse, Abuse, and Overdose: Many Opportunities, Few Requirements, 163 DRUG & 
ALCOHOL DEPENDENCE 100, 100-07 (2016) (finding that continuing medical education can 
help improve medical and provider knowledge to guard against overprescribing of opioids); 
Corey S. Davis & Derek Carr, Physician Continuing Education to Reduce Opioid Misuse, 
Abuse, and Overdose: Many Opportunities, Few Requirements, 163 DRUG & ALCOHOL 
DEPENDENCE 100, 100-07 (2016) (finding that continuing medical education can help im-
prove medical and provider knowledge to guard against overprescribing of opioids); Corey 
S. Davis et al., Laws Limiting the Prescribing or Dispensing Of Opioids for Acute Pain in 
the United States: A National Systematic Legal Review, 194 DRUG & ALCOHOL DEPENDENCE 
166, 166-72 (2019) (finding that just over half of all states have enacted laws that restrict the 
prescribing or dispensing of opioids for acute pain); Nathan Guevremont, Mark Barnes & 
Claudia E. Haupt, Physician Autonomy and the Opioid Crisis, 46 J. L., MED. & ETHICS 203, 
203-19 (2018) (discussing the limitations on physician autonomy related to opioids and 
impacts of opioid-specific regulations the patient-physician relationships). 
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policy, as pressure on prescribers broadens and deepens.309 Without this evi-
dence-based precision, the pendulum will continue to swing broadly and harm-
fully. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
In the effort to reduce overdose morbidity and mortality, we must 
do more to address underlying pain among those most at risk. DOT-P is a 
reasonable, scientifically supported intervention that will improve the lives of 
the most marginalized people with OUD: those with co-occurring pain. 
Considerable evidence suggests that DOT-P will also benefit the communities 
in which injection drug use occurs in public. Federal law enforcement has 
challenged other similarly evidence-based interventions recently (e.g., SCFs) 
and in the past (e.g., syringe exchanges). However, DOT-P falls clearly 
within the bounds of professional practice. Clinicians in the United States 
retain broad authority to use opioids in the treatment of pain, including when that 
pain co-occurs with OUD. A plain reading of the CSA supports practitioners’ 
leeway in this area, as do congressional intent and constitutional principles. 
While DOT-P is an incremental innovation in the United States, this country’s 
history with narcotics use and states’ willingness to push federal boundaries 
indicate that DOT-P’s implementation is inevitable, and help may soon be on 
the way for thousands of people in need of evidence-based treatment. 
 
309 But let us be plain: problems with opioids also reflect deeper problems in healthcare delivery. 
A healthcare system that privileges volume of services will always produce incidental harm 
(think: overprescribing) and fail to adequately support people with the greatest unmet needs, 
especially when those needs cannot be addressed exclusively by highly reimbursable 
technological solutions like precision medicine. While we expect physicians to respond to 
the current moment, health institutions are enormously cumbersome and slow to change. 
Institutional medicine seems incapable of focusing on the things that work (e.g., investments 
in the social determinants of health, etc.) rather than the moonshots that pay (e.g., proton 
therapy, immunotherapy, etc.). 
